Collins v. Martin

• Decision Date: 07 April 1980
• Docket Number: No. 59136,59136
• Citation: 267 S.E.2d 858,154 Ga.App. 250
• Parties: COLLINS v. MARTIN et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 858

267 S.E.2d 858

154 Ga.App. 250

COLLINS v. MARTIN et al.

No. 59136.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Submitted Jan. 11, 1980.

Decided April 7, 1980.

Anthony R. Cueto, Macon, for appellant.

C. Richardson Cook, Macon, for appellees.

SOGNIER, Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the Bibb County Juvenile Court permanently terminating the appellant's parental rights to her daughter. The child's paternal grandparents brought a petition in juvenile court alleging deprivation. After a hearing, the trial court found the child deprived and ordered that the paternal grandparents be awarded temporary custody of the child. The court further ordered a subsequent hearing be held to give the appellant an opportunity to show that she could establish a home suitable for the care of the child. At a hearing held two years after the initial hearing, the court found that the deprivation which existed was likely to continue and the situation was not likely to improve. The court terminated appellant's parental rights and awarded custody of the child to the paternal grandparents. The issue presented on appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence for the court to find the probability of continuous deprivation so that the mother's rights to her child should be terminated. We find that the evidence did not support the court's order.

Appellant had been married to the son of the appellees, who now have custody of the child. While the appellant and the father of the child were married, he took the child to his parents and asked that they look after the child since he and his wife (the appellant) had separated. At the time, appellant had no job and testified that although she did not consent to the grandparents having custody of her daughter, as long as the child was with her father appellant did not object to her daughter living with the grandparents. Subsequently, the grandparents brought a petition in juvenile court alleging that the child was deprived and that appellant's parental rights should be terminated.

At the initial hearing, evidence was introduced to show that the home in which appellant had lived with her daughter, then two years old, was substandard with regard to cleanliness; that the child had a severe diaper rash; that appellant and her husband argued and used profane language in front of the child; that appellant and her husband had had sexual relations in front of the child; and that the child had been left unattended on occasion. There was also evidence of sexual promiscuity. The juvenile court found the child to be deprived and awarded the grandparents temporary custody of the child until such time as the court could determine if said deprivation would continue. At a subsequent hearing, there was evidence that appellant had given birth to a second child out of wedlock and that appellant had moved to Indiana and was drawing welfare. Evidence was also introduced that appellant had changed her lifestyle and had established a home for herself and her second child in Indiana; that she had been employed prior to giving birth to her second child; that she was properly caring for the second child; and that she was to begin secretarial training for which she would be paid. The court also received into evidence various reports from social service agencies in Indiana which indicated that appellant's home was adequate and that it could not be said that appellant should not have custody of her daughter. The court found the deprivation likely to continue and that appellant had not shown a situation which would warrant returning the child to its mother. The court, in accordance with Code Ann. § 24A-3201(a)(2), terminated appellant's parental rights.

In R. C. N. v. State of Ga., 141 Ga.App. 490, 233 S.E.2d 866 (1977), this court faced a similar situation regarding the termination of the parental rights of a mother. The trial court's decision was reversed in that case even though the evidence showed that the mother was unemployed and had no steady source of income; that she had lived at several different addresses; that she had formerly been in trouble with the police; that she had missed several appointments to see the child; that the home in which she lived had been observed to be unclean; and that she was known to use profane language.

We find the court's reasoning in R. C. N. applicable to the present case. "Seldom does the state wield so awesome a power as when it permanently cuts the family ties between parent and child. While the state may not sit blindly idle as a child suffers unconscionable hardship, neither may it blithely intercede simply because the child's lot is substandard. A mother's failure fully to live up to societal norms for productivity, morality, cleanliness and responsibility does not summarily rob her of the right to raise her own offspring, nor does it end the child's...