Coles v. US

• Decision Date: 08 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-CM-896.,95-CM-896.
• Citation: 682 A.2d 167
• Parties: Milton H. COLES, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

682 A.2d 167

Milton H. COLES, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 95-CM-896.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued June 27, 1996.

Decided August 8, 1996.

Maria L. Alonso-Vazquez, Washington, DC, for appellant.

John R. Fisher, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, Roy W. McLeese, III, Assistant United States Attorney, and David Waymire, Student Counsel, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before FARRELL and RUIZ, Associate Judges, and MACK, Senior Judge.

FARRELL, Associate Judge:

A jury found appellant guilty of one count of possessing marijuana. D.C.Code § 33-541(d) (1993). The trial judge sentenced him to one year in prison. The only issue prompting this published opinion is whether remarks made by the judge at sentencing demonstrate that he penalized appellant for exercising his right to stand trial or for his failure to admit responsibility for the offense after trial at a time when his Fifth Amendment privilege was still intact. Although the judge's remarks just before imposing sentence trouble us, we conclude that they provide no ground for resentencing.

I.

We first reject appellant's contention that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him, requiring suppression of the marijuana seized from him following the arrest. Testimony credited by the trial judge established that a police sergeant with nineteen years of police experience watched appellant speak with another person and give that person currency in exchange for a ziplock plastic bag which the latter retrieved from an apparent stash in a nearby tree-box space. "Probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard" that "does not demand any showing that the officer's belief that he has witnessed criminal behavior be correct or more likely true than false." Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1543, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (plurality opinion). See also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) ("In dealing with probable cause, ... as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities"). While the police officer could not see the contents of the plastic bag, our decisions nonetheless confirm that he had probable cause to believe he had witnessed an exchange of drugs for money. See, e.g., United States v. Bolden, 429 A.2d 185, 186 (D.C. 1981); Tobias v. United States, 375 A.2d 491, 492-94 (D.C.1977); Munn v. United States, 283 A.2d 28, 30-31 (D.C.1971); Peterkin v. United States, 281 A.2d 567, 568 (D.C.1971). An experienced officer, familiar with the conventional packaging of drugs and the common stashing of them in places like the tree-box space involved here, could reasonably conclude that the glassine bag was not empty but instead contained a controlled substance.¹

II.

At sentencing, after hearing allocution and advising appellant of his right to appeal, the trial judge stated his intention to ignore a 1985 conviction mentioned in the presentence report which appellant was apparently challenging collaterally, then continued as follows:

I never understood why you went to trial in this case, Mr. Coles, you had — your lawyer did the best he could with no defense at all. I was amazed how successfully he was able to even come up with something plausible. If you had come before the Court and said, look, I had a little stuff on me and I needed a little extra money, I would have had some sympathy for you;² I don't have any sympathy for you at all. So the Court sentences you to one year.

A one-year prison term was the maximum for appellant's offense.³ Appellant contends that the judge's remarks reveal an intention to punish him for exercising his constitutional right to stand trial. Alternatively, he argues the judge penalized him for his failure to admit to the drug offense as a condition of leniency at sentencing.

A.

The line between affording leniency to a defendant who has admitted guilt by pleading guilty and punishing one who has denied his guilt and proceeded to trial is elusive, to say the least. See Scott v. United States, 135 U.S.App. D.C. 377, 395, 419 F.2d 264, 282 (1969) (Leventhal, J., concurring in the judgment). Cf. Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 557 n. 4, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 1362 n. 4, 63 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980) ("We doubt that a principled distinction may be drawn between `enhancing' the punishment imposed upon the petitioner and denying him the `leniency' he claims would be appropriate if he had cooperated"). On the one hand, the authority of sentencing judges to ameliorate the sanction when an offender admits his responsibility, including by entry of a plea of guilty, is well recognized. The ABA Standards governing pleas of guilty, for example, deem it "proper for the court to grant ... sentence concessions to defendants who enter a plea of guilty" when "there is substantial evidence to establish that ... the defendant is genuinely contrite and has shown a willingness to assume responsibility for his or her conduct...." ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Vol. 111, 2d ed., Ch. 14 ("Pleas of Guilty"), Standard 14-1.8(a)(i). See United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 (1995 edition).⁴ See also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1471, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) (defendant who pleads guilty "demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and to enter the correctional system in a frame of mind that affords hope for success in rehabilitation"). Implicit in this authority to extend leniency to a defendant who pleads guilty must be the discretion to "withhold leniency from others who appear less deserving." United States v. Jones, 302 U.S.App. D.C. 273, 276, 997 F.2d 1475, 1478 (1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1065, 114 S.Ct. 741, 126 L.Ed.2d 704 (1994). As the Supreme Court has stated, "After trial, the factors that may have indicated leniency as consideration for a guilty plea are no longer present." Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 801, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 2206, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989) (emphasis added). See also United States v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 1252, 1260 (7th Cir.1974) ("It is within proper bounds for the court to preserve some leeway so that it is able to extend leniency in consideration of the cooperation and at least superficial penitence evidenced by one who pleads guilty").

Nevertheless, "there is a line between responding favorably to an individual's sincere expression of remorse, and reacting in a hostile way because of a personal belief in the guilt of one" who insists on putting the government to its proof. Scott, 135 U.S.App. D.C. at 395, 419 F.2d at 282 (Leventhal, J., concurring). "The `augmentation of sentence' based on a defendant's decision to `stand on his right to put the Government to its proof rather than plead guilty' is clearly improper." United States v. Hutchings, 757 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1031, 105 S.Ct. 3511, 87 L.Ed.2d 640 (1985) (quoting United States v. Araujo, 539 F.2d 287, 291-92 (2d Cir.1976)). Consequently, a reviewing court must be satisfied that the defendant's sentence "reflects an individuated judgment as to the balance of deterrence and rehabilitation applicable in the appellant's case" rather than a categorical "approach of using a maximum sentence for a defendant" who required the government to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Scott, 135 U.S.App. D.C. at 395, 419 F.2d at 282 (Leventhal, J., concurring).

The government asserts that the most natural reading of Judge Murphy's remarks, read in context, is that he was neither adding to appellant's sentence ("punishing" him) nor withholding leniency for his decision to stand trial, but rather was concerned with his post-trial failure to provide any reason for the judge to depart downwards (borrowing language from the federal sentencing-guide-lines regime) from a "baseline" prison term of one year that was strongly indicated on the record. As the government points out, the prosecutor in allocution urged incarceration because of appellant's record of multiple prior convictions and the fact that he committed the present crime while on parole. Also, the prosecutor noted, the presentence report revealed that appellant had refused to speak at all with the probation officer preparing the report. Appellant's counsel, while asking for a sentence of work release, acknowledged that "there is an extensive recidivistic record." When appellant's turn to speak came, Judge Murphy asked him why he had refused to talk to the probation officer. Appellant replied that he "didn't feel good" at the time and had told the officer he could get any information he desired from the parole officer. The presentence report confirms that appellant had "refused to be interviewed" and instead told the officer to "talk to my parole officer." This did not prevent appellant from asserting to the judge that the report "must not be as accurate as you think" because it did not mention his recent enrollment in an apparent job-placement program, Project Able.

Against this background of appellant's conceded record of prior convictions, present parole status, and blanket refusal to talk to the probation officer, the government insists that Judge Murphy's remarks quoted above most naturally convey a refusal to extend leniency to a defendant whose pattern of behavior, past and present, justified a maximum sentence and who simply had given the judge no reason to extend "sympathy" by a downward departure. Given the array of information the judge had, the government says, it is un natural or at least implausible to infer that the judge, without ever suggesting a lesser sentence might otherwise be called for, was boosting the sentence because of appellant's decision to stand trial. Ultimately we agree with this conclusion, although the judge's language is disturbing. Immediately after expressing puzzlement that appellant had gone to trial and contrasting him with a...