Coller v. State of Mo., Dept. of Economic Develop.

• Decision Date: 13 February 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-4201-CV-C5.,96-4201-CV-C5.
• Citation: 965 F.Supp. 1270
• Parties: Helen COLLER, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF MISSOURI, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

965 F.Supp. 1270

Helen COLLER, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF MISSOURI, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, et al., Defendants.

No. 96-4201-CV-C5.

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Central Division.

February 13, 1997.

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Audrey L. McIntosh, Hawkins Law Offices, Jefferson City, MO, for Helen Coller.

Carolyn Gail Vasterling, Missouri Attorney General's Office, Jefferson City, MO, for Department of Economic Development, State of Missouri.

Lori J. Levine, Carson & Coil, Jefferson City, MO, for Randall J. Singer.

Mary Susan Erickson, Missouri Attorney General's Office, Jefferson City, MO, for Jim Hall.

ORDER

LAUGHREY, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendant Hall's Motion to Dismiss, Defendant Singer's Motion to Dismiss Counts I and III, and Defendant State of Missouri's Motion to Dismiss Counts II and III. Plaintiff's suggestions in opposition and Defendants' replies are also on file with the Court. After due consideration of the Complaint and the motions, the Court grants the motions in part and denies the motions in part.

I. Background

Plaintiff, Helen Coller ("Coller"), brings this employment discrimination action against the State of Missouri, Department of Economic Development ("DED"), Mr. Singer ("Singer") and Mr. Hall ("Hall"). Singer worked for DED as the Director of the Division of Professional Registration. He supervised Coller while she worked for DED. Hall, a co-worker of Coller, also worked for DED. Among other things, Coller alleges that she was sexually harassed, discriminated against, and subjected to a hostile work environment. Coller filed a four-count complaint raising the following claims: 1) Title VII; 2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 3) Missouri Human Rights Act, Mo.Rev.Stat. Chapter 213; and 4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

II. Standard

In considering a motion to dismiss, whether on the grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim, the "complaint must be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Coleman v. Watt, 40 F.3d 255, 258 (8th Cir.1994) (citations omitted); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).

In ruling on a motion for failure to state a claim, the court must assume "all well pleaded factual allegations in the complaint are true." Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir.1990) (citing Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir.1986)). This standard applies to well pleaded facts and the court will not "blindly accept the legal conclusions drawn by the pleader from the facts." Westcott, 901 F.2d at 1488 (citing Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir.1987)). Dismissal under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is not proper "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).

III. Discussion

A. Defendant DED's Motion to Dismiss

1. Count II (Section 1983)

DED contends that Coller's § 1983 claim against the Department is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment provides:

The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens or another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Absent consent to be sued or Congressional abrogation, the Eleventh Amendment bars federal court actions against the state or its agencies. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2308, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-01, 104 S.Ct. 900, 907-08, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Bronfman v. Missouri, 707 F.Supp. 419, 422 (W.D.Mo. 1989), aff'd w/o op. 994 F.2d 842 (8th Cir. 1993). This Eleventh Amendment bar limits a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction in civil rights cases and is not overridden by § 1983. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338-40, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1143-45, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979); Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 432 (8th Cir.1989); Hadley v. North Arkansas Community Tech. College, 76 F.3d 1437, 1438 (8th Cir.1996). The bar applies whether the plaintiff seeks damages, injunctive or declarative relief. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100-01, 104 S.Ct. at 907-08. The immunity protects states from suits brought by its own citizens as well as by citizens of another state. Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 102 S.Ct. 3304, 73 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1982).

The primary purpose of the Eleventh Amendment is to safeguard the state treasury. Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 115 S.Ct. 394, 130 L.Ed.2d 245 (1994). The Eleventh Amendment also serves to protect a state from the indignity of subjecting itself "to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties." In re SDDS, Inc., 97 F.3d 1030, 1035 (8th Cir.1996) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1124, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996)). It is clear that DED is a state agency. Mo. Rev.Stat. § 620.010. Even Plaintiff admits this fact in her Complaint. Because DED is a state agency, it may invoke the Eleventh Amendment in order to protect the state treasury from liability. Hadley, 76 F.3d at 1439. The Court dismisses Count II against DED.

2. Count III (MHRA)

DED further claims that Count III, based on the Missouri Human Rights Act, should be dismissed because of the Eleventh Amendment. As previously discussed, the Eleventh Amendment bars federal court actions against a state or its agencies unless the state waives its immunity or Congress abrogates it. Will, 491 U.S. at 63, 109 S.Ct. at 2308. A state can waive this immunity, but the evidence of waiver must be clear. Bronfman, 707 F.Supp. at 422-23. Neither Plaintiff's Complaint nor her response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss points to any statute which shows the State clearly waived its immunity to be sued in federal court on this claim. Although MHRA provides for actions in Missouri circuit courts, the statute does not authorize actions in federal court. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 213.111.1. See Bronfman, 707 F.Supp. at 423.

Plaintiff argues that the Court can exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law claim under the MHRA. (Sugg. Opp. at 10). Pendent jurisdiction, however, cannot override Eleventh Amendment immunity as to a state law claim. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 121, 104 S.Ct. at 919. Therefore, the Court dismisses Count III against DED.

B. Defendants Hall and Singer's Motions to Dismiss

1. Count I (Title VII)

Defendants Hall and Singer assert that Count I should be dismissed as to them because they cannot be held individually liable under Title VII. It is clear that employees are not individually liable under Title VII. Smith v. St. Bernards Reg'l Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 1254 (8th Cir.1994). Likewise, supervisors are not individually liable under Title VII. Stevenson v. Brod Dugan Paint and Wall Coverings, 934 F.Supp. 1131, 1133 (E.D.Mo.1996); Johnson v. Missouri Lottery, No. 96-4019-CV-C-2 (W.D.Mo.1996).

Plaintiff, however, states that Hall and Singer are each being sued in their official not individual capacity. (Sugg. Opp. at 1). Therefore, the Court must address the question of whether a supervisor and an employee sued in their official capacities are subject to liability under Title VII.

Although Title VII actions are inappropriate against defendants in their individual capacity, a Title VII claim may be brought against the employer or against a supervisor in her official capacity as an agent of the employer. Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir.1991). In this case, however, Plaintiff has brought a Title VII claim against both DED and Singer. This is duplicative because a suit against a supervisor in his or her official capacity is treated as a suit against the employer itself. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3104-05, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Stafford v. Missouri, 835 F.Supp. 1136, 1149 (W.D.Mo.1993); Bryson v. Chicago State Univ., 96 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir.1996); Lynn v. United Techns. Corp., 916 F.Supp. 1217, 1219 (M.D.Ala.1996); Jungels v. State Univ. College of New York, 922 F.Supp. 779, 782 (W.D.N.Y.1996). DED does not contest its status as "employer" under Plaintiff's Title VII claim. Because any liability against Singer will be satisfied by DED, Count I alleging a violation of Title VII is dismissed against Singer.

Plaintiff's argument that he is suing Hall in his official capacity must also fail. Hall is a non-supervisor. Because he is not an agent of DED, he is not subject to suit in an official capacity under Title VII. Redpath v. City of Overland Park, 857 F.Supp. 1448, 1456 (D.Kan.1994). Hence, Plaintiff's Title VII claim against Hall in his official capacity is dismissed.

2. Count III (MHRA)

Hall and Singer also argue that they are not subject to liability under the MHRA, relying mainly on the Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377 (8th Cir.1995). In determining who is subject to individual liability under the MHRA, the Eighth Circuit analyzed Title VII and the case law decided thereunder to reach the holding that individual liability suits cannot be maintained against employees, including managers and supervisors, because these people do not qualify as "employers" under the MHRA's definition. Lenhardt, 55 F.3d at 381. Plaintiff has sued these Defendants in their official capacities under the MHRA. Lenhardt does not stand for the proposition that employees sued in their official capacities are not subject to liability.

Alternatively, Singer suggests that these counts should be dismissed because a suit against him in his official capacity is the same as a suit filed against the ...