Collins v. Guinn, 06-02-00110-CV.

Decision Date01 April 2003
Docket NumberNo. 06-02-00110-CV.,06-02-00110-CV.
Citation102 S.W.3d 825
PartiesRobert L. COLLINS, Individually and d/b/a Collins and Associates, Appellants, v. Royce GUINN, Individually and d/b/a Video One, Appellees.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Daniel Kistler, Houston, for appellant.

John Wesley Wauson, Wauson & Associates, PC, Sugar Land, for appellee.

Before MORRISS, C.J., ROSS and CARTER, JJ.

OPINION

Opinion by Chief Justice MORRISS.

Robert L. Collins, Individually and d/b/a Collins and Associates, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for summary judgment and the grant of summary judgment in favor of Royce Guinn,1 Individually and d/b/a Video One. In several points of error, Collins contends the trial court erred (1) in finding Guinn's lawsuit was not barred by res judicata, (2) in finding Guinn's suit was not barred by the statute of limitations, (3) in finding that no genuine issue of material fact existed that would preclude summary judgment, (4) in granting Guinn's motion for summary judgment, for the reasons that the evidence is insufficient to support it, and (5) in denying Collins' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

I. Factual And Procedural Background

In 1987, Pele Chandler, the daughter of Chloe Chandler ("Chandler"), was killed in a motor vehicle accident. Chandler hired Collins to sue Hyundai Motor Company in a wrongful death action ("Hyundai suit"). In connection with the wrongful death suit, Collins asked Video One to provide videotape production and editing services. Video One provided the services as requested.

By 1992, the Hyundai suit was still pending and Video One had not yet been paid for $93,854.51 in services it billed to Collins in connection with the suit. Video One sued Collins for the unpaid debt in a Harris County district court. Collins defended the suit, claiming he and Video One had agreed that payment was not due until the Hyundai suit was settled. Collins prevailed in the 1992 suit, and the trial court entered a take-nothing judgment in favor of Collins. The 1992 trial court later issued the following findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its ruling:

Findings of Fact

1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this cause of action.

2. On or about December 12, 1989 Plaintiff, Video One, and Defendant, Robert Collins[,] d/b/a Collins & Associates, entered into an oral contract.

3. Pursuant to the terms of the contract, Plaintiff provided goods and services at the direction and according to the specifications of the Defendant.

4. The services furnished by the Plaintiff, pursuant to the contract and at the request of and on behalf of the Defendant,

have a reasonable market value of Ninety — Three Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty — Four and 51/100 Dollars ($93,854.51).

5. Defendant owes Plaintiff a total of Ninety-Three Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty-Four and 51/100 Dollars ($93,-854.51) for the services furnished by Plaintiff pursuant to the contract.

6. Pursuant to the terms of the contract, payment of the full Ninety — Three Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty — Four and 51/100 Dollars ($93,854.51) is not due until the resolution of the appeal in the case styled Chloe J. Chandler, et al[.] vs. Hyundai, et al[.], Cause No. 87-39802, in the First Court of Appeals for the State of Texas.

7. The only condition precedent to Plaintiffs right to recover under the contract is the resolution of the appeal of the case styled Chloe J. Chandler, et al[.] vs. Hyundai, et al[.], Cause No. 87-39802, in the First Court of Appeals for the State of Texas.

8. To the extent that any of these are erroneously determined Findings of Fact, but are Conclusions of Law, they shall be deemed Conclusions of Law for all purposes.

Conclusions of Law

1. A valid[,] enforceable contract was entered into by and between Plaintiff, Video One, and Defendant, Robert Collins[,] d/b/a Collins & Associates on or about December 12, 1989.

2. The Court finds that pursuant to the terms of the contract, payment of Ninety-Three Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty-Four and 51/100 Dollars ($93,-854.51) is due upon the resolution of the appeal in the case styled Chloe J. Chandler, et al[.] vs. Hyundai, et al[.], Cause No. 87-39802, in the First Court of Appeals for the State of Texas.

3. The Court finds that the sum of Ninety — Three Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty — Four and 51/100 Dollars ($93,-854.51) is due and payable upon ruling and issuance of an opinion by the First Court of Appeals in the appeal styled Chloe J. Chandler, et al[.] vs. Hyundai, et al[.], Cause No. ________, in the First Court of Appeals for the State of Texas, regardless of the outcome of such appeal, and regardless of any additional appeals or court action.

4. To the extent that any of these are erroneously denominated Conclusions of Law, but are Findings of Fact, they shall be deemed Findings of Fact for all purposes.

Neither Guinn nor Collins appealed the 1992 judgment, nor did they object to the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. On August 25, 1994, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Hyundai Motor Co. v. Chandler, 882 S.W.2d 606 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied).2 By September 22, 1997, Chandler had settled the Hyundai case.

On September 6, 1996, after the Hyundai appeal had been reversed, but while the case was still pending before the trial court, Guinn/Video One filed a plea in intervention in the Hyundai suit. An intervenor's amended petition was filed on June 10, 1997. On July 11, 1997, the trial court granted Guinn's motion to sever the intervention; the severed case was restyled Royce Guinn, Individually and d/b/a Video One vs. Chloe Chandler, Cause Number 87-39802-A.

Guinn/Video One filed a first supplemental petition on December 8, 1997, alleging subrogation, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit as causes of action. A second amended petition was filed against both Chandler and Collins on August 19, 1998, alleging breach of contract, subrogation, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit. Guinn filed a motion for summary judgment on November 3, 1998. He asked for judgment on the debt plus attorney's fees in the amount of $40,000.00. In support of his claim for attorney's fees, Guinn submitted the affidavit of Allen D. Russell, which reads in pertinent part, as follows:

My name is Allen D. Russell. I am the attorney of record in the above-styled and numbered cause for and on behalf of ROYCE GUINN, INDIVIDUALLY and d/b/a VIDEO ONE, Plaintiff herein. I am over eighteen (18) years of age and am fully competent and duly authorized to make this Affidavit, which facts are true and correct.

1. I am an attorney duly licensed by the State of Texas and an associate of the law firm of Wauson & Associates, P.C. I am currently practicing in Houston, Harris County, Texas. I am familiar with the fees charged by attorneys in and around Harris County, Texas, for services of a similar nature to those performed herein.

2. ROYCE GUINN, Individually and d/b/a VIDEO ONE has retained the law firm of Wauson & Associates, P.C. to represent it in the suit against Chloe J. Chandler, Defendant herein.

3. All legal services performed on behalf of Royce Guinn, Individually and d/b/a VIDEO ONE have been reasonable and necessary.

4. In my opinion, the sum of no less than Forty Thousand Dollars ($40,-000) is a reasonable and customary fee for the legal services performed in this matter for and on behalf of Royce Guinn, Individually and d/b/a VIDEO ONE in and around Harris County, Texas, through the granting of this Summary Judgment, and collection efforts thereon. My opinion is based on a number of facts, including without limitations, ... the following:

a. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the legal questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly;

b. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;

c. The amount involved;

d. The time limitation imposed by the client and the circumstances;

e. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

f. The experience of the attorneys performing these services.

Collins filed a response to Guinn's motion for summary judgment, contending (1) Guinn's claim is barred by a four-year statute of limitations because the debt was due in 1991, (2) Guinn's summary judgment evidence failed to show an agreement between Collins and Guinn that the 1991 debt would not accrue until the Hyundai case was settled, (3) Guinn should not be allowed to use the 1992 findings of fact and conclusions of law to sue Collins when the judgment in that case ordered that Guinn take nothing, and (4) the 1992 take-nothing judgment bars relitigation of this debt under the doctrine of res judicata.

Guinn/Video One filed a third amended petition on December 17, 1998. That petition alleged breach of contract, subrogation, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit; it also called for application of the "main purpose doctrine" under the theory that Collins "personally promised and represented that he would be liable for the purchase of the goods, wares, merchandise and/or services described in the Plaintiffs account, and that, in the event Chloe J. Chandler did not pay for same, then he would pay for same." Finally, the petition asked for Collins to be collaterally estopped from denying his obligation to pay the debt based on the findings and conclusions issued in 1992 and based on Collins' prior admission in the 1992 suit that he would pay once the Hyundai case settled.

On March 20, 2002, the trial court granted Guinn's motion for summary judgment. The trial court ordered that Guinn recover from Collins and Chandler, jointly and severally, $93,854.51 for services rendered in...

To continue reading

Request your trial
14 cases
  • Orion Refining Corp. v. Uop, 01-05-00681-CV.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • October 4, 2007
    ...and will preclude summary judgment if it affects the outcome of the suit under the substantive law. See Collins v. Guinn, 102 S.W.3d 825, 834 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. denied). A material fact issue is "genuine" only if a reasonable jury could find the fact in favor of the nonmoving pa......
  • Texas South Rentals, Inc. v. Gomez
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • July 17, 2008
    ...nor individual reliance are elements of, or prerequisites to, Plaintiff's UCC and contract Class claims. See Collins v. Guinn, 102 S.W.3d 825 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied). Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Kennedy, 808 S.W.2d 159, 162 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1991, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Hi-Lo Auto S......
  • Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Titan Intern., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • March 3, 2005
    ...51 Ill.2d 186, 281 N.E.2d 652 (1972); Long v. Reeves Southeastern Corp., 259 Ga.App. 257, 576 S.E.2d 641 (2003); Collins v. Guinn, 102 S.W.3d 825, 836 (Tex.App.2003); Campbell, Maack & Sessions v. Debry, 38 P.3d 984, 991 (Utah App.2001). Wausau did that. It showed how the terms of the polic......
  • Fullington v. Equilon Enters., LLC
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • October 25, 2012
    ...in a subsequent lawsuit absent a showing that the same claims were mature at the time of the prior judgment.” ( Collins v. Guinn (Tex.App.2003) 102 S.W.3d 825, 832.) In other words, “judgment in one suit will not operate as res judicata to a subsequent suit on the same question between the ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT