Collado v. J. & G. Transp., Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 March 2015
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 14-80467-CIV-GOODMAN
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
• Parties: ENRIQUE COLLADO, and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. J. & G. TRANSPORT, INC. et al., Defendants.

ENRIQUE COLLADO, and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. J. & G. TRANSPORT, INC. et al., Defendants.

CASE NO. 14-80467-CIV-GOODMAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA MIAMI DIVISION

March 31, 2015

[CONSENT CASE]

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS ALL OPT-IN PLAINTIFFS AND DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE OPT-IN NOTICES

This Order resolves two issues currently before the Court. Defendants J&G Transport, Javier Guzman, and Ivis Guzman filed a Motion to Dismiss All Opt-In Plaintiffs or, in the Alternative, to Compel Arbitration. [ECF No. 135]. The Court has reviewed the Motion, Plaintiff Enrique Collado and all Opt-in Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to the Motion [ECF No. 145], and Defendants' reply in support of the Motion [ECF No. 150].¹ In conjunction with analyzing Defendants' Motion, theUndersigned has also reviewed Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Late Opt-in Notices [ECF No. 147], Defendants' response in opposition to that Motion [ECF No. 152], and Plaintiff's reply [ECF No. 156]. For the reasons outlined below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss all Opt-in Plaintiffs.² In addition, the Court denies without prejudice Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Late Opt-in Notices, as described below.

I. Background

Plaintiff Enrique Collado ("Collado") filed his Amended Complaint on June 21, 2014, alleging that Defendants J&G Transport Inc., Javier Guzman, and Ivis Guzman failed to pay him and other similarly situated employees the overtime rate for hours worked over forty hours a week (Count I) and/or a minimum wage (Count II), in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. ("FLSA"). [ECF No. 36]. According to the Amended Complaint, J&G Transport is a Florida corporation thattransports, inter alia, garbage, debris, mulch, sugar, sugar cane, and molasses exclusively within the State of Florida. [ECF No. 36, ¶ 10]. J&G Transport employed Collado from 2013 to 2014 as a truck driver hauling garbage, debris, or mulch. [ECF No. 38-1, ¶ 2].

Plaintiff alleges that J&G Transport intentionally misclassifies all of its truck drivers as "independent contractors." [ECF No. 36, ¶ 17]. Plaintiff further alleges that all similarly situated truck drivers routinely work more than forty hours per week and are not paid overtime or a minimum wage. [Id., ¶ 18].

The Undersigned issued an order granting a motion for conditional class certification on October 23, 2014. [ECF No. 52]. That Order required, among other things, that Defendants provide Plaintiff with an Excel spreadsheet detailing certain contact information of putative class members no later than November 7, 2014, so that Plaintiff could notify potential opt-in Plaintiffs. Rather than provide that spreadsheet, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the case was moot in light of Defendants' offer of judgment to the named Plaintiffs.³ [ECF No. 55]. The Undersigned denied that motion to dismiss. [ECF No. 65]. Defendants then provided Plaintiff's counsel the information necessary to contact putative class members, and a number ofthose persons (more than forty) timely filed "opt-in" notices, consenting to join this lawsuit.

Defendants have now filed the instant Motion, arguing that all of the opt-in Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (or for failure to state a claim) because these disputes are subject to arbitration at the Defendants' election. Alternatively, Defendants request that the Undersigned stay this case as to all opt-in Plaintiffs and compel arbitration of their claims.

The Motion is based on an arbitration clause in the so-called "Independent Contractor Agreement" ("ICA") that each driver must sign before commencing work on behalf of Defendants. Copies of each opt-in Plaintiff's signed ICA, with the exception of opt-in Plaintiffs Henry T. Bennett [ECF No. 92] and Willie J. Mccants [ECF No. 99], are attached to either the Motion or the reply brief submitted in support of the Motion.⁴ [ECF Nos. 135; 150]. According to the arbitration clause, Defendant J&G Transport hasthe unilateral option to submit any ICA-related dispute between itself and a driver to arbitration. [ECF No. 135, p. 2].

II. The Applicable Legal Standards

Motions filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a party to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court to hear a case. Such motions are grounded in the idea that "[a]rticle III of the Constitution limits federal 'Judicial Power,' that is, federal-court jurisdiction, to 'Cases' and 'Controversies.'" U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395 (1980). If the issues presented in a case are no longer live or the plaintiff lacks a legally cognizable interest in the outcome -- a "personal stake" -- then a case is moot. Cameron-Grant v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240, 1244 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted).

Defendants have also filed their Motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which operate under a different standard. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted tests the sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Faced with such a motion, a reviewing court accepts all of the allegations in the complaint as true, and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Specific facts arenot necessary -- the statement need only "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation omitted).

Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides that a party aggrieved by the failure of another to arbitrate may file a motion to compel arbitration with a district court. See 9 U.S.C. § 4; Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 62 (2009). Defendants have filed such a motion here, seeking dismissal of the opt-in Plaintiffs' claims, or, alternatively, a stay in favor of arbitration.

Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") to "declare 'a national policy favoring arbitration of claims that parties contract to settle in that manner.'" Vaden, 556 U.S. 49, 58 (quoting Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353 (2008)); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012) (internal citation and quotation omitted) (noting that the Federal Arbitration Act reflects a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration."). The Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that courts must "rigorously enforce" arbitration agreements. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985). "By its terms, the [FAA] leaves no room for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed." Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 470 U.S. at 213 (emphasis in original).

The Florida Arbitration Code also favors arbitration. Fla. Stat. § 682.03(1). According to the statute:

(1) On motion of a person showing an agreement to arbitrate and alleging another person's refusal to arbitrate pursuant to the agreement:

(a) If the refusing party does not appear or does not oppose the motion, the court shall order the parties to arbitrate.

(b) If the refusing party opposes the motion, the court shall proceed summarily to decide the issue and order the parties to arbitrate unless it finds that there is no enforceable agreement to arbitrate.

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 682.03; see also John B. Goodman Ltd. P'ship v. THF Constr, Inc., 321 F.3d 1094, 1097 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that "[t]he Florida Arbitration Code is substantially similar to the FAA and the Uniform Arbitration Act.").

III. Analysis

A determination of whether parties have agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration is an issue of law subject to judicial resolution rather than resolution via arbitration. See Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 296 (2010). Under the FAA, an arbitration agreement is "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2.

An arbitration agreement must be "enforceable under ordinary state-law contract principles," in order for the Court to find that the agreement is valid. Lambert v. Austin Ind, 544 F.3d 1192, 1195 (11th Cir. 2008). By the terms of the ICA, as well as the fact that Defendants' business is conducted -- and the events at issue occurred -- solely inFlorida, Florida state law contract principles govern the enforceability of the arbitration agreement in this case. Under both Florida and federal law, a district court considers three factors in reviewing a motion to compel arbitration:

1) Whether there is a valid, written agreement to arbitrate;

2) Whether there is an arbitrable issue; and

3) Whether the right to arbitrate was waived.

Mercury Telco Grp., Inc. v. Empresa De Telecommunicaciones De Bogota S.A. E.S.P., 670 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (citing Integrated Sec. Svcs. v. Skidata, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2009)); Sims v. Clarendon Nat. Ins. Co., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (citing Marine Envtl. Partners, Inc. v. Johnson, 863 So. 2d 423, 426 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)). A party attempting to avoid arbitration must either prove waiver of the right to arbitration, Ivax Corp. v. B. Braun of Am., Inc., 286 F.3d 1309, 1315-16 (11th Cir. 2002), or must deny that the agreement to arbitrate was made and offer evidence to substantiate the denial, Wheat, First Sec., Inc. v. Green, 993 F.2d...