Collins v. Collins

• Decision Date: 13 December 2000
• Docket Number: No. 27717.,27717.
• Citation: 543 S.E.2d 672,209 W.Va. 115
• Parties: James R. COLLINS, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Susan A. COLLINS (now Davis), Defendant Below, Appellee.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

543 S.E.2d 672

209 W.Va. 115

James R. COLLINS, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Susan A. COLLINS (now Davis), Defendant Below, Appellee.

No. 27717.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted September 19, 2000.

Decided December 13, 2000.

James R. Collins, Hurricane, West Virginia, Pro Se.

James M. Casey, Point Pleasant, West Virginia, for the Appellee.

DAVIS, Justice:

The appellant herein and plaintiff below, James R. Collins [hereinafter referred to as "Mr. Collins"], appeals from orders entered by the Circuit Court of Putnam County on June 4, 1999, and August 25, 1999. In the first order, the circuit court awarded the appellee herein and defendant below, Susan A. Collins (now Davis) [hereinafter referred to as "Ms. Davis"], a decretal judgment¹ against Mr. Collins in the amount of $25,482.74, with interest, for past due child support payments from March 1, 1987, to August 31, 1988.² In the second order, entered August 25, 1999, the court denied Mr. Collins' motion to set aside its order of June 4, 1999, and affirmed that ruling. The court also found, though, that Mr. Collins had demonstrated good cause for extending the appeal period based upon a breakdown in communications with his counsel.

On appeal to this Court, Mr. Collins raises numerous assignments of error, including (1) the circuit court erred by holding him responsible for child support which accrued after he had petitioned the court for a modification of his child support obligation and (2) the ten-year statute of limitations contained in W. Va.Code § 38-3-18 (1923) (Repl.Vol. 1997) barred the circuit court from enforcing Ms. Davis' March 19, 1987, judgment against Mr. Collins for past due child support. Upon a review of the parties' arguments, the record submitted for appellate review, and the pertinent authorities, we find that the circuit court did not commit reversible error in awarding the above-referenced decretal judgment. Specifically, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by charging Mr. Collins with child support arrearages for the period in question because Rule 19 of the West Virginia Rules of Practice and Procedure for Family Law did not become effective until several years after these support payments had accrued. In addition, the statute of limitations set forth in W. Va.Code § 38-3-18 does not preclude the circuit court from enforcing Ms. Davis' 1987 judgment against Mr. Collins because she twice obtained writs of execution thereon, the last one being issued in 1993, which effectively continued the ten-year limitations period until the year 2003. Therefore, we affirm the June 4, 1999, and August 25, 1999, orders of the Circuit Court of Putnam County.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts underlying the instant proceeding are generally not disputed by the parties. Mr. Collins and Ms. Davis were married on October 30, 1970, and two children were born³ of the marriage. On October 31, 1978, the parties were divorced, with custody of the parties' children being awarded to Ms. Davis. The divorce decree also ordered Mr. Collins to pay child support to Ms. Davis of $220 per month, i.e., $110 per child per month.

During the ensuing years, Mr. Collins neglected to satisfy his child support obligation. As a result of Mr. Collins' support payment arrears, Ms. Davis sought and obtained a judgment against him, on March 19, 1987, in the amount of $8,919.75 for past due child support. On May 23, 1989,⁴ and again on September 9, 1993,⁵ Ms. Davis obtained writs of execution in pursuance of her efforts to collect on her March 19, 1987, judgment against Mr. Collins.⁶

In the meantime, Mr. Collins, on June 24, 1987, petitioned the circuit court for modification of his child support obligation claiming his financial circumstances had changed. By order entered October 5, 1988, the circuit court reduced Mr. Collins' child support obligation to $0 while he was unemployed and participated in a work training program sponsored by the West Virginia Department of Human Services. The court further ruled that Mr. Collins' prior support obligation would resume upon his employment or departure from the training program. Thereafter, based on information provided to the court by Ms. Davis, the circuit court reinstated Mr. Collins' child support obligation. In its January 23, 1992, order, the circuit court directed Mr. Collins to pay child support in the amount of one-third of his monthly net income, up to $110 per month.⁷

Given Mr. Collins' continued arrearages, Ms. Davis sought and obtained a decretal judgment against Mr. Collins on June 4, 1999. In this order, the circuit court found

1. From March 1, 1987 to August 31, 1988, the Plaintiff, James R. Collins, had the ability to pay Two Hundred Twenty and 00/100 ($220.00) per month for the support of the children.

2. Current child support obligation of the Plaintiff, James R. Collins, ceased on August 31, 1988.

3. The Defendant, Susan A. Collins (now Davis), was previously granted a judgment against the Plaintiff, James R. Collins, of Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Nineteen and 75/100 ($8,919.75) by Order entered March [19], 1987....

Having so found, the circuit court then awarded Ms. Davis "a decretal judgment against the Plaintiff, James R. Collins, in the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-Two and 74/100 ($25,482.74), which includes interest of Seventeen Thousand Four Hundred Eighteen and 29/100 ($17,418.29), from March 1, 1987 to January 31, 1999."

Following this ruling, Mr. Collins filed, on July 26, 1999, a motion to set aside the court's June 4, 1999, order claiming that his attorney had failed to advise him of its entry. In its August 25, 1999, order, the circuit court denied the requested relief and upheld its prior order. Nevertheless, the court determined that,

[b]ased upon the lack of communication by Petitioner's [Mr. Collins'] counsel with Petitioner regarding [sic] Order of June 4, 1999, the Court finds "good cause" to permit Petitioner thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing to file notice of appeal, if desired, to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.

Mr. Collins then appealed to this Court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a decision of a circuit court, we typically employ a multifaceted standard of review:

[i]n reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court, we apply a two-prong deferential standard of review. We review the final order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review the circuit court's underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo review.

Syl. pt. 2, Walker v. West Virginia Ethics Comm'n, 201 W.Va. 108, 492 S.E.2d 167 (1997). See also Syl. pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995) ("Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving the interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review."). In addition, and of particular relevance to the instant appeal, we customarily accord deference to circuit court rulings involving a determination of child support.

"Questions relating to alimony and to the maintenance and custody of the children are within the sound discretion of the court and its action with respect to such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that such discretion has been abused." Syllabus, Nichols v. Nichols, 160 W.Va. 514, 236 S.E.2d 36 (1977).

Syl. pt. 2, Lambert v. Miller, 178 W.Va. 224, 358 S.E.2d 785 (1987). With these standards in mind, we turn now to the errors assigned by Mr. Collins.

III. DISCUSSION

On appeal to this Court, Mr. Collins raises numerous assignments of error, including (1) the circuit court erred by holding him responsible for child support that accrued after he had filed a petition to modify his support obligation and (2) the statute of limitations provided by W. Va.Code § 38-3-18 (1923) (Repl.Vol.1997) barred the circuit court from enforcing Ms. Davis' March 19, 1987, judgment against Mr. Collins for child support arrearages.⁸

A. Effect of Modification Petition on Current Child Support Obligation

Mr. Collins first complains that the circuit court erroneously calculated the period of time for which he was required to pay child support. In its June 4, 1999, order, the circuit court determined that Mr. Collins failed to satisfy his support obligation from March 1, 1987, to August 31, 1988, a period of approximately eighteen months. Mr. Collins argues, however, that because he petitioned the circuit court for a modification of his support obligation on June 24, 1987, and because the court subsequently reduced his obligation pursuant to this request,⁹ he is responsible for child support payments only from March 1, 1987, to June 24, 1987, a period of roughly four months. In support of his arguments, Mr. Collins relies upon Rule 19 of the West Virginia Rules of Practice and Procedure for Family Law which provides: "[a] family law master or circuit court granting relief in the form of alimony or child support shall, except for good cause shown, make such award of alimony or child support retroactive to the date of service of the motion for relief upon the opposing party." Since he served his modification petition on June 24, 1987, then, Mr. Collins contends that the court's subsequent reduction of his child support obligation should be retroactive to that date.

While Mr. Collins' basic interpretation of Rule 19 is fairly accurate, we do not agree that it affords him the result which he desires. When applying a principle of law to a particular set of facts, we ordinarily apply the law that was in effect at the time of the relevant events.¹⁰ See generally 1B Michie's Jurisprudence Appeal and Error § 237, at 436 (1995) ("[O]nce [an] appeal or writ of error is granted, it must be disposed of in accordance with the law as it existed at the...