Collins v. Sotka

• Decision Date: 29 April 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-2127,96-2127
• Citation: 81 Ohio St.3d 506,692 N.E.2d 581
• Parties: COLLINS, Admr., Appellant, v. SOTKA; Dudich, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 506

81 Ohio St.3d 506

692 N.E.2d 581

COLLINS, Admr., Appellant, v. SOTKA; Dudich, Appellee.

No. 96-2127.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Dec. 10, 1997.

Decided April 29, 1998.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. The discovery rule applies to toll R.C. 2125.02(D), the two-year statute of limitations for a wrongful death claim. (Shover v. Cordis Corp. [1991], 61 Ohio St.3d 213, 574 N.E.2d 457, overruled.)

2. In a wrongful death action that stems from a murder, the statute of limitations begins to run when the victim's survivors discover, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, that the defendant has been convicted and sentenced for the murder.

The underlying facts in this case stem from the tragic abduction and killing of seventeen-year-old Angel C. Ormston by defendant Mark J. Sotka. Angel was last seen alive by family and friends on July 31, 1992. Nearly five months later, on December 15, 1992, two hunters discovered Angel's body in the woods in Perry Township. An autopsy was performed by the Cuyahoga County Coroner's Office, finding the cause of death to be multiple stab wounds in the trunk. The first death certificate listed the date of death as "unknown." However, at the request of Angel's family, a second death certificate was issued listing the date of death as July 31, 1992, the date Angel disappeared.

On January 4, 1993, the Lake County Grand Jury handed down a secret indictment against Sotka, charging him with aggravated murder (count one), aggravated kidnapping (count two), and aggravated felonious assault. On February 5, 1993, Sotka pled guilty to the aggravated murder and kidnapping of Angel. On that same date, but in an order journalized on February 10, 1993, the trial court sentenced Sotka to a term of incarceration of twenty years on count one and to an indefinite term of ten to twenty-five years on count two, to run consecutively to count one.

On February 6, 1995, plaintiff-appellant, Luckye Collins, the administrator for the estate of Angel Ormston, filed a pro se wrongful death action against Sotka and defendant-appellee Kathleen Dudich, the owner of the vacant house where Sotka allegedly killed the decedent. Both Sotka and Dudich sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it had not been timely filed within the two-year statute of limitations for a wrongful death action.

Appellee argued that since the wrongful death action was not commenced within two years from the decedent's death (which was said to be July 31, 1992), the action was time-barred under R.C. 2125.01. The trial court dismissed the case because the action was not commenced within two years from the date of death.

On appeal, appellant argued that the discovery rule should apply so that the two-year statute of limitations begins to run when the court adjudicates the murder case and states who is responsible for the murder. Only then can a wrongful death action commence. The court of appeals, however, relying on Shover v. Cordis Corp. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 213, 574 N.E.2d 457, rejected this argument and refused to apply the discovery rule to this type of case. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court and held that the action was properly dismissed, since the complaint was not filed within two years from the decedent's date of death.

The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal.

Les E. Rockmael, Parma Heights, for appellant.

Williams & Sennett Co., L.P.A., Roger H. Williams, Louis R. Moliterno, Twinburg, and Gina K. Desiderio, Chagrin Falls, for appellee Dudich.

FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, Sr., Justice.

In the context of a wrongful death action, we are asked to determine when the two-year statute of limitations begins to run. In answering this question, we must decide whether the statute of limitations runs from the date of death of the victim, or whether the discovery rule can be used to extend the statutory period in which to commence such an action. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the discovery rule is applicable.

Ordinarily, a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run at the time the wrongful act was committed. Kunz v. Buckeye Union Ins. Co. (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 79, 1 OBR 117, 437 N.E.2d 1194. However, under the discovery rule, which is an exception to the general rule, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered, that he or she was injured by the wrongful conduct of the defendant. O'Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp. (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 84, 4 OBR 335, 447 N.E.2d 727; Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Found. (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 111, 5 OBR 247, 449 N.E.2d 438, syllabus. In essence, the running of the limitations period is delayed until triggered by a "cognizable event" that alerts the plaintiff that he or she was injured by the defendant. See, e.g., Zimmie v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 54, 538 N.E.2d 398 (where the cognizable event in a legal malpractice case was the event that should have alerted a reasonable person that a questionable legal practice may have occurred).

In deciding whether the discovery rule can be used to toll R.C. 2125.02(D), the two-year statute of limitations for a wrongful death claim, it is necessary to revisit our decision in Shover v. Cordis Corp., which appellee asserts directly supports her position, and which the lower courts relied upon in dismissing appellant's cause of action.

In Shover, the decedent's death was caused by a defective pacemaker. It was not until about four years after her death (and beyond the two-year statute of limitations) that decedent's son learned through a newspaper article that the pacemaker manufacturer had pled guilty to charges of concealing the pacemaker's defects. Less than five months after learning this fact, the son filed a products liability and wrongful death action against the manufacturer. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the wrongful death claim had not been brought within two years from the date of the decedent's death. The court of appeals affirmed.

In a four-to-three decision, this court likewise affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the case and held that "[n]either fraud nor the discovery rule can toll R.C. 2125.02(D), Ohio's statute setting forth the time within which to commence wrongful death actions." Id. at syllabus. In refusing to apply the discovery rule, we focused on the fact that a wrongful death claim is based upon the death of a person and is a special statutory action created by the General Assembly. We strictly construed the statutory language of R.C. 2125.02(D) (now R.C. 2125.02[D] ), which states that "[a]n action for wrongful death shall be commenced within two years after the decedent's death," and held that the discovery rule is inapplicable, since the legislature did not engraft tolling language into the wrongful death statute.

We further reasoned that the discovery rule has traditionally been limited to malpractice actions, which we said differ from wrongful death claims. With respect to malpractice claims, we reasoned that the injury may not be discovered immediately, whereas in wrongful death actions, the death of the person, which is the basic element of a wrongful death action, is a known factor, allowing the survivors to proceed on the decedent's behalf without delay. Id., 61 Ohio St.3d at 218, 574 N.E.2d at 461. Based upon these reasons, we concluded that the General Assembly "intended that wrongful death actions be brought within two years regardless of the date of discovery of the cause of death." Id. at 215, 574 N.E.2d at 459.

In reexamining this issue, we find that our analysis in Shover is flawed. To begin with, we incorrectly focused on the statutory language of the wrongful death statute and ignored the many policy considerations that have supported our application of the discovery rule in a variety of contexts.

A wrongful death claim is not triggered merely by the death of a person, but by "the death of a person * * * caused by wrongful act." (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2125.01(A)(1); see, also, Shover v. Cordis Corp., 61 Ohio St.3d at 220-221, 574 N.E.2d at 463, construing former R.C. 2125.01 (A. William Sweeney, J., dissenting). Therefore, in order for a wrongful death case to be brought, the death must be wrongful. The fact that a body was discovered and/or that a death took place is irrelevant unless there is proof that a defendant was at fault and caused the death. Death, in and of itself, does not trigger the running of the statute of limitations in a wrongful death case stemming from a murder.

Furthermore, we were incorrect in Shover when we stated that the discovery rule was traditionally limited to malpractice claims and when we noted that, with respect to a wrongful death claim, the injury manifests itself upon the death of the person. Although the discovery rule was initially applied in the context of medical malpractice (Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic [1972], 32 Ohio St.2d 198, 61 O.O.2d 430, 290 N.E.2d 916; Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Found.), it has not been limited solely to that area. Instead, it has been applied in several other situations. See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co. (S.D.Ohio 1986), 656 F.Supp. 49, 74 (fraud); Burr v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1986), 23 Ohio St.3d 69, 23 OBR 200, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (adoption); Skidmore & Hall v. Rottman (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 210, 5 OBR 453, 450 N.E.2d 684 (legal malpractice); Liddell v. SCA Services of Ohio (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 6, 635 N.E.2d 1233 (negligent exposure to toxic gas); Ault v. Jasko (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 114, 637 N.E.2d 870 (sexual abuse); NCR Corp. v. U.S. Mineral Products Co. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 269, 649 N.E.2d 175 (asbestos removal).

In each of these cases in which we invoked the discovery rule, we found that the injury complained of did not manifest itself immediately. Therefore, rather...