Coleman v. Crawford

• Decision Date: 04 August 1926
• Docket Number: 19639.
• Citation: 140 Wash. 117,248 P. 386
• Parties: COLEMAN v. CRAWFORD et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

248 P. 386

140 Wash. 117

COLEMAN v. CRAWFORD et al.

No. 19639.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

August 4, 1926

Appeal from Superior Court, Klickitat County; Homer Kirby, Judge.

Action by Vera Fay Coleman against Gertrude Crawford and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

McMaster Hall & Schaefer, of Vancouver, for appellant.

Brooks & Brooks, of Goldendale, for respondents.

BRIDGES J.

The appellant is the daughter of Hiram I. Coleman, deceased, and his first wife, Pearl Coleman, deceased. The respondent Gertrude Crawford was the second wife of Hiram I. Coleman and the respondent Clarence I. Coleman is the son of Hiram I Coleman, deceased, and Gertrude Coleman, now Gertrude Crawford. Hiram and Pearl were married in January, 1900, and Pearl died in 1903. In February, 1905, Hiram married Gertrude, and died in March, 1908, his heirs being Gertrude, his widow, Clarence, his son, and Vera, his daughter. No administration was ever had upon the estate of the first wife. After Hiram's death, letters of administration were issued upon his estate, and in the petition for letters of administration the real estate here in controversy was described as the community property of Hiram and Pearl. The inventory later filed listed the property as his separate property. A guardian ad litem was appointed by the court to represent the two children, who were minors, and final account and petition for distribution were presented in January, 1910. Before the account was approved and the distribution made, in August, 1910, the guardian ad litem made an investigation and acquiesced in the finding that the real estate was Hiram's separate property, and the court so distributed it. No appeal has ever been taken from that decree of distribution. This action was begun in March, 1923, seeking to have the title quieted in the appellant to an undivided two-thirds interest in the real property, based upon the fact that the property was community property of Hiram and Pearl Coleman, having been paid for during their marriage, and that therefore the appellant was entitled to one-half thereof, as the heir of her mother, and to one-third of her father's half. The defense to the action was that the title had become fixed by reason of the probate decree, and that the matter was res judicata.

With the decision of the trial court sustaining this defense we must agree. It has been held that the superior court, sitting in probate, has full jurisdiction to try the title to land if that question is involved and the parties have been properly brought before the court. In re Martin's Estate, 82 Wash. 226, 114 P. 42. And a decision of the court on that matter is as binding as any judgment or decree entered in any other proceeding. In re Ostlund's Estate, 57 Wash. 359, 106 P. 1116, 135 Am. St. Rep. 990; State ex rel. Keasal v. Superior Court, 76 Wash. 291, 136 P. 147; Krohn v. Hirsch, 81 Wash. 222, 142 P. 647; Manning v. Alcott (Wash.) 241 P. 287. The appellant, however, denies the applicability of this rule, by asserting that no issue of title was tried between the appellant and her father's estate, and that she did not appear in the settlement of that estate as an individual, but only as an heir of her father. Whether, if that situation were the one which obtains here, the result contended for by the appellant would be the correct one or not, it is unnecessary, as we view it, to determine in this action, for the reason that the record does not justify holding that the appearance of the appellant in the probate of her father's estate was for such a restricted purpose as that alleged, or that the issue determining that case did not involve the very question raised by the appellant's complaint. The appellant was properly served and properly brought into the probate proceeding. She there appeared by a guardian ad litem, and, giving full faith and credit to the decree made by the probate court, it appears that in that action the very question was determined as to whether this property was Hiram's separate property or the community property of Hiram and Pearl, the decree stating:

'* * * The residue of the property belonging to said estate consists of the following real estate, which was erroneously alleged to be community property (the allegation being that it was the community property of Hiram and Pearl), but which appears from the record title and the best evidence obtainable to be separate property of the deceased.'

Then follows a description of the real estate here in controversy. The court having the authority to determine that very question, and it being the question which was raised in the proceeding, the court exercised that authority and determined the question. Whether the appellant might have appeared only as an heir of her father, the fact is that she appeared by her guardian ad litem in her individual capacity, and there was tried out the question as to the nature of this property, and that question was determined adversely to her interest. It wad decided in State ex rel. Keasal v. Superior Court, supra, in which the prior case of In re Alfstad's Estate, 27 Wash. 175, 67 P. 593, was reversed, that, in a probate proceeding to settle an account and distribute an estate, the court has jurisdiction to determine adverse claims to the property of the estate, and,...