People v. Cheatham
| Citation | 453 Mich. 1,551 N.W.2d 355 |
| Decision Date | 30 July 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 13,No. 102201,102201,13 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Willie C. CHEATHAM, Defendant-Appellee. Calendar |
| Court | Supreme Court of Michigan |
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training and Appeals, and Jeffrey Caminsky, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Detroit, for the people.
Gerald S. Surowiec, Farmington Hills, for the defendant.
Krause & Zambon, P.C. by Tonya L. Krause, Grand Rapids, for the Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan.
We granted leave in this case to determine whether the state has carried its burden of establishing that defendant validly waived his Miranda 1 rights. There is no dispute that the waiver was voluntary. The question presented is whether the waiver was "knowing and intelligent." We conclude that the state has fulfilled its burden of proving that defendant sufficiently understood the warnings given to him and that his subsequent waiver was valid. Thus, we would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Defendant Willie Cheatham and codefendant Joseph Stringer were jointly tried on first-degree murder 2 and felony-firearm 3 charges. The two defendants had separate juries who heard different evidence and reached different outcomes. Stringer was acquitted on the murder charge, but convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; defendant was convicted of the lesser crime of second-degree murder 4 and felony-firearm. Among the critical pieces of evidence heard by defendant's jury, but not by Stringer's jury, was defendant's statement admitting his presence at the murder scene and acknowledging that he threw a gun into an alleyway.
The charges stem from a murder in the City of Detroit on October 26, 1991. About 9:30 p.m., the police were summoned to a house where they discovered the decedent, Dewone Ridley, lying on the floor with three gunshot wounds.
A short distance away from the house where Ridley was discovered, the police were investigating an automobile accident in which a car had run into a building. The police found Stringer slumped over the steering wheel of the car, unconscious, with bullet wounds of the chest and leg, and with a .45 caliber pistol near his feet. Further down the block from the accident, the police observed defendant with blood on his head and inquired whether he had been in the car. Defendant responded that he had, and the police, after sending him to the hospital, took him into custody. During a patdown search, five empty .38 caliber shells were found in defendant's pocket.
While in custody, defendant gave two slightly different statements to the police. After being advised of and waiving his Miranda rights, defendant in his first statement said that Stringer had offered to give him a ride home and he accepted the offer. On the way, Stringer stopped at a house and got out of the car; defendant stayed in the car. While waiting in the car, defendant heard a door being kicked in, which was quickly followed by the sound of gunshots. Shortly thereafter, Stringer returned to the car with blood on his leg and a .45 caliber gun in his hand. Defendant stated that he did not have a gun.
In his second statement, again after being properly informed of and waiving his Miranda rights, defendant repeated that Stringer was giving him a ride home and had stopped at a house on the way. Stringer got out of the car with a .45 caliber pistol in his hand and headed toward the house. Defendant then heard a door being kicked in and shots being fired. Contrary to his previous statement, defendant in this statement claimed to have gotten out of the car at this point and walked onto the porch of the house. As he was standing on the porch, defendant saw Stringer shoot Ridley three times. Defendant returned to the car, and a few seconds later Stringer, with blood on his leg, got into the car and drove toward the hospital. Before reaching the hospital Stringer lost control and the car hit a building. Defendant struck his head on the windshield during the accident, but was able to get out of the car and throw the .38 caliber revolver he was carrying into an alley. Defendant said that he threw his gun into the alley because he had been arrested before with a gun and was afraid that he would have to go back to jail.
Before trial, defendant sought to have both statements suppressed. 5 At the suppression hearing, Dr. Steven Miller, a forensic psychologist, testified that he had examined defendant. Defendant had a history of being in special education classes and had dropped out of school in the ninth grade. Defendant had told Miller that he no prior contact with the police and that he could not read or write. On the basis of several psychological tests, Miller concluded that defendant has an IQ of sixty-two and that he did not believe defendant was competent to waive his Miranda rights.
At the suppression hearing, defendant testified that at the time he gave his statements he did not know what it meant to be "silent," or what the word "attorney" meant. Defendant did agree, however, that he knew he did not have to tell the police anything, that he wanted to tell the police what happened, that the officers had informed him of his Miranda rights, and that he told the officers he understood his rights.
The police officer who questioned defendant the second time, Sergeant Arlie Lovier, testified that he did not have any problems communicating with defendant and that it appeared defendant understood what he was saying. Lovier stated that, after learning defendant was unable to read, he read defendant his Miranda rights. After reading each right, he asked defendant to place his initials next to the right if he understood what the right meant. Defendant initialed each right and signed the statement at the end, agreeing that he had been informed of and understood his rights.
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial judge concluded that there was no coercion on the part of the police and that defendant had not been forthright with Miller when he claimed he had no previous contact with law enforcement. 6 The trial judge further found that defendant's confession was wholly voluntary and that the only issue was whether defendant understood his rights. Although noting that defendant was intellectually limited and could not read, the judge concluded that his understanding of the Miranda rights was sufficient for a valid waiver.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial judge's determination regarding defendant's cognitive abilities. The Court, citing People v. Garwood, 205 Mich.App. 553, 517 N.W.2d 843 (1994), found that, regardless of the lack of coercive police conduct, defendant did not have the intellectual ability to understand his rights and thus his waiver was invalid and his confession should have been suppressed. 7
The prosecutor sought leave to appeal, and we granted the application on October 10, 1995. 450 Mich. 873, 539 N.W.2d 506.
The Fifth Amendment 8 of the United States Constitution guarantees that the government cannot compel a defendant in a criminal case to testify against himself. 9 This protection has been applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964). In addition, Art. 1, § 17 of the Michigan Constitution affords defendants a corresponding state constitutional right to be free from compelled self-incrimination. 10
The wording of the Michigan Constitution granting protection from compelled self-incrimination is identical to the Fifth Amendment protection. Recently, this Court examined the relationship between the Fifth Amendment and Art. 1, § 17 in People v. Wright, 441 Mich. 140, 490 N.W.2d 351 (1992), but could not reach a consensus regarding that relationship. We do not face the issue that separated the Court in Wright, and there is no need in this case to construe the protection against self-incrimination found in the Michigan Constitution differently from the identical federal guarantee. 11 On the facts of this case, if defendant's Fifth Amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination was not violated, neither was a corresponding right under Art. 1, § 17 of the Michigan Constitution.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court created a set of prophylactic safeguards to insure protection of the Fifth Amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination during custodial interrogation. 12 The stated goal of Miranda is to protect against the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation. Id. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624.
Miranda protects defendants against governmental coercion leading them to surrender rights protected by the Fifth Amendment; it goes no further than that. [Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170, 107 S.Ct. 515, 523, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986).]
In an attempt to dissipate the coercion found to be inherent in custodial interrogation, thus protecting a defendants Fifth Amendment right, the Miranda Court created the familiar litany:
To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, ... [h]e must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to questioning if he so desires. [Id. at 478-479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630.]
The United States Supreme Court, both in Miranda and in its progeny, has repeatedly stated that the warnings...
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