Collins v. State
| Decision Date | 05 May 2010 |
| Parties | Jacquon Lakeem COLLINS v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
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Bradford C. Peabody (Paul DeWolf, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.
Diane E. Keller (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee.
Panel: JAMES R. EYLER, KEHOE and CHARLES E. MOYLAN, JR. (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Jacquon Lakeem Collins appeals his October 7, 2008, conviction by a jury in the Circuit Court for Dorchester County of attempted second degree murder, assault in the first and second degree, first degree burglary, reckless endangerment, and wearing or carrying a dangerous weapon.
Appellant presents three questions, which we have reworded1 for purposes of this appeal:
We answer the first two questions in the negative and conclude the third has not been preserved for appellate review. We affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
On September 26, 2007, appellant shot Juan Figueroa3 (Figueroa) at Figueroa's home in Cambridge, Maryland. Appellant's version of the events is that he had gone to Figueroa's home to purchase heroin and that the two began arguing over the price. Appellant claims that Figueroa then produced a shotgun. A struggle ensued, during which the shotgun discharged, critically wounding Figueroa.
The State's version of events is that appellant broke into Figueroa's home, armed with a shotgun, and demanded money from Figueroa. Figueroa attempted to defend himself by grabbing the shotgun, but was unsuccessful. Collins then shot Figueroa.
Figueroa was first taken to Dorchester General Hospital and then "life flighted" to the Shock Trauma Center in Baltimore. On September 27, 2007, Detective Christopher Flynn, with the aid of Corporal Jose Hernandez, both with the City of Cambridge Police Department, met Figueroa in his hospital room at the Shock Trauma Center. Figueroa was awake, but unable to speak. Figueroa could not speak English. With Corporal Hernandez acting as a translator, Detective Flynn presented Figueroa with a photo array containing six photographs of possible suspects, including appellant.4 Figueroa immediately pointed to appellant's photograph and, when asked if appellant was the one who shot him, nodded his head up and down. Charges were promptly filed against appellant.
On September 28, 2007, the Salisbury Police Department arrested appellant. Appellant was then transferred to the Cambridge Police Department for questioning, during the course of which he made first an oral and then a written confession to Detective Flynn.
On November 20, 2007, the State charged appellant in the District Court for Dorchester County with attempted first degree murder, first degree burglary, first degree assault, second degree assault, wearing and carrying a dangerous weapon with intent to injure, and reckless endangerment. Appellant's initial appearance was on November 27, 2007. Appellant's trial was scheduled for April 16, 2008.
On March 24, 2008, Figueroa's mother contacted the Cambridge Police Department and informed them that she had developed "leads" as to who had shot her son. Appellant's was not among the names she provided. The Cambridge Police Department informed the Dorchester County State's Attorney of this on April 14, 2008. The State promptly notified appellant's counsel. On April 16, 2008, the day of trial, the State nol prossed the charges against appellant. The transcript of the nol pros proceedings does not reflect the State's reason for nol prossing the charges.
The Cambridge Police Department investigated the information generated by Ms. Figueroa and quickly concluded that appellant had been responsible for the shooting.
On May 8, 2008, appellant was indicted by a Grand Jury for the Circuit Court for Dorchester County for attempted first degree murder, first degree burglary, first degree assault, second degree assault, wearing or carrying a dangerous weapon with intent to injure, reckless endangerment, conspiracy to commit murder, and conspiracy to commit first degree assault. Other than the addition of the two conspiracy counts, the indictment was not substantially different from the earlier statement of charges against appellant.
A pre-trial suppression hearing was held on September 18, 2008, on appellant's motions to suppress Figueroa's hospital bed identification of appellant's photograph5 and appellant's confession. On October 6, 2008, the trial court heard argument on appellant's motion to dismiss for violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and the Hicks rule.6 All of appellant's motions were denied. (We will discuss the evidence presented at the hearings later in this opinion.)
At trial, the State presented evidence, in the form of Figueroa's testimony, that appellant broke into Figueroa's home on September 26, 2007. After seeing appellant on a home surveillance system, Figueroa confronted appellant in the kitchen. Appellant was holding a shotgun and demanded money from Figueroa. Figueroa refused, grabbed for the shotgun, and was shot. The State also introduced evidence of Figueroa's identification and appellant's confession. Figueroa also testified that his assailants were wearing masks and dressed all in black.
Appellant called Corporal Hernandez to ask whether Figueroa had ever previously mentioned "anyone wearing a black mask" in connection with his shooting. Corporal Hernandez testified "no" and the defense rested.
The jury acquitted appellant of attempted first degree murder, but convicted him of attempted second degree murder, first degree burglary, assault in the first and second degree, wearing or carrying a dangerous weapon with intent to injure and reckless endangerment.7 On October 7, 2008, appellant was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment for attempted second degree murder with a consecutive sentence of 10 years for first degree burglary.8 Appellant filed a timely appeal.
We will discuss additional facts as necessary later in this opinion.
Criminal Procedure Article § 6-103 provides:
The Court of Appeals adopted what is now Maryland Rule 4-271 to implement the statute. The language of Rule 4-271(a) tracks the statute. It states:
(a) Trial date in circuit court. (1) The date for trial in the circuit court shall be set within 30 days after the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the circuit court pursuant to Rule 4-213, and shall be not later than 180 days after the earlier of those events.... On motion of a party, or on the court's initiative, and for good cause shown, the county administrative judge or that judge's designee may grant a change of a circuit court trial date. If a circuit court trial date is changed, any subsequent changes of the trial date may be made only by the county administrative judge or that judge's designee for good cause shown.
Appellant's initial appearance was on November 27, 2007. His trial, if not for the nol pros, therefore, would have had to have been begun by May 27, 2008, in order to avoid a Hicks violation.9
Appellant contends that the State nol prossed the original charges as a tactical method for circumventing the Hicks rule. He asserts that the State's stated reason for nol prossing the charges, in order to explore evidence that might exculpate appellant, clearly shows that it was not ready to go to trial and needed more time to gather evidence. Appellant also argues that the nol pros had the actual effect of circumventing the Hicks rule as appellant's actual trial did not occur until four and one-half months after the expiration of the 180 day deadline in the original prosecution.
The State contends that the nol pros of the initial charges was in good faith and did not have the purpose or necessary effect of circumventing the 180-day rule.10
Writing for the Court of Appeals, Chief Judge Bell has identified the policy considerations underlying § 6-103 and Rule 4-271:
The statute and the rule ... have two aspects. Section 6-103 and Rule 4-271 "set forth both a definite time requirement for the trial of criminal cases and an explicit procedure for postponing a case beyond the 180-day limit." They "codify and implement the chief legislative objective that `there should be a prompt disposition of criminal charges in the circuit courts.'" Their intended objectives, implemented via the mechanism established by the statute and the rule, are to afford reasonably prompt trials, and eliminate excessive scheduling delays and unjustifiable postponements. Thus,...
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