Coleman v. McGinnis

Decision Date09 February 1994
Docket NumberNo. 93 CV 70304 DT.,93 CV 70304 DT.
PartiesMark COLEMAN, Carl S. Proctor-Bey, Raymond C. Walen, Jr., C. "Pepper" More, Brent E. Koster, Elton F. Mizell, Individually, Plaintiffs, v. Kenneth L. McGINNIS, Director, Michigan Department of Corrections; Alvin L. Whitfield, Deputy Director, Bureau of Administrative Services; David C. Viele, Assistant Deputy Director, Bureau of Administrative Services; John Jabe, Warden and Acting Business Manager, State Prison of Southern Michigan; Dan Purple, Assistant Business Manager, State Prison of Southern Michigan; Edward Benson, Former Business Manager, State Prison of Southern Michigan; Jim Best, Chief Accountant, State Prison of Southern Michigan; Arron Wemple, Shift Commander, State Prison of Southern Michigan; Ric Hartig, Bookkeeping Clerk, State Prison of Southern Michigan; Randy Parsons, Prison Store Supervisor, State Prison of Southern Michigan; Doug Bishop, Prison Store Assistant Manager, State Prison of Southern Michigan; State Prison of Southern Michigan, Individually, and in their Official Capacity, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

Mark A. Coleman, pro se.

Linda M. Olivieri, MI Dept. of Atty. Gen., Corrections Div., Lansing, MI, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ANNA DIGGS TAYLOR, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, prisoners at the State Prison of Southern Michigan ("SPSM"), brought this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that actions taken by prison officials deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. This case is now before this Court on Defendant's motion for summary judgement, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b).

A number of Plaintiffs' claims focus on the Defendant's actions concerning the Prisoner Benefit Fund (the "Fund"). Pursuant to Department of Corrections Rule 791.2235, the Fund was organized to finance and oversee activities that benefit prisoners, such as recreation and self-help programs. 1990 MR 7. The Fund's income is derived from a variety of activities, including a percentage of profits from the Prisoner Store (the "Store") and vending machine concessions. Both prisoners and prison officials are involved in the management of the Fund through positions reserved for them on the Fund's administrative board, known as the Fund Council. At present, there are four seats on the Fund Council, two reserved for prisoner representatives and two reserved for prison officials.

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants violated their Procedural Due Process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to maintain proper accounting procedures. In particular, Plaintiffs allege that the Fund's balance sheet does not reflect the value of fixed assets. Moreover, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants have failed to implement controls to verify accuracy of revenues and costs associated with deposits from the return of soda cans, vending machine sales, photocopying machine usage, and profits from employee clubs, of which the Fund is entitled to a percentage. Plaintiffs allege that money was stolen from the Fund by the Defendants and used to pay for state sponsored services, such as burial expenses, the prison newspaper typesetter, and "out of cell" activities mandated by the consent decree entered into in Hadix v. Johnson (80-73581). Plaintiffs also allege that their Procedural Due Process rights were violated by Defendants failure to implement rules of procedures for Fund Council meetings.

In addition to allegations that Defendant's improperly manage the Fund, Plaintiffs also base several claims on Defendants management of the Store. According to Rule 791.2235(1), the Fund is entitled to a percentage of the profits earned by the Store. On September 30, 1986, Defendants issued a check for $48,000.00 to pay for SPSM's portion of the costs associated with the installation of a new computerized accounting system for prisoners, known as the Resident Accounts Credit Card System ("RACCS"). Plaintiffs argue that the money was taken from the Fund's store account, but Defendants argue that the money was taken from the Store's capital account.

The installation of the RACCS system proved to be more costly than initially expected, and in July, 1991, Defendant McGinnis issued a revised administrative policy directive that ordered the store to deduct from gross profits additional costs associated with RACCS equipment. Although the percentage of profits diverted to the Fund remained constant, the revised policy effectively lowered the Fund's income, because the percentage of profits allocated to the Fund was based on net profits.

Plaintiffs argue that the two purchases of RACCS equipment constituted a violation of their Substantive Due Process rights, and a "taking" of private property without just compensation. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant's actions constituted conversion, and Plaintiffs allege a state law claim of conversion. Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants failed to acknowledge the Fund's authority over the Store constitutes a violation of Plaintiff's Due Process rights.

Plaintiffs also allege that since April 1, 1991, Defendants have misappropriated revenue earned by prisoner's use of telephone services. As a result of negotiating efforts of SPSM officials, telephone companies paid SPSM "premise fees" in exchange for the installation of collect-call only telephones used exclusively by the prisoners. Plaintiffs claim the Fund should receive these premise fees. In support of their argument, Prisoners cite to an official accounting letter issued in September 1986, by the Michigan Department of Management and Budget ("DMB"), stating that any revenues earned from exclusive prisoner telephone use should be transferred to the Fund's account.

Plaintiffs also bring two Due Process claims that challenge Defendant's policies regarding interest on prisoner accounts. At SPSM, prisoners are prohibited from holding accounts with any financial institution, except for one account operated by prison officials. The individual prisoner accounts established by SPSM officials accrue interest, which is then deposited in the Fund. Plaintiffs argue that the transfer of that interest to the Fund is a violation of the Due Process Clause. Similarly, Plaintiffs argue that the prohibition against prisoners establishing accounts with other financial institutions violates the Due Process Clause.

In addition to a percentage of profits from the Store, the Fund also received a percentage of profits earned on vending machines located throughout the prison. The amount that the Fund received was governed by a contract, executed by the Business manager of SPSM and Canteen Services Co., a vending machine operator. The contract, executed during January 1990, was intended to cover the entire year.

According to Plaintiffs, in May 1990, Defendants informed the Fund council that all revenues from vending machines used principally by prison employees would go to the employee's club, and revenues from all other machines would go to the Fund. This division of income resulted in a loss of revenue to the Fund. Plaintiffs now argue that they have a constitutionally protected property interest in the vending machine contract, and the transfer of the vending machine revenues to the employee clubs constitutes an egregious abuse of governmental power.

In addition to the numerous Due Process claims, Plaintiffs also raise two related Equal Protection claims. Plaintiffs claim that the Fund does not enjoy the same benefits as the employee clubs, specifically the ability to incorporate and engage in transactions with outside companies. This disparate treatment, according to the Plaintiffs, is a violation of the Equal Protection clause.

In addition, Plaintiffs argue that the administrative structure of the Fund violates the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection. As noted above, only two seats are reserved on the Fund Council for prisoner representatives. The prison representatives are drawn from prisoners in the Central and South complexes of SPSM, and prisoners housed in Cell Block Four, Cell Block Five and in Administrative Segregation have no representation. Plaintiffs argue that the decision to deny representation to those prisoners is a violation of the Equal Protection.

I.

Summary judgment should be granted by this Court as a matter of law if it is shown that no genuine issue as to material facts exists. Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 64 (6th Cir.1979). A pro se complaint is subject to a less stringent standard of review. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). However, summary judgment must not be granted if there is "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party." Pressley, 754 F.Supp. at 114. When the moving party offers affidavits or other evidence in support of the motion for summary judgement, Plaintiff, as the non-moving party, must demonstrate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See Matshushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

The essential elements of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are that the conduct complained of (1) was committed by a person acting under color of state law and (2) deprived the plaintiffs of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parrat v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). "Absent either element, a § 1983 claim will not lie." Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir.1991).

II.

At the outset, this Court is aware of the substantial deference that should be accorded prison administrators who are charged with and trained in the running of correctional systems. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (1984). Furthermore, as the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Burns v. Heyns
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan
    • July 15, 2015
    ...him of a property interest in those materials when they decided to replace them with an electronic system. Cf. Coleman v. McGinnis, 843 F. Supp. 320, 324 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (concluding that prisoner-plaintiffs did not possess a protected property interest in the PBF). To the extent Plaintiff......
  • International Trading Co. v. U.S.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of International Trade
    • July 14, 2000
    ...of entitlement, it must limit an official's discretion in denying the benefit to objective and defined criteria." Coleman v. McGinnis, 843 F.Supp. 320, 324 (E.D.Mich.1994) (citing Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 239, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983)). Cf. Pietrofeso v. United States,......
  • Schneider v. California Dept. of Corrections
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
    • March 24, 1997
    ...the argument that prisoners have a constitutionally proctected property interest in interest income. See, e.g., Coleman v. McGinnis, 843 F.Supp. 320, 325 (E.D.Mich.1994) (no state statute provided prisoners with a protected property interest in interest earned on accounts; therefore failure......
  • Hopkins v. Smith
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • December 20, 2019
    ...is rationally related to that interest." Foster v. Hughes , 979 F.2d 130, 133 (8th Cir. 1992) ; see also, e.g. , Coleman v. McGinnis , 843 F.Supp. 320, 325 (E.D. Mich. 1994). Similarly, limiting an inmate’s access to his institutional account to a maximum of $1,000 is permissibly related to......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT