Coleman v. State

• Decision Date: 24 December 1992
• Docket Number: No. 74944,74944
• Citation: 610 So.2d 1283
• Parties: 18 Fla. L. Weekly S28 Michael COLEMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 1283

610 So.2d 1283

18 Fla. L. Weekly S28

Michael COLEMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 74944.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Dec. 24, 1992.

Ted A. Stokes, Milton, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Michael Coleman appeals his convictions of first-degree murder and resultant sentences of death. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. We affirm the convictions and sentences.

Michael Coleman, Timothy Robinson, and brothers Bruce and Darrell Frazier were members of the "Miami Boys" drug organization, which operated throughout Florida. Pensacola members of the group moved a safe containing drugs and money to the home of Michael McCormick from which his neighbors Derek Hill and Morris Douglas stole it. Hill and Douglas gave the safe's contents to Darlene Crenshaw for safekeeping.

Late in the evening of September 19, 1988 Robinson, Coleman, and Bruce Frazier, accompanied by McCormick, pushed their way into Hill and Douglas' apartment. They forced Hill and Douglas, along with their visitors Crenshaw and Amanda Merrell, as well as McCormick, to remove their jewelry and clothes and tied them up with electrical cords. Darrell Frazier then brought Mildred Baker, McCormick's girlfriend, to the apartment. Robinson demanded the drugs and money from the safe and, when no one answered, started stabbing Hill. Crenshaw said she could take them to the drugs and money and left with the Fraziers. Coleman and Robinson each then sexually assaulted both Merrell and Baker.

After giving them the drugs and money, Crenshaw escaped from the Fraziers, who returned to the apartment. Coleman and Robinson then slashed and shot their five prisoners, after which they and the Fraziers left. Despite having had her throat slashed three times and having been shot in the head, Merrell freed herself and summoned the authorities. The four other victims were dead at the scene.

Merrell and Crenshaw identified their abductors and assailants through photographs, and Coleman, Robinson, and Darrell Frazier were arrested eventually. ¹ A grand jury returned multiple-count indictments against them, charging first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, armed kidnapping, armed sexual battery, armed robbery, armed burglary, and conspiracy to traffic. Among other evidence presented at the joint trial, the medical examiner testified that three of the victims died from a combination of stab wounds and gunshots to the head and that the fourth died from a gunshot to the head. Both Crenshaw and Merrell identified Coleman, Robinson, and Frazier at trial, and Merrell identified a ring Coleman gave to a girlfriend as having been taken from her at the apartment. Several witnesses testified to drug dealing in Pensacola and to the people involved in that enterprise. Coleman and Robinson told their alibis to the jury ² with Coleman claiming to have been in Miami at the time of these crimes and Robinson claiming he had been in New Jersey then. The jury found Coleman and Robinson guilty of all counts as charged and, after the penalty phase, recommended that they receive sentences of life imprisonment. ³ The trial court, however, disagreed with that recommendation and sentenced Coleman and Robinson to death.

As his first point on appeal, Coleman argues that the court erred in refusing to sever his trial from those of his codefendants because he was not involved in the drug conspiracy, his DNA did not match the sexual battery victims' vaginal swabs while Robinson's did, and his alibi defense was antagonistic to his codefendants'. All of the codefendants moved for severance at trial, but the trial court denied those motions. We find no error in the refusal to sever these trials.

Severance can be granted when it "is appropriate to promote a fair determination of the guilt or innocence of one or more defendants." Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.152(b)(1)(i). Severance is not necessary, however, "when all the relevant evidence regarding the criminal offense is presented in such a manner that the jury can distinguish the evidence relating to each defendant's acts, conduct, and statements, and can then apply the law intelligently and without confusion to determine the individual defendant's guilt or innocence." McCray v. State, 416 So.2d 804, 806 (Fla.1982). A strategic advantage or hostility among defendants does not, by itself, require severance. Id.

These codefendants did not blame one another for these crimes, nor did anyone confess. Coleman and Robinson raised alibi defenses, and Frazier held the State to its burden of proof by standing mute. The evidence of the facts and circumstances leading to these murders explained these murders and the drug conspiracy to the jury; the convictions did not depend on the use of antagonistic evidence by one defendant against the others. The jury's lack of confusion is illustrated by its finding Coleman and Robinson guilty of four counts of first-degree murder and Frazier guilty of only one count of first-degree murder and three counts of second-degree murder when the eyewitness, Merrell, testified that Coleman and Robinson slashed and shot the victims and played the major roles in these crimes. We see no undue prejudice caused by the refusal to sever the trials of the defendants and hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying the motions for severance.

During deliberations, the jury asked if the vaginal swabs taken from the sexual battery victims matched Coleman's DNA. After discussing the question with the parties, the court refused the defense request to tell the jury "no" and, instead, told the jurors to rely on their recollection of the evidence. Coleman now argues that refusing to answer the question constituted reversible error.

A trial court need only answer questions of law, not of fact, when asked by a jury and has wide discretion in deciding whether to have testimony re-read. Kelley v. State, 486 So.2d 578 (Fla.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S.Ct. 244, 93 L.Ed.2d 169 (1986). The judge, therefore, correctly told the jurors that they would have to rely on their collective recollection of the evidence. ⁴ We find no abuse of discretion in refusing to have Merrell's testimony reread.

Coleman also argues that the State exercised two peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. The record, however, discloses that the court correctly found the State's explanation of why it excused these prospective jurors to be race neutral. Coleman has shown no abuse of discretion in the trial court's disagreement with him on this issue. See Reed v. State, 560 So.2d 203 (Fla.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 882, 111 S.Ct. 230, 112 L.Ed.2d 184 (1990). We find no merit to this argument. ⁵

Before trial Coleman filed motions to suppress the testimony of Merrell, Crenshaw, and Arabella Washington, a woman who had seen him in Jacksonville with the Fraziers and some of their associates. All three witnesses identified Coleman through photographs initially and in person at trial. Coleman now claims that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress their testimony because their in-court identifications were based on their tainted out-of-court identifications.

Based on Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972), this Court has stated the appropriate test for out-of-court identifications as: "(1) did the police employ an unnecessarily suggestive procedure in obtaining an out-of-court identification; (2) if so, considering all the circumstances, did the suggestive procedure give rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Grant v. State, 390 So.2d 341, 343 (Fla.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1987, 68 L.Ed.2d 303 (1981). If the first part of the test is not met, the second part need not be considered. Id. at 344. In the instant case, after hearing testimony and argument, the trial court stated that

the law enforcement procedures utilized here to obtain pretrial identification were not impermissibly suggestive or suggestive in any way.... The situation here has depicted and disclosed that the investigating officers utilized a photographic album initially and there were no identifications effected through the use of the photographic albums, that they later utilized a photo-array of six or more separate individual photos. The court finds that the photos were not suggestive. There was no coercion or suggestiveness utilized during the course of the witness interviews or the ... identifications that were subsequently made.

The court denied Coleman's motions. ⁶

We agree that the initial identifications were not tainted and that these witnesses' testimony did not need to be suppressed. Although shown photographs of numerous individuals, these witnesses unhesitatingly identified the codefendants when given groups of photographs containing theirs, and none of these witnesses picked out anyone other than the codefendants. The photographic lineups were not impermissively suggestive, and there is no merit to this point on appeal.

The trial judge found that five aggravating factors had been established: prior conviction of a violent felony; committed while engaged in robbery, sexual battery, burglary, and kidnapping; committed to avoid or prevent arrest; heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and cold, calculated, and premeditated. Coleman does not challenge any of these aggravators, but, as with his codefendant Robinson, we find the evidence insufficient to support the avoid, prevent arrest aggravator. Robinson v. State, 610 So.2d 1288 (Fla.1992). The four other aggravators are amply supported by the record.

The judge considered the potential...