Coleman v. Coleman

• Decision Date: 20 July 2021
• Docket Number: NO. 2020-CA-00429-COA,2020-CA-00429-COA
• Parties: Donald COLEMAN, Appellant v. Gwendolyn COLEMAN, Appellee
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

324 So.3d 1204

Donald COLEMAN, Appellant

v.Gwendolyn COLEMAN, Appellee

NO. 2020-CA-00429-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

July 20, 2021

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: KRISI ALLEN, RONALD WARREN SMITH

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: ANGELA TURNER FORD

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., McCARTY AND SMITH, JJ.

SMITH, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Donald and Gwendolyn Coleman consented to an irreconcilable differences divorce and submitted the issues of equitable division of marital property, alimony, and attorney's fees to the Clay County Chancery Court for determination. On appeal, Donald argues the chancellor erred by (1) improperly applying the Ferguson factors¹ for equitable property distribution; (2) denying him alimony without a complete analysis; and (3) denying his attorney's fees without specific findings of fact under the McKee factors.² Finding no error, we affirm the chancellor's judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Donald and Gwendolyn married on July 6, 1997, and separated in August 2016. No children were born of the marriage. Gwendolyn filed a divorce complaint on November 21, 2017, on the grounds of adultery and habitual cruel and inhuman treatment or, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences. Gwendolyn alleged that Donald had engaged in inappropriate communications and/or relationships with other women as of July 2016. On December 20, 2017, Donald answered and denied that Gwendolyn was entitled to relief. He also counterclaimed and sought a divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment; uncondoned adultery and/or desertion; or, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences. Donald requested alimony and attorney's fees in addition to equitable division of the marital property. Ultimately, the parties consented to an irreconcilable differences divorce and submitted the remaining issues of equitable division of the property, alimony, and attorney's fees to the court.

¶3. In 2002, Donald was working as a forklift driver for Bryan Foods when he suffered a work-related injury. He was disabled as a result and has been unemployed since his injury. On Donald's financial statement, his source of income was listed as $1,500 per month in Social Security disability payments. Gwendolyn alleged that he had additional income from selling appliances, cars, and cattle. Donald responded that he sold the cattle he had for a loss and denied selling appliances and cars. From 2004 through 2011, Gwendolyn worked and took classes, eventually obtaining her undergraduate degree and two master's degrees. At the time of trial, Gwendolyn was employed as a school psychologist for West Point Consolidated School District and earned a net monthly income of $2,781.39.

¶4. Throughout the marriage, Donald acquired multiple lump-sum payments, including disability payments, homeowner's insurance, and lawsuit settlements. Donald testified that he contributed his lump-sum payments to the construction of the marital home, which was built on two acres of land gifted to them by Donald's parents. Gwendolyn testified that she used her paychecks and student loan monies to pay the marital bills and purchase construction materials for their home.

¶5. After their separation, Gwendolyn moved out and purchased her own house while Donald continued to live in the marital home. When Gwendolyn purchased her house, the bank required Donald's name on the initial deed because they were still married. However, Donald quitclaimed his interest to Gwendolyn before the trial and had not assisted in financing the house or contributed to payments associated with it.

¶6. The chancellor determined that the parties’ marital assets included the marital home, Gwendolyn's state-government-employee retirement account, both parties’ vehicles, Donald's cattle, Gwendolyn's student loan debt, and a lawn mower. According to the chancellor's findings, Donald's separate estate consisted of his Black Farmer's settlement proceeds and any heirship interest he has in 200 acres of family land. The chancellor then found that Gwendolyn's separate estate was comprised of her house and any debt associated with it, and all credit card debt from Bank of America, Capital One, and Home Depot.

¶7. When addressing division of the marital home, the chancellor accepted the market value as $171,919 and found Donald had a heightened emotional connection to it and a strong desire to continue living in the home. The chancellor assigned each party one-half of the value of equity in the marital home but awarded the marital home to Donald upon his payment to Gwendolyn for her share. The chancellor then split the following assets and awarded each party one-half: Gwendolyn's state-government-employee retirement account; and Donald's contributions from workers’ compensation benefits, Black Farmer's settlement proceeds, and family land. The chancellor concluded that the amount Donald owed Gwendolyn for her equity in the marital home, as offset by distribution of the other assets, amounted to $50,959.50.

¶8. Thereafter, the chancellor awarded Donald the five vehicles in his possession, the lawn mower, and the cattle. In addition to her half of the equity in the marital home and Donald's contributions, Gwendolyn received the entirety of her state-government-employee retirement account and the two vehicles in her possession. The chancellor also found that she was to be solely responsible for her student loan debt in the amount of $96,000.

¶9. Subsequently, the chancellor denied Donald's request for alimony from Gwendolyn upon finding that the equitable division of marital property adequately provided for his future needs. The chancellor also denied his request for attorney's fees after determining that Donald failed to show a financial inability to pay.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10. When reviewing property distribution in a divorce case, this Court applies a limited standard. Poisso v. Poisso , 300 So. 3d 1067, 1073 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020). A chancery court's findings of fact will not be disturbed "unless the court's actions were manifestly wrong, the court abused its discretion, or the court applied an erroneous legal standard." Ory v. Ory , 936 So. 2d 405, 409 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). "[T]he chancellor's division and distribution will be upheld if it is supported by substantial credible evidence." Poisso , 300 So. 3d at 1074 (¶22) (citing Bowen v. Bowen , 982 So. 2d 385, 393-94 (¶32) (Miss. 2008) ). "Alimony awards are also within the sound discretion of the chancellor." Reynolds v. Reynolds , 287 So. 3d 1019, 1023 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Speed v. Speed , 757 So. 2d 221, 224 (¶6) (Miss. 2000) ). "A trial judge's award of attorneys’ fees is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard, and the award of attorneys’ fees must be supported by credible evidence." McNeese v. McNeese , 119 So. 3d 264, 274 (¶26) (Miss. 2013).

ANALYSIS

I. Whether the chancellor erred in considering the Ferguson factors.

¶11. To divide and distribute property between the parties, the chancellor must "(1) classify the parties’ assets as marital or separate, (2) value those assets, and (3) divide the marital assets equitably." Burnham v. Burnham , 185 So. 3d 358, 361 (¶12) (Miss. 2015). When dividing the parties’ marital assets equitably, the chancellor must consider the Ferguson factors. Carney v. Carney , 201 So. 3d 432, 440 (¶27) (Miss. 2016). These factors include:

1. Substantial contribution to the accumulation of the property. Factors to be considered in determining contribution are as follows:

a. Direct or indirect economic contribution to the acquisition of the property;

b. Contribution to the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationships as measured by quality[, and] quantity of time spent on family duties and duration of the marriage; and

c. Contribution to the education, training[,] or other accomplishment bearing on the earning power of the spouse accumulating the assets.

2. The degree to which each spouse has expended, withdrawn[,] or otherwise disposed of marital assets and any prior distribution of such assets by agreement, decree[,] or otherwise[;]

....

4. The value of assets not ordinarily, absent equitable factors to the contrary, subject to such distribution, such as property brought to the marriage by the parties and property acquired by inheritance or inter vivos gift by or to an individual spouse; [and]

....

7. The needs of the parties for financial security with due regard to the combination of assets, income and earning capacity. ...

Ferguson , 639 So. 2d at 928.

¶12. Donald alleges the chancellor erred in addressing Ferguson factor (1) by failing to give him credit for, or otherwise take into account, $13,000 in fire insurance proceeds that he contributed to the construction of the marital home. Also, Donald claims that by not considering testimony that indicated Gwendolyn had purchased a second home and had depleted marital assets, the chancellor erred in addressing Ferguson factor (2). Donald further asserts error because, under factor (4), the chancellor gave him credit for the value of his lot of land, workers’ compensation settlement, and Black Farmer's settlement, but did not give him credit for his $13,000 fire insurance settlement. Lastly, Donald argues the chancellor committed reversible error by completely failing to address factor (7).

A. Ferguson Factors (1) and (4)

¶13. Donald's contentions regarding factors (1) and (4) arise from the same facts related to the $13,000 fire insurance settlement and are of a similar nature; therefore, our review combines these claims of error. In addressing factor (1), the chancellor found that Donald and Gwendolyn equally contributed to the acquisition of marital property based on evidence showing each had been the primary breadwinner and had supported the marriage with some form of income. As to factor (4), the chancellor found no testimony to substantiate Donald's value of his heirship interest in the 200 acres of land. However, the chancellor did credit...