Collins v. Brierly

• Decision Date: 05 February 1974
• Docket Number: No. 72-1036 and 72-1037.,72-1036 and 72-1037.
• Citation: 492 F.2d 735
• Parties: Royall COLLINS v. Joseph R. BRIERLY, Superintendent State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Appellant. Royall COLLINS, Appellant, v. Joseph R. BRIERLY, Superintendent State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

492 F.2d 735 (1974)

Royall COLLINS v. Joseph R. BRIERLY, Superintendent State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Appellant.

Royall COLLINS, Appellant, v. Joseph R. BRIERLY, Superintendent State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Nos. 72-1036 and 72-1037.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued January 9, 1973.

Submitted on Rehearing November 16, 1973.

Decided February 5, 1974.

As Amended March 12, 1974.

James D. McDonald, Jr., Quinn, Plate, Gent, Buseck & Leemhuis, Erie, Pa., for Royall Collins.

R. Gordon Kennedy, Dist. Atty., Frank L. Kroto, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Erie County, Pa., for the Commonwealth.

Before McLAUGHLIN and VAN DUSEN, Circuit Judges, and GREEN, District Judge.

Before SEITZ, Chief Judge, and McLAUGHLIN, VAN DUSEN, ALDISERT, ADAMS, GIBBONS, ROSENN, HUNTER, WEIS and GARTH, Circuit Judges.

Submitted on Rehearing en banc November 16, 1973.

Argued January 9, 1973.

Before McLAUGHLIN and VAN DUSEN, Circuit Judges, and GREEN, District Judge.

Submitted en banc November 16, 1973.

Before SEITZ, Chief Judge, and McLAUGHLIN, VAN DUSEN, ALDISERT, ADAMS, GIBBONS, ROSENN, HUNTER, WEIS and GARTH, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

WEIS, Circuit Judge.

During the course of an armed robbery in Erie, Pennsylvania on April 27, 1967, one Nicholas Fytikas was shot and killed by Norman Stanyard, an acquaintance of petitioner, Royall Collins, alleged to be the driver of the getaway car. After a jury trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, Pennsylvania, Collins was convicted of second degree murder, and the judgment was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.¹ During the course of its opinion, that Court held that it had been error to admit a statement of Collins into evidence at his trial but that the ruling of the trial judge had been harmless in view of other evidence in the case.

On a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania found that the "error" had not been harmless, although it accepted the view of the Pennsylvania appellate court that the statement had been secured in violation of petitioner's constitutional rights.² On this latter point we differ with both the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the District Court, and we reverse.

The record establishes that Collins and two friends, Carr and Seawright, went to the home of a friend at about 10:00 P.M. on April 26, 1967, where they met Stanyard. Later that evening all four left in petitioner's automobile. Where they went thereafter is disputed. Collins contended that they took Stanyard to Eighteenth and Parade Streets in Erie, Pennsylvania and did not see him again that day. The contested statement that the petitioner made to police contained little more than this information.

Stanyard, however, testified that all four first drove to Sixteenth and Parade Streets where he robbed a Spur Gas Station at gunpoint while the others remained in the car. After driving around for about an hour, it was decided by all to rob an establishment called "Steve's Lunch" located at Sixteenth and State Streets, about four blocks from the gas station. Again Stanyard went into the lunch room alone while the others waited outside. When the proprietor attempted to dive below a counter top, he was shot by Stanyard. The others drove away and Stanyard fled on foot. The shooting occurred about 2:00 A.M., and Stanyard was apprehended a few hours later.³

About 5:00 P.M. on that same day, Detective Kalinowski of the Erie Police force went to petitioner's residence and found both Collins and Seawright there. They were asked and agreed to accompany the police to headquarters. When they arrived there, Kalinowski told Collins, Seawright, and three other youths that they were going to have a lineup and that the police wanted to see if "this boy can identify some of them . . ." The detective testified that ". . . I think it was Seawright, he already knew who the boy was because I guess he saw it on T.V. or something."⁴

After the lineup, Seawright and Collins were taken to separate rooms, and each was interviewed privately. Kalinowski testified at the suppression hearing that he gave petitioner a card on which his "rights" were printed and asked Collins to read it and, if he understood it, to sign it. Collins replied that he did understand it and at the officer's request signed the form.⁵

Following this, according to the version at the suppression hearing, Kalinowski told Collins that they wished to talk to him about the "Nicholas Fytikas case and about Stanyard." At the trial several months later, the detective testified that "before signing that the waiver form, we told him that we were going to ask him questions regarding the shooting done by Norman Stanyard and then we explained his rights to him . . ."

Collins testified at the suppression hearing that at the time he was questioned he had not known that Fytikas had been killed or that Stanyard was involved.⁶

Petitioner did not testify at the evidentiary hearing in the district court.

The Court of Common Pleas, in rejecting a motion for a new trial, wrote:

"Counsel also argues that the statement is inadmissible because the officers did not advise Collins of the reasons for his detention on questioning until after he was advised of his rights, and until after he signed the waiver. It is our opinion that the sequence is unimportant as long as Collins knew his rights when the questioning began. That this is so is, in our opinion, an established fact."

The court then discussed the requirements set out in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and concluded, "We believe that Collins was properly apprised of these matters and that he effectively waived his privilege and that he did so knowingly and intelligently."^6a

We understand these statements to be a finding that the officers had in fact advised the petitioner of the reasons for his interrogation. A plurality of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania⁷ seemingly made a similar interpretation because its opinion assumed that there was error based on the time when the notice was given, not that it was actually lacking. We acknowledge that the state appellate court's phraseology is not as precise on this point as might be desired. The court stated:

"We agree with appellant that an intelligent and understanding waiver of the right to counsel is impossible where the defendant has not been informed of the crime which is being investigated." 259 A.2d 160, 163 (1969).

But the opinion went on to say at 163-164:

"The court below was of the view that so long as appellant knew why he was being held when the questioning began, that is enough. We cannot agree. The crucial moment is the time when the waiver is signed. Once an accused has signed the waiver stating that he is willing to give a statement, it is no longer efficacious that he then be told what he is being questioned about. The compulsive force of the unintelligent waiver has already had its effect. We thus hold that it was error to admit appellant\'s statement."

We have serious reservations about an interpretation of Miranda v. Arizona, supra, which would require that before custodial interrogation begins, in addition to the mandated declarations, a statement must be made by the police as to the nature of the crime under investigation. That landmark decision was painstakingly specific in listing the basic constitutional rights which the police must propound to a suspect before he is questioned. Nowhere is there the slightest indication that there must be included a warning about the nature of the crime which has led to the interrogation conference, what the penalty is for the offense, what the elements of the offense consist of, and similar matters. That these might be requisites for the entry of a valid guilty plea in open court is not relevant to the standards applicable to the custodial interrogation stage of a prosecution. In a sense, all of these elements might conceivably enter into an "intelligent and understanding" rejection of an offer for the assistance of counsel, but the simple answer is that Miranda does not by its terms go so far. It requires that the accused be advised of his rights so that he may make a rational decision, not necessarily the best one or one that would be reached only after long and painstaking deliberation. Indeed, it may be argued forcefully that a choice by a defendant to forego the presence of counsel at a police interrogation is almost invariably an unintelligent course of action.⁸ It is not in the sense of shrewdness that Miranda speaks of "intelligent" waiver but rather in the tenor that the individual must know of his available options before deciding what he thinks best suits his particular situation. In this context intelligence is not equated with wisdom. See United States v. Hall, 396 F.2d 841 (4th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 918, 89 S. Ct. 248, 21 L.Ed.2d 205 (1968).

It is possible that in some situations the fact that the suspect was not aware of the offense under investigation would be of concern to the court in evaluating the totality of the circumstances to determine the voluntariness of a statement.⁹ This is quite different, however, from a holding that unless the information is included in the pre-interrogation litany, a confession is per se inadmissible.

We need not and do not decide this question, however, since our inquiry may be limited to the issue of whether the "waiver" was ineffective because it was signed before the petitioner was advised of the nature of the crime with which the interrogation was concerned. This was the reason assigned by the Pennsylvania appellate court, as we read its plurality opinion, for finding that there had been error of constitutional dimension in the trial court's ruling. We say again that whether the disclosure was made before or after the "waiver" is a matter...