Coleman v. State

• Decision Date: 13 June 1989
• Citation: 562 A.2d 1171
• Parties: Daniel COLEMAN, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. . Submitted:
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 1171

562 A.2d 1171

Daniel COLEMAN, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: June 13, 1989.

Decided: July 17, 1989.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 21, 1989.

John S. Malik, Wilmington, and Sylvia E. Hall (argued), Pennsville, N.J., for defendant below, appellant.

Timothy J. Donovan, Jr. (argued), and Ferris Wharton, Deputy Attys. Gen., Wilmington, for plaintiff below, appellee.

Before CHRISTIE, C.J., HORSEY and HOLLAND, JJ.

HOLLAND, Justice:

The defendant-appellant, Daniel Coleman ("Coleman"), was indicted on two counts of Kidnapping in the First Degree (11 Del.C. § 783A), one count of Robbery in the First Degree (11 Del.C. § 832), and one count of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Third Degree (11 Del.C. § 767). Coleman was tried before a jury in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County. The jury found Coleman guilty as charged in all of the counts of the indictment except Robbery in the First Degree, for which Coleman was convicted of the lesser-included offense of Robbery in the Second Degree (11 Del.C. § 831).

Coleman was sentenced to be imprisoned for life on each conviction of Kidnapping in the First Degree, five years for the conviction of Robbery in the Second Degree, and two years for the conviction of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Third Degree. All of the sentences are to be served consecutively by Coleman. On November 19, 1987, Coleman filed a timely direct appeal to this Court. ¹

Coleman has raised five issues on appeal. He argues, through his attorney, that (1) his identification by two police officers should have been suppressed because the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they initially stopped him solely upon the basis of his race and without any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; (2) the Superior Court committed plain error when it denied his motion to suppress inculpatory statements which he made following a warrantless arrest unsupported by probable cause; (3) the admission of testimony in the pretrial suppression hearing about his alleged involvement in another unrelated and uncharged crime was prejudicial error; (4) the Superior Court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a trial before an impartial jury, by allowing an allegedly biased juror to sit and deliberate his case; and (5) the Superior Court's instructions to the jury on the kidnapping charges were inadequate with respect to the element of "restraint" that was required to support a conviction. We find no merit in any of Coleman's contentions.

Facts

The victim testified that on February 21, 1987, at approximately 4:15 a.m., she attempted to withdraw money from an automatic teller machine on Main Street in Newark, Delaware. While she was operating the teller machine, but before completing her transaction, the victim was grabbed from behind by a man who said, "this is a stick-up" and "I want your money." After a brief struggle, during which the man pressed a "hard ... blunt object" into her back, the victim was forced from the front of the bank to a parking lot in back of the bank. The victim gave what money she had to the man.

According to the victim, the man then demanded that she perform fellatio. However, almost immediately, the man changed his mind and said that "he knew of a better place." He forced the victim to walk back to the front of the bank and ordered the victim to get into the driver's seat of her car by threatening to "blow [her] brains out" if she did not comply. The man positioned himself next to the victim in the front passenger seat. The man then directed the victim where to drive the car.

As they were riding in the car, the man told the victim again that he intended to have her perform fellatio. He also rubbed the victim's thighs and forced her to rub his genital area. As she was driving, the victim noticed a pizza shop that appeared to be open. She accelerated the car in that direction and jumped the curb. She was able to get out of the car and ran screaming for help. Several people emerged from the shop. During the confusion, the assailant walked away.

The police were called, and arrived at the pizza shop shortly thereafter, at approximately 4:30 a.m. According to the first investigating officer, Officer Corcoran, the victim described her assailant as a "black male 5' 11"' to 6 feet two inches wearing a ski cap, had a mustache, was wearing a light-colored coat, dark pants, white tennis shoes and had medium to dark skin."

At approximately 5:25 a.m., another officer, having received a description of the assailant from Officer Corcoran, stopped Coleman in the parking lot of a restaurant located approximately one-half of a mile from the pizza shop. According to police testimony, Coleman fit the general description of the assailant, except for the facts that he had a goatee as well as a mustache and was not wearing a coat or a cap. Coleman was questioned briefly about his identity and destination. Coleman stated that he was coming from his girlfriend's home and that he was on his way to work. During this discussion, Officer Corcoran drove by with the victim. She was unable to identify Coleman as her assailant. Coleman was detained no further at that time.

Later that morning, the police viewed a videotape taken by a camera which had been installed by the bank near the automatic teller machine. Both of the police officers who had seen Coleman earlier that morning during his brief detention viewed the videotape and identified the assailant on the videotape as Coleman. Coleman was arrested, without a warrant, later that same morning at his place of employment.

According to police testimony at trial, Coleman gave several statements, after being informed of his Miranda rights. At first, Coleman said he was at home in bed at the time of the crimes. Then, Coleman said that he and the victim met at the bank, that she consented to leaving with him, and that they had consensual sexual intercourse. During this statement, the police testified that Coleman admitted wearing a tan jacket with a hood and leaving it over a trash can.

The police then showed Coleman still photographs that had been taken from the videotape of the incident at the bank's automatic teller machine. According to the police officers' testimony, upon viewing the photographs, Coleman confessed to the crimes. Coleman admitted grabbing the victim, forcing her to go behind the bank, taking her money, and ordering her to drive around in her car. However, after a recess in the questioning, Coleman recanted these statements and once again asserted that he was home in bed at the time of the crimes.

Coleman testified at his trial. He denied any involvement in the crimes. He testified that at the time of the crimes, he was asleep in bed with his girlfriend at his girlfriend's house. Coleman's girlfriend also testified and corroborated his testimony.

Investigatory Detention

Coleman contends that the police violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when they stopped and detained him for questioning in the restaurant parking lot. Coleman argues that the police stopped him solely on the basis of his race. In support of this position, Coleman argues that the police lacked a reasonable basis to suspect that he had been involved in any criminal activity.

It is a well settled principle of law that police have the authority to forcibly stop and detain a person if the police have a "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity on the part of that person. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). ² See Byrd v. State, Del.Supr., 458 A.2d 23, 25 (1983); see also 11 Del.C. § 1902. ³ Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, Del.Supr., 382 A.2d 1359 (1978) aff'd, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). "Reasonable suspicion" has been defined as the officer's ability to "point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant th[e] intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. ⁴ This Court has held that the quantum of evidence necessary for reasonable suspicion is less than that which is required for probable cause to arrest. State v. Deputy, Del.Supr., 433 A.2d 1040, 1043 (1981), appeal after remand, Del.Supr., 500 A.2d 581 (1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940, 107 S.Ct. 1589, 94 L.Ed.2d 778 (1987).

In this case, the victim gave a general description of her assailant to the first police officer on the scene. Less than one hour after the crimes, a second police officer, who had learned of the suspect's description from the first officer, observed Coleman in the parking lot of a restaurant approximately one-half of a mile from the crime scene. Coleman fit the general description of the assailant ⁵ except for the facts that he had a goatee and was not wearing a jacket or cap. ⁶

Coleman argues that he was detained solely on the basis of his race, and that such practice is arbitrary and discriminatory. ⁷ The majority of Courts have held that race, as a single criteria, provides an insufficient basis for the detention or arrest of a suspect. Development in the Law--Race and the Criminal Process, 101 Harv.L.Rev. 1494, 1501 (1988). ⁸ Generally, however, courts have upheld the use of race as an identifying factor when the totality of the circumstances reveals other nonracial factors. Id. at 1502. This Court has held that the improper injection of race into a criminal proceeding violates a defendant's right to due process as guaranteed by the Constitution of this State. Feddiman v. State, Del.Supr., 558 A.2d 278 (1989). However, we find that "the use of race may be legitimate when it is one among several factors suggestive of criminality." Development in the Law--Race and the Criminal Process, 101...