Collins v. King Am. Finishing, Inc., CV 612-077

• Decision Date: 09 November 2012
• Docket Number: CV 612-077
• Parties: STEPHEN COLLINS and DENISE COLLINS, Plaintiffs, v. KING AMERICA FINISHING, INC., WESTEX HOLDING CO., and MICHAEL ALBERT BEASLEY Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

STEPHEN COLLINS and DENISE COLLINS, Plaintiffs, v. KING AMERICA FINISHING, INC., WESTEX HOLDING CO. and MICHAEL ALBERT BEASLEY Defendants.

CV 612-077

United States District Court Southern District Of Georgia Savannah Division

DATED: November 9, 2012

ORDER

Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand this case to the Superior Court of Bulloch County. See Dkt. No. 19. Upon due consideration, Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand is GRANTED.

I. INTRODUCTION

This action is predicated on the alleged property damage resulting from Defendants' alleged tortious actions. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants released toxic chemicals into the Ogeechee River, harming the river andPlaintiffs' property. Dkt. No. 1-1. Consequently, Plaintiffs assert the following claims against Defendants: Damage to Property, Continuing Nuisance, Trespass, Negligence Per Se, Negligence, Riparian Rights, Punitive Damages, and Attorney's Fees. Id.

Plaintiffs filed this action in the Superior Court of Bulloch County, Georgia. Id. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446, Defendants removed the case to this Court. Dkt. No. 1. Defendants assert that Defendant Beasley was fraudulently joined. Id. Defendants further assert that, by ignoring Defendant Beasley, who they contend was fraudulently joined, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction due to complete diversity of citizenship between Plaintiffs and the corporate Defendants. Id.

Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case to the Superior Court. Dkt. No. 19. Defendant filed a response to Plaintiffs' motion. Dkt. No. 26. Plaintiffs filed a reply. Dkt. No. 27.

II. PARTIES

Plaintiffs are Georgia residents. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 14. Defendant King America Finishing, Inc. ("King America") is aforeign corporation.¹ Id. at ¶ 16. Defendant Westex Holding Co. is a foreign corporation.² Id. at ¶¶ 17-18. Defendant Beasley is a Georgia resident and President of Defendant King America. Id. at ¶¶ 20, 24.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

An action filed in state court may be removed to federal court based upon diversity or federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). When a case is removed based on diversity jurisdiction, the case must be remanded to state court if there is not complete diversity between the parties, Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806), or one of the defendants is a citizen of the state in which the suit is filed, § 1441(b). However, "[w]hen a plaintiff names a non-diverse defendant solely in order to defeat federal diversity jurisdiction, the district court must ignore the presence of the non-diverse defendant and deny any motion to remand the matterback to state court." Stillwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 663 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Henderson v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 454 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2006)). In such a case, the plaintiff is said to have "fraudulently joined" the non-diverse defendant. See id.

To establish fraudulent joinder, "the removing party has the burden of proving [by clear and convincing evidence] that either: (1) there is no possibility the plaintiff can establish a cause of action against the resident defendant; or (2) the plaintiff has fraudulently pled jurisdictional facts to bring the resident defendant into state court." Id. (citing Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997)) (bracketed text in original). This burden is a "heavy one." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

"To determine whether the case should be remanded, the district court must evaluate the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and must resolve any uncertainties about state substantive law in favor of the plaintiff." Id. at 1333 (citing Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997)). The court may consider the plaintiff's pleadings as well as affidavits and depositiontranscripts submitted by the parties. Id. at 1333 n.l; Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1538.

In evaluating the factual allegations and resolving uncertainties in state substantive law, the court applies a "lax" standard. See Stillwell, 663 F.3d at 1332-323. The court is "not to weigh the merits of a plaintiff's claim beyond determining whether it is an arguable one under state law." Id. at 1333 (citing Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1538). "If there is even a possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any one of the resident defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder was proper and remand the case to the state court." Id. (citing Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433, 1440-41 (11th Cir. 1983), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 991 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir. 1993)). In other words, "[t]he plaintiff need not have a winning case against the allegedly fraudulent defendant; he need only have a possibility of stating a valid cause of action in order for the joinder to be legitimate." Id. (citing Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998)).

This standard differs from the standard applicable to a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss under the Federal Rules of CivilProcedure. Id. To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. In contrast, all that is required to defeat a fraudulent joinder claim is "a possibility of stating a valid cause of action." Stillwell, 663 F.3d at 1333 (citing Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs and Defendant Beasley are Georgia residents. Therefore, this Court lacks diversity jurisdiction over the case unless Defendant Beasley was fraudulently joined. As the removing party, Defendants bear the heavy burden of proving that Defendant Beasley was fraudulently joined.

In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege the following facts. Defendant Beasley is the President of King America. Dkt. No. 1-1 at ¶ 4. Defendant Beasley³ is "in the business of preparing, dyeing, finishing, applying fire retardant, crease prevention materials, and other processing of textiles" in Dover, Georgia. Id. at ¶ 7. He "disposed of treated waste water into the Ogeechee River" pursuant to a state permit "for more than five (5) years." Id. at ¶¶ 8, 10. This release of toxic chemicals "killed significant numbers of aquatic wildlife downstream of [King America's] plant," including areas "in and around the Ogeechee River, along Plaintiffs' properties located downstream of [King America's] plant." Id. at ¶¶ 11-12. Defendant Beasley's release of these toxic chemicals damaged Plaintiffs' property through loss of fish and wildlife, market devaluation, and loss of the use and enjoyment of Plaintiffs' property. Id. at ¶ 13.

Defendants claim that Plaintiffs have not stated a colorable cause of action against Defendant Beasley. Dkt. No. 26. Specifically, Defendants allege that Plaintiffs' Complaint contains "bare-boned, nonspecific allegations" that do not articulate what Defendant Beasley did or did not do to give riseto personal liability. Id. at 4-5. In contrast, Plaintiffs submit that the case should be remanded to state court. This Court finds that Defendant Beasley was not fraudulently joined. Therefore, this case must be remanded to state court.

A. Legal Standard

A claim of fraudulent joinder is defeated by the "possibility" of a valid cause of action. See supra Part III. In its analysis, this Court "must necessarily look to the pleading standards applicable in state court, not the plausibility pleading standards prevailing in federal court." Stillwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 663 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2011).

Georgia follows a notice pleading standard.⁴ See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-8; Sherman v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Assessors, 288 Ga. 88,90 (2010). Under this standard, "it is immaterial whether a pleading states conclusions or facts as long as fair notice is given, and the statement of claim is short and plain. The true test is whether the pleading gives fair notice . . . ." Stillwell, 663 F.3d at 1334 (citing Carley v. Lewis, 221 Ga. Ct. App. 540, 542 (1996)).

B. Application

Plaintiffs' Complaint recites allegations sufficient to satisfy Georgia's notice pleading standard. Specifically, the Complaint names Defendant Beasley as one of three defendants. Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶¶ 3-5. The Complaint then alleges that Defendants' actions resulted in, inter alia, damage to and diminution in value of Plaintiffs' property. Dkt. No. 1-1. Plaintiffs allege that this damage resulted from Defendants' intentional and negligent actions. Id. (bringing property damage, nuisance, trespass, negligence per se, negligence, and riparian rights causes of action).

1. Specificity of the Complaint

Defendants suggest that Plaintiffs' allegations are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can possibly begranted. Defendants argue that the Complaint contains "bare-boned, nonspecific allegations." Dkt. No. 26 at 4. However, in assessing the possibility of a valid state court cause of action, the Eleventh Circuit only requires "conclusory allegations or a certain level of factual specificity." Stillwell, 663 F.3d at 1334. Therefore, it is sufficient that Plaintiffs allege that Defendants—including Defendant Beasley— released toxic chemicals that damaged Plaintiffs' property. Each defendant, including Defendant Beasley, is on notice that Plaintiffs bring eight (8) causes of action against it.⁵ Dkt. No. 1-1. This is all that Georgia law requires. See In re D.C., 268 Ga. Ct. App. 882, 885 (2004) ("Under notice pleading procedure of the [Georgia] Civil Practice Act, not more than a short and plain statement of the claim giving the defendant reasonable notice thereof is required."); Hawkins v. Rice, 203 Ga. Ct. App. 537, 537 (1992) ("It is not...