Coleman v. Haworth

• Citation: 8 S.W.2d 931,320 Mo. 852
• Decision Date: 20 July 1928
• Docket Number: 28179
• Parties: Laura Belle Stephens Coleman, Appellant, v. Virginia Haworth et al., Appellants
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

8 S.W.2d 931

320 Mo. 852

Laura Belle Stephens Coleman, Appellant, v. Virginia Haworth et al., Appellants

No. 28179

Supreme Court of Missouri

July 20, 1928

Appeal from Lawrence Circuit Court; Hon. Charles L. Henson Judge.

Affirmed.

Katherine Halterman and William B. Skinner for appellant.

(1) "A will being made for the express purpose of altering pro tanto only, the general law of descents and distribution, it is to be construed in harmony with that law on all doubtful points. The heir is a natural favorite of the law and a construction will not be preferred which disinherits an heir." Borland on Wills and Administration, par. 114; Owens v. Men and Millions Movement, 246 S.W. 174. (2) A cardinal rule to be observed in the construction of wills is that the intention of the testator is to be sought out and when ascertained that intention is to be given effect. In arriving at such intention the relation of the testator to the beneficiaries named in the will and the circumstances surrounding him at the time of its execution may be taken into consideration. Tinsdale v. Prather, 210 Mo. 407; Roth v Rauschenbusch, 173 Mo. 587; Middleton v. Dudding, 183 S.W. 444. (3) Another canon for the construction of words of a will is that when such words at the outset clearly indicate a disposition in the testator to give the entire interest, use and benefit of the estate devised, absolutely to the first donee, that estate will not be cut down to a less estate by subsequent or ambiguous words, inferential in their intent. Roth v. Rauschenbusch, 173 Mo. 588; Jackson v. Littell, 213 Mo. 598. (4) It is an incontrovertible rule that when an estate is given to a person generally or indefinitely with a power of disposition superadded, it carries the fee, and the only exception to the rule is that when the testator gives to the first taker an estate for life, only, and annexes to it a power of disposition. Middleton v. Dudding, 183 S.W. 445; Gibson v. Gibson, 239 Mo. 506; Tinsdale v. Prather, 210 Mo. 402; Lemp v. Lemp, 264 Mo. 533; Jackson v. Littell, 213 Mo. 589; In re McClelland's Estate, 257 S.W. 810. (5) It is a settled rule in the construction of wills that where there is a gift or devise of property to one person and in case of his death, or in the event of his death, or any similar expression, then the property to go to or vest in another, the contingency referred to is the death of the first-named beneficiary during the lifetime of the testator and if such beneficiary or devisee survive the testator he takes an absolute fee in such property. The words of contingency do not create a remainder over to take effect upon the death at any time of the first taker, nor an executory devise, but are merely substitutionary for the purpose of preventing a lapse in case the devisee first named should not be living at the time of the death of the testator. 30 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, p. 708; Page on Wills, par. 676; In Re N. Y. L. v. Ry. Co., 105 N.Y. 89; Stokes v. Weston, 142 N.Y. 432; Engels Estate, 180 Pa. St. 77; Fleck v. Oil Co., 188 Pa. St. 317; Northcutt v. McAllister, 249 S.W. 398; Howard v. Howard, 184 S.W. 293; Henderson v. Calhoun, 183 S.W. 585; Real Estate Co. v. Megaree, 280 Mo. 41; Dameron v. Lanyon, 234 Mo. 627; Robinett v. Ashlock, 49 Mo. 175.

H. A. Gardner for respondents.

(1) The language used in clause 2 is not a general or indefinite devise. Lewis v. Pittman, 101 Mo. 291; Jackson v. Littell, 213 Mo. 589. (2) However, if such grant is a general one, yet other unequivocal terms used in the will limit the estate to one for life. Huntington Real Estate Co. v. Megaree, 280 Mo. 41; Walton v. Drumtra, 152 Mo. 507; Middleton v. Dudding, 183 S.W. 443; Burnet v. Burnet, 244 Mo. 491; Gibson v. Gibson, 239 Mo. 500. (3) The power to create a life estate by implication from terms and clauses in the will, without using express words, is no longer an open question in this State. Cross v. Hoch, 149 Mo. 343; Walton v. Drumtra, supra; Armor v. Frey, 226 Mo. 669. (4) Sec. 551, R. S. 1919, manifestly has no application where expressions are embraced in the will showing an intention to convey an estate for life only and where a further devise is made of the devised premises. Armor v. Frey, 226 Mo. 667; Burnet v. Burnet, 244 Mo. 505; Schneider v. Koepple, 270 Mo. 389. (5) Regardless of the language used in clause 2, the disposition in clause 3 of the residue of the estate clearly shows an intent to create in the first taker only a life estate. Schneider v. Koepple, supra; Payne v. Reece, 247 S.W. 1006. (6) "In the event of the death," used in this will, refers to death as a certainty and not as a contingency. Dameron v. Lanyon, 234 Mo. 641; Northcutt v. McAllister, 297 Mo. 484; Owens v. Men & Millions Movement, 246 S.W. 172. (7) There could be no reverter in this case upon the death of decedent's wife, because clause 3 of the will clearly made disposition of his property in that event. Grace v. Perry, 197 Mo. 562.

OPINION

White, P. J.

This action is brought to construe the will of John Henry Stephens. The plaintiff is his only daughter, and so far as the record shows his only living relative.

The will of Stephens was executed in June, 1921, admitted to probate in Lawrence County, in December, 1922. His widow, Louise G. Stephens, died intestate, May 25, 1923, leaving the plaintiff Laura Belle Stephens Coleman as her only child and heir at law. The construction of the will determines the title to certain real estate in Lawrence County, described in the petition. The will is as follows:

"I, John Henry Stephens of Lawrence County, Missouri, declare this to be my last will and testament.

"1st, I bequeath and give to my daughter Laura Belle Stephens Coleman. One Thousand ($ 1000) dollars in money.

"2nd, I devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my entire estate both personal and real to my beloved wife, Louise G. Stephens, for her disposition and disposal during her lifetime.

"3rd. In the event of the death of my wife Louise G. Stephens, I request that all of my estate both personal and real that may be left, be converted into money and the money be invested in United States Government Bonds, and the bonds be placed in trust for the further carrying out of this will, in the Farmers and Merchants Bank in Long Beach, California.

"4th. I request and desire that all the interest due on said bonds be paid to my daughter Laura Belle Stephens Coleman during her lifetime.

"5th. In the event of the death of my daughter Laura Belle Stephens Coleman I request and desire that one-half (1/2) of the value of said Government Bonds mentioned herein be given to Virginia Haworth of Long Beach, California, and David Samuel Mayberry of Lawrence County, Missouri, or in the event of the death of either to their heirs, each of the two named herein to share and share alike equally in the one-half of said bonds.

"6th. I request and desire that the remaining one-half of Government Bonds be given to Louise Eshelman of Fort Smith, Arkansas, and to Louise Artella Douglass, of Okmulgee, Oklahoma, and to Louise Petty of Fort Smith, Arkansas, each one named to share and share alike equally in said one-half bonds.

"7. I request that my wife Louise G. Stephens be permitted to act as my executrix of this my will and that she be permitted to serve as such without being required to give bond. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I John Henry Stephens have to this my last will and testament, subscribed by name this 4th day of June, 1921."

The claim of the plaintiff, appellant, is that John Henry Stephens devised all his property, including the real estate involved, to his widow, Louise G. Stephens, in fee simple, and the title thereupon came to the plaintiff by descent. It is the claim of the defendants that the will gave to the widow Louise G. Stephens only a life estate, with remainder to the plaintiff Laura Belle Stephens Coleman for life, with the remainder to the defendants in fee. The court so held.

I. Those who deplore technical rules and precision of statement required by the courts in interpreting legal documents, should consider the matter of wills. Of all written instruments, wills are the least formal. Anything written, in any form, goes for a will if it reveals the intention of the maker to dispose of his property at death. Yet wills cause more misunderstandings, more difficulties of interpretation, and more litigation than any other kind of writing; in discovering the intention of the maker, in reconciling his contradictions, in reducing to order his confused purposes. It is our task here to find the general purpose of the testator, to reconcile and coordinate provisions which may appear to be in conflict where such reconciliation and coordination can reasonably be made consistent with the general purpose, and, if the testator was confused in the expression of his desires, to pierce through such confusion and reduce to articulate terms the underlying intent. In doing so we must always keep in mind that the intention of the testator is the guiding principle; that his blood relatives, his heirs, are favorites of the law and entitled to first consideration in doubtful expressions; that a testator however clear of intellect cannot always foresee and provide for contingencies that may arise to hamper interpretation.

II. The first clause of the will gives Laura Belle Stephens Coleman one thousand dollars.

The second clause, which demands construction, is as follows:

"I devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my entire estate, both personal and real, to my beloved wife, Louise G. Stephens, for her disposition and disposal during her lifetime."

This clause, defendants claim, gave the widow a life estate only in the property, taken alone or in...