Colgan v. Shadow Point, LLC
| Decision Date | 28 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 3D17-962,3D17-962 |
| Parties | Sean P. Colgan, as Trustee Under Agreement of Trust of Sean Colgan Dated January 25, 2008, Appellant, v. Shadow Point, LLC, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Luis M. Garcia, Judge.
Annesser & Chaiken, PLLC, and John W. Annesser and Fernando J. Valle, for appellant.
Hershoff, Lupino & Yagel, LLP, and Russell A. Yagel and Brittany N. Miller, for appellee.
Before ROTHENBERG, C.J., and SUAREZ and SCALES, JJ.
Sean P. Colgan, as Trustee Under Agreement of Trust of Sean Colgan Dated January 25, 2008 ("Colgan"), appeals from the trial court's entry of a final judgment, which granted Shadow Point, LLC ("Shadow Point") injunctive and declaratory relief and granted Colgan injunctive relief regarding the parties' disputed riparian rights. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the final judgment insofar as it awarded Shadow Point declaratory and injunctive relief and remand for the entry of a final judgment in favor of Colgan.
Colgan currently owns waterfront property adjacent to Shadow Point's waterfront property alongside the shore of Largo Sound. These two properties were at one point under common ownership, but that larger parcel of land was subdivided and transferred over time to different parties. The two properties now share a boundary line constituting the southern boundary of Colgan's property and the northern boundary of Shadow Point's property. The properties meet to form a roughly ninety degree angle at the southern and eastern borders of Colgan's property and the northern border of Shadow Point's property. There is a concrete dock, which is built over a bulkhead, that extends east from the vertex of this angle. There is also a boathouse on Colgan's property near where the concrete dock begins. The parties dispute ownership over the concrete dock and the uplands underneath it ("the disputed property").
The dispute in this case began when Colgan constructed a boundary fence extending along its property's southern border and on top of the concrete dock. Shadow Point objected to the placement of this fence and filed suit on the grounds that the fence was constructed on Shadow Point's property and interfered with Shadow Point's riparian rights. In response, Colgan claimed that the boundary fence was necessary to protect its property and its ability to ingress and egress from its boathouse because Shadow Point's tenants have trespassed and moored boats to the concrete dock, blocking Colgan's access to its boathouse.
Shadow Point filed suit and, in its amended complaint, pled counts to quiet title and for ejectment, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. The claims to quiet title and for ejectment sought a declaration and adjudication that Shadow Point owns the disputed property in fee simple and is entitled to exclusive possession. The claims for injunctive and declaratory relief sought to protect Shadow Point's riparian rights that were allegedly interfered with when Colgan constructed the boundary fence. Colgan filed its answer and a counterclaim for injunctive relief, alleging that Shadow Point's continued use of the concrete dock violated Colgan's riparian rights.
During a bench trial, after Shadow Point's case-in-chief, Colgan moved for a directed verdict against all of Shadow Point's claims on the ground that Shadow Point failed to prove that it owned the disputed property. The trial court grantedColgan's motion for a directed verdict as to Shadow Point's quiet title and ejectment claims, and the trial court expressly found, while rebuffing Colgan's attempt to introduce testimony that it owned the disputed property, that "[the court has] already determined that [Shadow Point] has not proven their [sic] ownership." However, the trial court nevertheless denied Colgan's motion for a directed verdict as to Shadow Point's injunctive and declaratory relief claims.
After the bench trial, the trial court entered a final judgment and concluded, among other things, that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to determine that there is one owner of the concrete dock "to the exclusion of all others"; (2) "the disputed property is filled land, and Shadow Point has riparian rights inuring from the disputed property"; (3) Colgan's boundary fence interferes with Shadow Point's riparian rights and must therefore be removed; and (4) Shadow Point's mooring of vessels at the concrete dock interferes with Colgan's riparian rights, and thus, neither Shadow Point nor Colgan may moor vessels there. Only Colgan has appealed.
Although a trial court's order granting an injunction is typically reviewed for an abuse of discretion, "the standard of review is de novo if a legal principle is involved." Telemundo Media, LLC v. Mintz, 194 So. 3d 434, 435 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). Similarly, "[a]lthough this court has recognized that our review of adeclaratory judgment is limited and the trial court's decision is accorded a presumption of correctness, a declaratory judgment may be overturned on appeal if it is based on a misapplication of law or shown by the record to be clearly wrong." Yorty v. Realty Inv. & Mortg. Corp., 938 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); see also Pages v. Seliman-Tapia, 134 So. 3d 536, 538 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) ().
Central to the final judgment is the trial court's finding that the disputed property is filled land, and thus, Shadow Point has riparian rights inuring from the disputed property. However, the mere fact that land has been filled is insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish entitlement to riparian rights. The Legislature has defined riparian rights as follows:
Riparian rights are those incident to land bordering upon navigable waters. They are rights of ingress, egress, boating, bathing, and fishing and such others as may be or have been defined by law. Such rights are not of a proprietary nature. They are rights inuring to the owner of the riparian land but are not owned by him or her. They are appurtenant to and are inseparable from the riparian land....
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