Hyundai Motor Co. v. Chandler

Decision Date25 August 1994
Docket NumberNo. 13-92-145-CV,13-92-145-CV
Citation882 S.W.2d 606
PartiesHYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY, Hyundai Motor America, and Leland Hyundai, Inc., Appellants, v. Chloe J. CHANDLER, Individually and as an Heir of the Estate of Pele Anne Chandler, Jesse Srader, and Shannon Modrell, Appellees.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Charles B. Kirklin, David Scott Curcio, Tim S. Leonard, Kirklin, Boudreaux & Leonard, for appellee/cross appellant Shannon Modrell.

Mike O'Brien, Robert L. Collins, Terrill L. Flenniken, J. Preston Wrotenbery, Hirsch, Glover, Robinson & Sheiness, Houston, for appellees.

Before DORSEY, FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA, Jr. and YANEZ, JJ.

OPINION

FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA, Jr., Justice.

This is an appeal from a products liability suit involving a 1986 Hyundai Excel automobile. The suit arose when the Excel left the road and hit a tree, killing Pele Chandler (the left rear seat passenger) and injuring Shannon Modrell (the driver), Jesse Srader, (the front seat passenger), and Susan Englishbee (the right rear seat passenger).

In August 1987, 19-year-old Pele Chandler attended her friend, Shannon Modrell's 18th birthday party. Shannon's parents and Shannon's friends, Jesse Srader and Susan Englishbee, also attended the party. The party was held at a Steak and Ale Restaurant located near the intersection of I-45 and FM 1960 in Harris County. The party ended late in the evening and Shannon's father, Garry Modrell, let Shannon drive away from the restaurant in his 1986 Hyundai Excel. Shannon only had a learner's permit to drive so Srader sat in the front seat and acted as her licensed, supervising driver. Englishbee sat in the right rear seat and Pele sat in the left rear seat. Shannon drove the Excel out of the restaurant parking lot and turned onto the I-45 feeder road. While on the feeder road, the Excel went out of control, left the road, and collided head on with a tree. All four people were taken to a hospital. Pele was treated in the emergency room and rushed to surgery. She died on the operating table. Shannon, Srader, and Englishbee were only injured.

Chloe Chandler (Pele's mother), Srader, and Shannon sued Hyundai Motor America, Hyundai Motor Company, and Leland Hyundai, Inc. (collectively "Hyundai"), alleging breach of warranty, negligence, and strict liability in its design of the Excel. Chandler also sued Srader and Shannon for negligence and Srader sued Shannon for negligence. The case was tried to a jury and it returned a verdict favorable to appellees. The jury, however, found Shannon 35% negligent. The trial court entered judgment that Chandler recover $661,876.10 from Hyundai and Shannon, that Srader recover $163,951.44 from Hyundai, and that Shannon recover $22,423.98 from Hyundai.

Appellants, Hyundai, appeal by eighteen points of error. Shannon raises six cross-points of error. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.

By points of error ten through sixteen, appellants attack the factual and legal sufficiency of the evidence to support certain jury findings and the damage awards to appellees.

When a party without the burden of proof complains on appeal of a jury finding, the appropriate points of error are that there is "no evidence" or "insufficient evidence" to support the jury finding. Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex.1983).

When we review a "no evidence" or legal sufficiency of the evidence point, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that tend to support the jury's finding, and we disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Responsive Terminal Sys., Inc. v. Boy Scouts of Am., 774 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Tex.1989). We overrule the point and uphold the finding if we find any evidence to support the finding. Southern States Transp., Inc. v. State, 774 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tex.1989).

When we review an "insufficient evidence" or factual sufficiency of the evidence point, we consider, weigh and examine all of the evidence which supports or undermines the jury's finding. Plas-Tex, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex.1989). We set aside the verdict only when we find that the evidence standing alone is too weak to support the finding or that the finding is so against the overwhelming weight of the evidence that it is manifestly unjust and clearly wrong. Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965).

When a party with the burden of proof complains on appeal from an adverse jury finding, the appropriate points of error are "that the matter was established as a matter of law" or "that the jury's finding was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence." Croucher, 660 S.W.2d at 58.

When we review a legal sufficiency or "that the matter was established as a matter of law" point, we examine the record for evidence supporting the finding of fact and ignore all evidence to the contrary. Sterner v. Marathon, 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex.1989); Hickey v. Couchman, 797 S.W.2d 103, 109 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied). If we find that no evidence supports the finding, we must determine from the record whether the contrary proposition is established as a matter of law. Sterner, 767 S.W.2d at 690; Hickey, 797 S.W.2d at 109.

When we review a factual sufficiency or "that the jury's finding was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence" point, we examine the entire record. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986); Hickey, 797 S.W.2d at 110. We set aside the verdict only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176; Hickey, 797 S.W.2d at 110.

By their tenth point of error, appellants attack the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to show that a design defect caused the occurrence.

Chloe Chandler alleged: 1) that the Excel was defective in that it was designed with only a lap belt seat restraint mechanism for back seat passengers, 2) that this mechanism was designed to fasten about the soft tissue portions of the abdomen, as opposed to fastening about the body's pelvic bone region, 3) that at the time of the collision, Pele was wearing the lap belt, 4) that the impact threw her forward, and 5) that the seat belt, which was fastened about her abdomen, broke through her abdominal wall, causing fatal injuries. In the alternative, she alleged that the Excel's defective design caused it to suddenly and without warning, veer off the road and crash, and that this was the producing cause of Pele's death.

Shannon alleged that the Excel had design defects in its steering system, braking system, front drive shaft, and drive system which caused her to lose control of the vehicle. Srader alleged that the Excel had a defect in the right front wheel assembly, causing Shannon to lose control of the car.

Special Question 1 asked the jury:

Was there a manufacturing defect and/or design defect and/or a defect in the marketing of the 1986 Hyundai Excel in question at the time it left the possession of Hyundai that was a producing cause of the occurrence in question?

The jury answered affirmatively to a design defect. We will analyze the evidence to determine whether a design defect caused the Excel to leave the road and whether a design defect in the car's left rear restraint system caused Pele's death.

To recover under a theory of strict liability, a plaintiff must prove the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the defendant's product and a causal connection between the condition and the plaintiff's injuries or damages. Lucas v. Texas Indus., Inc., 696 S.W.2d 372, 377 (Tex.1984); Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Urquidez, 570 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex.1978). A plaintiff may prove a product defective if it is unreasonably dangerous in construction, or if it is unreasonably dangerous as designed, or if it is unreasonably dangerous because adequate warnings or instructions were not provided. Lucas, 696 S.W.2d at 377; Miller v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 568 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tex.1977).

The Supreme Court has established a test for determining design defect. Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex.1979). The test requires balancing the product's utility against the risks involved in its use in order to find that the design is unreasonably dangerous. Id. The Supreme Court has stated:

The jury may consider many factors before deciding whether a product's usefulness or desirability are out-weighed by its risks. Their finding on defectiveness may be influenced by evidence of a safer design that would have prevented the injury. [citations omitted.] Because defectiveness of the product in question is determined in relation to safer alternatives, the fact that its risks could be diminished easily or cheaply may greatly influence the outcome of the case....

This feasibility is a relative, not an absolute, concept; the more scientifically and economically feasible the alternative was the more likely that a jury may find that the product was defectively designed. A plaintiff may advance the argument that a safer alternative was feasible with evidence that it was in actual use or was available at the time of manufacture. Feasibility may also be shown with evidence of the scientific and economic capacity to develop the safer alternative....

Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 746 (Tex.1980). See Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 62 (Tex.1983).

Evidence of a Design Defect Leading to Shannon's Loss of Control of the Excel

Roger Owens, an engineer, testified that he inspected and evaluated the Excel to see if it had a defect in its steering or front end. He looked at the steering and drive-train assembly, some reports and test data performed by independent contractors at Hyundai's request, and consumer complaints that, according to Owens, addressed the severe vibration in the Excel's front end. When Owens was...

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8 cases
  • Sipes v. General Motors Corp.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • June 3, 1997
    ...accepted in Texas to show that an injury is compatible with certain types of impacts. See Hyundai Motor Co. v. Chandler, 882 S.W.2d 606, 612-13 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied). The defect does not have to cause the collision precipitating the injury. Turner v. General Motors Cor......
  • Parks v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc.
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    ...arose out of an accident that occurred in 1987, more than a year before the Parkses' Hyundai Excel was sold. Hyundai Motor Co. v. Chandler, 882 S.W.2d 606 (Tex.App.1994). Although the reported Chandler opinion does not indicate when the complaint was filed, the decision raises an issue as t......
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    • April 30, 1997
    ...appellant was required to prove that a defect existed in order to warrant a finding on this issue. Hyundai Motor Co. v. Chandler, 882 S.W.2d 606 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); Crosbyton Seed Co. v. Mechura Farms, 875 S.W.2d 353 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1994, no writ). Appell......
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