Coleman v. State
| Decision Date | 07 December 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-91,92-91 |
| Citation | 843 P.2d 558 |
| Parties | James COLEMAN, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Donald L. Painter, Casper, for appellant.
Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Barbara L. Boyer, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and John D. Montgomery, Student Intern, for appellee.
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and GOLDEN, JJ.
Appellant James Coleman pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of felony child abuse. He subsequently filed two separate motions to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere, both of which the district court denied. Appellant takes issue with the trial court's order denying his second motion to withdraw his plea because the court failed to conduct a hearing.
We affirm.
Appellant states as his sole issue:
1. Whether the Defendant is entitled to a hearing before the District Court on his Renewed Motion to vacate Plea[ ] of Nolo Contendere and supporting affidavit showing commission of crime by another person.
On November 13, 1989, Appellant brought his girlfriend's two-year-old son to the Wyoming Medical Center. According to the investigating officer's affidavit, the child was unconscious when he arrived at the medical center and had bruises on his upper arms and elbows, as well as bruises and contusions on his cheeks and forehead. Other injuries cited by the officer included a collapsed lung, a subdural hematoma and large bilateral retinal hemorrhages to both eyes.
According to the record, Appellant initially claimed that the child's injuries were caused by a fall in the house. Appellant later indicated that he was carrying the child into the house when he fell on him while attempting to retrieve his keys. The investigating officer found Appellant's explanation of the events to be inconsistent with the injuries actually suffered, and a criminal complaint was filed on January 11, 1990, charging Appellant with aggravated assault in violation of Wyo.Stat. § 6-2-502(a)(i) and (b) (1988) and with felony child abuse in violation of Wyo.Stat. § 6-2-503 (1988). Appellant initially pleaded not guilty to the charges against him; however, on November 1, 1990, Appellant changed his plea to nolo contendere on the felony child abuse charge. In exchange for his plea of nolo contendere to felony child abuse, the State dismissed the aggravated assault charge. On January 31, 1991, the district court sentenced Appellant to a term in the Wyoming State Penitentiary of not less than twelve months nor more than eighteen months.
Approximately one week after being sentenced, Appellant filed a motion to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere, which the district court considered in a hearing held on February 11, 1991. Appellant argued that the district court failed to comply with W.R.Cr.P. 15 1 when it accepted his plea of nolo contendere. The district court found no violation of W.R.Cr.P. 15 was present, and this Court affirmed that decision in Coleman v. State, 827 P.2d 385 (Wyo.1992) (Coleman I ).
While his appeal in Coleman I was pending, Appellant filed a renewed motion to vacate his plea of nolo contendere. He submitted an affidavit in support of his renewed motion, stating that the injured child's mother told Appellant that she caused the child's injuries by violently shaking him. Following our decision in Coleman I, the district court denied Appellant's renewed motion without holding a hearing. Appellant now appeals a second time, with his sole contention being that the district court erred in not conducting a hearing on his renewed motion to vacate his plea of nolo contendere.
Appellant's motion to withdraw his nolo contendere plea was governed by W.R.Cr.P. 33(d): 2
(d) Withdrawal of plea of guilty or nolo contendere.--A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment or conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea.
Since Appellant filed his motion to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere after he was sentenced, he was required to show that withdrawal of his plea would prevent a manifest injustice. W.R.Cr.P. 33(d) did not specify whether the trial court was required to conduct a hearing on Appellant's claim of a manifest injustice. In Garnett v. State, 769 P.2d 371, 375 (Wyo.1989), we said that W.R.Cr.P. 33(d) would require a hearing prior to denial of a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty if the defendant presented a bona fide question of fact concerning whether he should be permitted to withdraw his plea. However, in Garnett we did not elaborate upon how plausible the defendant's allegations must be before he is entitled to a hearing. This case offers us the opportunity to make that determination.
The federal courts have adopted a test which we think is appropriate for use in determining when a hearing is required and which is also consistent with what we said in Garnett. See Zanetti v. State, 783 P.2d 134, 137 n. 4 (Wyo.1989) (). The federal courts use what is essentially a two-part test for determining when a hearing is necessary. First, if the defendant alleges facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief, the trial court must hold a hearing. United States v. Fournier, 594 F.2d 276 (1st Cir.1979). To prevent a possible deluge of unnecessary court proceedings, the second element of the test allows a trial court to deny a hearing if the defendant's allegations are contradicted by the record, are inherently unreliable, or are merely conclusions rather than statements of fact. 3 Id.; United States v. Crooker, 729 F.2d 889 (1st Cir.1984). See also Howard J. Alperin, Annotation, Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty or Nolo Contendere, After Sentence, Under Rule 32(d) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 9 A.L.R.Fed. 309 at § 6 (1971).
Applying this test to the present case, we conclude that Appellant was not entitled to a hearing on his renewed motion to vacate his plea of nolo contendere. Appellant's affidavit contained, among others, the following allegations:
1. On May 1, 1991, Appellant and the injured child's mother had a conversation in which the child's mother admitted causing the child's injuries by violently shaking him. The child's mother also allegedly repeated this...
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Brock v. State
...are contradicted by the record, are inherently unreliable, or are merely conclusions rather than statements of fact. Coleman v. State, 843 P.2d 558, 560 (Wyo.1992). If the defendant alleges facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief, however, the trial court is required to hold a hea......
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Meyers v. State
...are contradicted by the record, are inherently unreliable, or are merely conclusions rather than statements of fact. Coleman v. State, 843 P.2d 558, 559-60 (Wyo.1992) (internal citations and footnote omitted). We have also recognized that "[i]f the defendant offers no plausible reason for w......
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Johnson v. State, 95-209
...are contradicted by the record, are inherently unreliable, or are merely conclusions rather than statements of fact. Coleman v. State, 843 P.2d 558, 560 (Wyo.1992). The motion filed in district court consisted of conclusions contradictory to the record. Now on appeal, however, Johnson claim......
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Valle v. State, 05-31.
...court is required to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to deciding a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by the test we adopted in Coleman: [I]f the defendant alleges facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief, the trial court must hold a hearing. To prevent a possible delug......