Collier v. Shinn
| Decision Date | 16 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | CV-18-01442-PHX-RCC (MSA) |
| Parties | Lon Fredrick Collier, Petitioner, v. David Shinn, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Lon Fredrick Collier's first amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In 2007, a jury convicted Collier of two counts of aggravated assault and nine counts of sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen years of age. Collier argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not raising stronger objections to the admissibility of his confessions to law enforcement. Collier also argues that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when his coerced statements were admitted at trial. For the following reasons the Court will recommend that the petition be denied.
On March 3, 2004, Collier threw a pipe at his fourteen-year-old daughter, A.C, striking her in the face and breaking her nose. (Doc. 32-3 at 209.)[1] On March 5, A.C. reported the incident to school officials, who in turn contacted the Yuma County Sheriff's Office. (Doc. 32-2 at 95.) Sheriff's Deputy Isaac Almodova responded to the school and spoke with A.C. (Id. at 95-96.) Deputy Almodova then decided to speak with Collier, who was at work at his mother's clothing store. (Id. at 96.)
Deputy Almodova met Collier in a public area of the store and told him that they needed to speak about an incident. (Id. at 107.) For privacy, the two proceeded through the nonpublic backroom and outside the back door. (Id. at 97.) There, during a tape-recorded conversation, Collier confessed to throwing the pipe. (Id. at 98.) Deputy Almodova arrested Collier and, during the drive to a nearby substation, advised Collier of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). (Id. at 112-13.) Collier did not respond to the Miranda warnings. (Id. at 113.)
Collier's initial appearance took place on March 6. (Doc. 32-4 at 5.) During the hearing, he informed the court that he intended to hire private counsel. (Id.) He was then released on bail. (Id.)
After reporting the assault on March 5, A.C. ran away. (Doc. 32-3 at 209-10.) A few days later, A.C. told an acquaintance at a friend's house that Collier had been sexually abusing her. (Id. at 210.) The allegations were reported to Child Protective Services and the Yuma County Sheriff's Office. (Id.) On the evening of March 8, Sheriff's Deputy Anton Vasquez and Detective Guy Avenetti interviewed A.C. (Doc. 32-1 at 65-66.) After the interview, which lasted approximately two hours, Detective Avenetti decided to pick up Collier for questioning. (Id. at 97-98; Doc. 32-4 at 79-83.)
Detective Avenetti and four deputies arrived at Collier's home at around 1:00 a.m. on March 9. (Doc. 32-1 at 98.) Detective Avenetti said nothing to Collier about A.C.'s allegations of sexual abuse; he instead told Collier that they were investigating the March 3 assault. (Id. at 152-54.) Detective Avenetti requested that Collier accompany them back to a substation for questioning, and Collier agreed. (Id. at 98-99.) For safety reasons, Collier was handcuffed and transported in the back of a patrol vehicle. (Id. at 72-73.) At the substation, the handcuffs were removed, and Collier was placed in a small, windowless interview room. (Id. at 79-80.)
The interrogation, which was video recorded, lasted approximately two hours and fifteen minutes. (Id. at 107.) Detective Avenetti began by questioning Collier about the March 3 assault and A.C.'s status as a runaway. (Id. at 103.) This line of questioning was not preceded by the recitation of Miranda warnings. (Id.) After about 40 minutes, Detective Avenetti advised Collier of his Miranda rights, and Collier waived them. (Id. at 104-05.) Detective Avenetti then, for the first time, raised the allegations of sexual abuse. (Id. at 106.) Collier initially denied the allegations, but he eventually confessed to having sexual intercourse with A.C. on a regular basis from January 2003 to February 2004. (Id. at 107-08; Doc. 32-3 at 210.)
Collier was charged with two counts of aggravated assault in one case and with ten counts of sexual conduct with a minor in another. (Doc. 32-1 at 5-9, 11-12.). The two cases were consolidated for discovery and trial. (Id. at 59.)
Before trial, Collier filed two motions to suppress. In the first motion, Collier contended that his March 9 statement was coerced and obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. (Doc. 32-1 at 14.) The trial court granted the motion in part, finding that Collier's confession was voluntary but that there had been a Miranda violation. (Doc. 32-2 at 38- 39.) The court suppressed the first part of Collier's confession, which pertained to the March 3 assault, because it was given before Detective Avenetti provided Miranda warnings. (Id. at 39.) The court refused to suppress the second part of Collier's confession, relating to sexual abuse, because Collier had given it after voluntarily waiving his Miranda rights. (Id. at 39-40.)
The state later sought reconsideration of the trial court's suppression order. It argued that the Miranda warnings provided by Deputy Almodova on March 5 had carried over to the March 9 interrogation, such that the first part of Collier's confession was obtained constitutionally. (Doc. 32-2 at 193-97.) Collier responded that the motion should be denied because there was no evidence that he had heard or responded to the warnings. (Id. At 201.) The trial court issued a written order granting the motion, allowing Collier's full statement to be presented at trial. (Id. at 254-57.) The order contains factual errors: it states that Deputy Almodova advised Collier of his Miranda rights before asking questions about the March 3 assault, although the warnings were given after Collier confessed; it also states that Collier expressly waived his rights and agreed to speak to Deputy Almodova, although the record showed that Collier did not respond to the warnings. (Id. at 112-13, 254-55.) Collier's counsel did not seek reconsideration of the order or otherwise bring these errors to the trial court's attention. (Doc. 32-4 at 122-23.)
In the second motion, Collier again sought to have his March 9 statement suppressed, this time based on an alleged violation of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). (Doc. 32-2 at 46.) Collier argued that he had invoked his right to counsel near the time of his arrest on March 5, and that it was a violation of Edwards to subject him to further interrogation on March 9 without giving him an attorney. (Id. at 50-51.) The trial court denied the motion, finding that Collier had not clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to counsel. (Id. at 182.)
Collier was convicted of all charges except for one count of sexual conduct with a minor. (Doc. 32-3 at 15-17.) The trial court sentenced Collier to a combination of concurrent and consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling 180 years. (Id. at 47.) Collier appealed. (Id. at 68-69.) As relevant here, Collier argued that his March 9 statements were coerced, and that it was a constitutional violation to admit them at trial. (Id. at 121-26.) The Arizona Court of Appeals corrected a minor sentencing error but otherwise affirmed, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. (Id. at 208-32, 273.)
Collier filed a petition for post-conviction relief in July 2010 and a “supplemental” petition in September 2013. (Doc. 32-4 at 2, 118.) As relevant here, Collier argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for overlooking the strongest objections to the admissibility of his confessions. Collier contended (1) that he was arrested without probable cause on March 9; (2) that law enforcement trespassed onto the curtilage of his house on March 9; (3) that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when he was interrogated on March 9 without an attorney present; (4) that the trial court erred in concluding that the Miranda warnings given on March 5 had carried over to the March 9 interrogation; and (5) that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Deputy Almodova entered the nonpublic area of his family-owned business on March 5. (Doc. 32-4 at 21-29; 121-48, 152-56.)
The trial court summarily denied Collier's claims, finding he had not demonstrated that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. (Doc. 32-5 at 127-29.) The Arizona Court of Appeals similarly disposed of Collier's claims, summarily finding that Collier had not demonstrated deficient performance. (Id. at 189.) The Arizona Supreme Court denied review. (Id. at 214.)
Collier initiated this action on May 10, 2018, and filed the operative first amended petition on January 3, 2019. (Docs. 1, 30.) He raises six claims. These include the voluntariness claim rejected during Collier's direct appeal, as well as the five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel rejected during Collier's state post-conviction proceeding. Respondents raise no issues concerning timeliness, cognizability, or procedural default.
The petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) because it was filed after April 24, 1996, AEDPA's effective date. Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 996 (9th Cir. 2014). Under AEDPA, federal habeas relief may be granted on a claim that was denied on the merits in state court only if the denial “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States ” ...
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