Coles v. Astrue
| Decision Date | 31 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. : RDB-11-00867 |
| Parties | WILLIAM MELVIN COLES, PLAINTIFF, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, DEFENDANT. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
The pro se Plaintiff William Melvin Coles ("Coles") filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying Coles' claim for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under sections 205(g) and 1631(c) of the Social Security Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33, 1381-1383. Pending before this Court is the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19). Coles has not filed a response, and the time for doing so has passed. See Local Rule 105.2.a (D. Md. 2011). Upon review, this Court finds that no hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). As Coles is proceeding without counsel, his filing has been "liberally construed" and "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation omitted). For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19) is GRANTED.
Despite requests by this Court and a notification that his failure to respond could result in the dismissal of this case, Coles has failed to file a response to the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment. See Letter Order, ECF No. 21, at 1. The time for doing so has passed. See Local Rule 105.2.a (D. Md. 2011). As Coles' two-paragraph Complaint does not provide a statement of facts, this Court has no choice but to accept the uncontested facts as stated in the Commissioner's Memorandum in Support of the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19-1). Comm'r's Mem. at 1-9, ECF No. 19-1.
Coles filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") on August 1, 2008, alleging that he been unable to work since June 27, 2008, due to "severe depression, migraines, and extreme fatigue." Comm'r's Mem. at 1. Coles' claim was denied at the initial level and at reconsideration. Id. On June 24, 2010, a hearing was held before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). Id. at 2. In a decision dated August 19, 2010, the ALJ denied Coles' claim. Id.; Compl. at 2 ¶ 5, ECF No. 1. The Appeals Council has denied Coles' request for review, making the ALJ's opinion the final decision of the agency. Id.; Comm'r's Mem. at 2. Coles filed this action on April 1, 2011, seeking review of the agency's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The role of this Court is not to review a plaintiff's claim de novo or to reweigh the evidence of record. Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986). Instead, this Court must determine upon review of the whole record whether the ALJ's decision is supported by "substantial evidence" and is a proper application of the law. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453,1456 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987); 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3)). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla of evidence but . . . less than a preponderance." Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966). It is "evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion [,] . . . were the case before a jury." Johnson v. Califano, 434 F. Supp. 302, 307 (D. Md. 1977) (quoting id; citing Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972)). The ALJ's decision "must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence." Cook v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 1168, 1172 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing Richardson, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
In addition to reviewing the ALJ's decision to determine whether it it supported by substantial evidence, this Court must also determine whether the ALJ correctly applied the law. Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456. Upon review of the ALJ's decision, this Court may modify, affirm, or reverse the decision and may remand the case for a rehearing. Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 98 (1991); Coffman, 829 F.2d at 514; Vitak v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157, 1158 (4th Cir. 1971); 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
The Commissioner has set forth regulations that describe a five-step sequential evaluation procedure for determining whether a claimant is disabled. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The claimant bears the burden of proof at the first four steps. Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). First, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity," as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571 et seq., 416.971 et seq. If the claimant is engaged in a substantial gainful activity, the claimant is found to be not disabled, and the ALJ doesnot review the claim further. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). However, if the claimant is not engaged in a substantial gainful activity, the ALJ turns to the second step.
The second step requires the ALJ to examine the physical and/or mental impairments alleged by the claimant to determine whether any of them meets the durational and severity requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 404.1520(c), 404.1521, 416.909, 416.920(c), 416.921. If any impairment meets the durational and severity requirements, the ALJ's analysis turns to the third step.
At the third step, the ALJ considers whether the impairment or impairments, severally or in combination, meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, known as the Listing of Impairments ("Listings"). If one of the Listings is met, the claimant is found to be disabled, without consideration of age, education, or work experience. However, if a Listing is not met, the ALJ will proceed to the fourth step.
At the fourth step, the ALJ considers whether the claimant retains the residual functional capacity to perform past relevant work. If the ALJ finds that a claimant retains the residual functional capacity to perform past relevant work, then the claimant will be found to be not disabled. However, if a determination is made that the claimant is incapable of performing past relevant work, then the ALJ moves to the fifth and final step.
The burden of proof at the fifth and final step shifts to the Commissioner. Pass, 65 F.3d at 1203 (citation omitted). At this step, the ALJ considers whether the claimant is capable of performing some work. The process the ALJ must use to make this determination depends on the type of impairment, or impairments, the claimant has. Animpairment is either "exertional" or "nonexertional." An "exertional" impairment is an impairment affecting the claimant's ability to meet the strength demands of certain jobs. 20 C.F.R. §§ 4-4.1569.a, 416.969a. A "nonexertional" impairment is a "limitation that is present whether a claimant is attempting to perform the physical requirements of the job or not," Gory v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 929, 930 (4th Cir. 1983), and is "not manifested by a loss of strength or other physical abilities." Grant v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 189, 192 (1983).
If the claimant suffers solely from exertional impairments, then the Medical-Vocational Guidelines ("Guidelines") apply to determine of whether a claimant is capable of performing some work. 20. C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart 4, Appendix 2. An ALJ applying the Guidelines must examine the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functioning capacity to determine which rule pertains; the rule then directs a conclusion as to whether a claimant is disabled or is capable of some work. However, if the claimant does not suffer from exertional impairments, or suffers from a combination of exertional and nonexertional impairments, then the Guidelines do not apply. Instead, the ALJ must elicit the help of a vocational expert to determine whether the claimant is capable of some work. See Taylor v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 664, 668-69 & n. 9 (4th Cir. 1975). If the claimant is capable of performing some work, he is found to be not disabled; however, if he is not capable of performing any work, he is found to be disabled.
Upon review of the medical records and testimony from the hearing, the ALJ evaluated Coles' claim using the five-step sequential evaluation procedure and found that Coles was not disabled. Comm'r's Mem. at 9-12, ECF No. 19-1.
At step one of the sequential evaluation procedure, the ALJ found that Coles was not engaged in a substantial gainful activity. Accordingly, the ALJ proceeded to step two, at which he found that Coles' "affective disorder" met the severity and durational requirements of step one, but that Coles had no other impairments. Id. at 10. As Coles' "affective disorder" met the requirements of step two, the ALJ proceeded to step three, at which he determined that Coles' affective disorder did not meet or equal an impairment in the Listing of Impairments ("Listings"). Id. at 11. Thus, the ALJ turned to step four, at which he found that Coles could not perform his past relevant work. Id. at 12. As Coles was found to be incapable of performing his past relevant work, the ALJ turned to the fifth and final step, at which he found that Coles was capable of performing some work and thus was "not disabled." Id. at 16.
Coles seeks to allege that he is disabled due to "severe depression, migraines, and extreme fatigue." Comm'r's Mem. at 1, ECF No. 19-1. The record contains evidence from several sources: the JAI Medical Center; Healthcare for the Homeless; the University of Maryland Medical Center; Stephen A. Hirsch, M.D.; P. Sokas, M.D.; and Dr. Fan, from Key Point Health.
A report from the JAI Medical Center ("JAI"), dated July 2, 2008, states that Coles had minimal exertional limitations but suffered from depression,...
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