Cole v. Gohmann
Decision Date | 11 May 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 49A02-9906-CV-452.,49A02-9906-CV-452. |
Citation | 727 N.E.2d 1111 |
Parties | Kenneth COLE, Appellant-Defendant, v. Janice GOHMANN, Appellee-Co-Defendant, and Jeffrey Dodson and Shanice Brazell-Dodson, Appellees-Plaintiffs. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Jil Pullappally Unni, Kopka, Landau & Pinkus, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.
Patrick F. Mastrian, III, Sarah J. Graziano, Goodin & Kraege, Mark S. Alderfer, Hackman McClarnon Hulett & Cracraft, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee Janice Gohmann.
Dean J. Arnold, Nunn & Greene Law Office, Bloomington, Indiana, Attorney for Appellees Jeffrey and Shanice Dodson.
Appellant-defendant Kenneth Cole appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee-codefendant Janice Gohmann. Specifically, Cole asserts that the entry of summary judgment for Gohmann should be reversed because a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether she breached a duty of care to the plaintiffs-appellees, Jeffrey and Shanice Brazell-Dodson (collectively, the "Dodsons"),1 who were passengers in Cole's automobile. We agree and reverse.
The Dodsons filed a complaint against Cole seeking damages which arose out of a motor vehicle accident. The facts are not in dispute as to how the accident occurred. The Dodsons were traveling as passengers in a vehicle driven by Cole in Marion County. Cole was headed eastbound, it had been raining, and the streets were still wet. At one point, Cole's vehicle began to fishtail. Gohmann was traveling westbound and observed Cole's vehicle spin into her lane. Gohmann first observed Cole's vehicle when it was two to three car lengths away. Record at 48. Gohmann's automobile ultimately collided with Cole's vehicle. Gohmann testified that approximately four seconds had elapsed from the time that she saw Cole's vehicle begin to spin until the collision occurred. Record at 48-49.
Cole answered the complaint and defended on the grounds that the injuries may have been caused in whole or in part by Gohmann. The Dodsons amended their complaint to add Gohmann as a defendant in the cause of action. Gohmann then proceeded to file a cross-claim for damages against Cole.
Gohmann filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss her from the Dodsons' cause of action. Gohmann asserted that she did not breach any duty of care owed to the Dodsons and, therefore, the negligence claim must fail. Cole opposed the motion, claiming that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether Gohmann breached a duty of care while using a public highway. Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court granted summary judgment for Gohmann and dismissed her from the cause of action with prejudice. In essence, the trial court determined as a matter of law that Gohmann did not breach a duty of care to the Dodsons. Cole now appeals, claiming that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of Gohmann.
Cole argues on appeal that there are genuine issues and inferences of fact that preclude summary judgment in favor of Gohmann. Specifically, he contends that a question of fact exists as to whether Gohmann breached her duty to maintain a proper lookout while operating her vehicle. Cole claims that whether Gohmann exercised such precaution is a question best left for the fact finder to resolve. He further contends that summary judgment was inappropriate because the question of whether Gohmann acted reasonably in operating her vehicle in these circumstances was for the jury to resolve. We must agree.
Once again, we are presented with a case that illustrates the marked difference in summary judgment procedure in Indiana as compared to federal practice. Under Indiana procedure, the party moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Schmidt v. American Trailer Court, Inc., 721 N.E.2d 1251, 1253, (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied (2000) (citing Jarboe v. Landmark Community Newspapers, 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind. 1994); Lenhardt Tool & Die Co. v. Lumpe, 703 N.E.2d 1079, 1082 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied (2000)). Once the moving party has met this burden with a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue does in fact exist. Id. In contrast, federal summary judgment procedure requires summary judgment to be granted against a party who fails to establish an essential element of that party's case as to which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).
In Celotex, the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected the view that the nonmoving party bears the burden of responding to the summary judgment motion only once the movant has come forward with evidence of the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552). The Celotex Court stated:
Our supreme court in Jarboe rejected the federal summary judgment approach and explained Indiana's summary judgment framework as follows:
However, we note that Justice Boehm, with Chief Justice Shepard concurring, recently expressed his belief that Indiana courts have been too literal in interpreting and applying Jarboe. See Lenhardt Tool & Die Co. Inc. v. Lumpe, 722 N.E.2d 824 (Ind.2000) ( )
. He stated that Jarboe had been construed by the courts in some cases to require the movant to "establish a negative proposition" and that in his view such was "an incorrect reading of Trial Rule 56, and of Jarboe, and leads to unnecessary expense to litigants...
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