Collins v. United States, Civil No. 98-4990 (JBS) (D. N.J. 7/31/2000), Civil No. 98-4990 (JBS).
| Decision Date | 31 July 2000 |
| Docket Number | [Crim. No. 96-141 (JBS)].,Civil No. 98-4990 (JBS). |
| Parties | DWIGHT COLLINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Dwight Collins Fort Dix, New Jersey, Petitioner pro se.
Robert J. Cleary United States Attorney By: Mary A. Futcher Assistant U.S. Attorney Mitchell H. Cohen Courthouse Camden, New Jersey, Attorney for Respondent.
This matter comes before the Court on petitioner Dwight Collins' application for post-conviction relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. On August 14, 1996, a jury found petitioner guilty of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute approximately one kilogram of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, possession with intent to distribute in excess of 500 grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and using or carrying a semiautomatic pistol in relation to a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and (2). On October 18, 1996, this Court sentenced petitioner to 208 months imprisonment and five-years supervised release, a fine of $2,000, and a special assessment fee of $150.
In the present application, petitioner asserts four grounds for § 2255 relief. First, petitioner claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, due to counsel's failure to move the court to suppress illegally obtained testimony, failure to object to erroneous jury instruction, failure to properly inform petitioner of maximum sentence exposure, and failure to impeach the government's witness. Second, petitioner claims that he was denied due process because the government permitted and reinforced perjured testimony. Third, petitioner argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (). Fourth, petitioner argues that he was subjected to double jeopardy in violation of the Fifth Amendment because he was sentenced for both conspiracy to distribute cocaine and conspiracy to use firearms in a drug trafficking offense.1
For reasons now discussed, this Court finds petitioner's claims for § 2255 relief to be without merit, and as such, this petition will be denied in its entirety.
Petitioner was convicted for his involvement in a drug transaction that took place on March 7, 1996 in the parking lot of the Hilton Hotel in Cherry Hill, New Jersey. (Resp't's Br. at 3.) The details of the arrest and conviction, as developed from the evidence at trial, are as follows.
Tanika Miller went to the Hilton Hotel to deliver a previously negotiated kilogram of cocaine. (Id.) The purchasers of the cocaine, however, were undercover DEA task force officers. (Id.) The officers showed Miller $25,000 cash and Miller showed the officers cocaine which was stored in her car. (Id.) Miller and the officers then decided to return to the lobby of the hotel to finalize the deal. (Id.) On their way across the parking lot, co-conspirators William Thompson and Zel Tisby, performing counter-surveillance of the transaction, confronted and surrounded the undercover officers. (Id.) Thompson pulled a MAC 11, a semi-automatic assault weapon, from his pants and pointed it at one of the officers. (Id.) DEA surveillance agents moved in and Thompson and Tisby were arrested after a short foot chase. (Id.)
Thompson, in a post-arrest statement, said that petitioner told him and Tisby to follow Miller to make sure that Miller came back with his money from the cocaine deal. (Id.) Thompson also said that petitioner gave them the weapon. (Id.)
Miller, in a post-arrest statement, said that petitioner, who she called "Worm," was her source for the cocaine. (Id.) Miller also agreed to cooperate with law enforcement officials. (Id.) Miller placed several consensually monitored telephone calls to petitioner in which she told petitioner that her car had broken down and that she was stranded with all the money. (Id.) When petitioner arrived at the location where Miller told him she was stranded, petitioner was arrested. (Id.) Officers found documents with one of petitioner's names and a cocaine-cutting agent in petitioner's car. (Id.) DEA lab analysis determined that the cutting agent was used to cut the cocaine that was involved in the Hilton Hotel transaction. (Id.)
On March 12, 1996, a Grand Jury indicted petitioner for (1) conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute approximately one kilogram of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, (2) possession with intent to distribute in excess of 500 grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and (3) aiding and abetting the using or carrying a semiautomatic pistol in relation to a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2. (Id. at 2.)
Petitioner's jury trial before the undersigned began on August 5, 1996. (Pet'r's Br. at 3.) On August 14, 1996, petitioner was found guilty of the charged offenses. (Id.) On October 18, 1996, petitioner received a sentence of 208 months imprisonment and five years supervised release, a fine of $2,000, and a special assessment fee of $150. (Resp't's Br. at 2.)
Petitioner appealed his case to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. (Id.) On November 14, 1997, his conviction was affirmed. (Pet'r's Br. at 3; Resp't's Br. at 2.)
Petitioner timely filed the present petition for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on November 4, 1998. (Resp't's Br. at 2.) Respondent filed its Answer on January 19, 1999. (Id. at 1.) Petitioner filed a Reply Brief on February 10, 1999 and a Motion to Amend Petition with Additional Legal Argument on May 1, 2000. (Pet'r's Reply Br. at 1; Pet'r's Mot. to Amend at 1.) The Respondent did not answer petitioner's Motion to Amend, and the Court has deemed the proffered arguments incorporated into the initial petition.
In his petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner raises the following grounds for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel due to failure to move the court to suppress illegally obtained testimony, failure to object to erroneous jury instruction, failure to properly inform petitioner of maximum sentence exposure, and failure to impeach government witness, (2) denial of due process because the government permitted and reinforced perjured testimony, (3) insufficient evidence to convict defendant of violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), use or carry of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense, and (4) double jeopardy due to convictions for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and conspiracy to use firearms during a drug trafficking offense.
A prisoner who is in custody under the sentence of a federal court can move the court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to correct his sentence if it is erroneous. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 426 (1962). The sentencing court is authorized to discharge or resentence a defendant if it concludes that it was "without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." Hill, 368 U.S. at 426-27 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255). However, "[s]ection 2255 does not afford a remedy for all errors that may be made at trial or sentencing." United States v. Essig, 10 F.3d 968, 977 n.25 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979)). The Supreme Court has found that a claim of legal error, unlike a claim of jurisdictional or constitutional error, is not cognizable under § 2255, unless the alleged legal error raises a "fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 185 (quoting Hill, 368 U.S. at 428).
Petitioner raises the following four general grounds for relief in his petition: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) denial of due process, (3) insufficient evidence to convict, and (4) double jeopardy. An evidentiary hearing is not necessary for the disposition of these claims.
Under Rule 8(a) of the rules governing § 2255 proceedings, if the district court "upon a review of those proceedings and of the expanded record" determines that "an evidentiary hearing is not required, the judge shall make such disposition of the motion as justice dictates." 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2255, Rule 8(a). Whether to order an evidentiary hearing in connection with the review of a § 2255 motion is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 41 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Government of the Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 1989)). In exercising such discretion, the court must accept the truth of the factual allegations, unless they are clearly frivolous on the face of the existing record. Forte, 865 F.2d at 62. If the prisoner's allegations raise an issue of material fact, the court must hold an evidentiary hearing in order to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief. See Walker v. Johnson, 312 U.S. 275, 285 (1941); United States v. Constanzo, 625 F.2d 465, 468 (3d Cir. 1980). Moreover, the "district court need not hold a hearing where the record as it stands decisively answers the Section 2255 motion." United States v. Leiby, 820 F.2d 70, 73 (3d Cir. 1987).
Here, the record before the Court is complete and detailed, making further discovery unnecessary. As detailed below, the file and record in this case provide all the information necessary to decide whether petitioner's claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, denial of due process, insufficient evidence, and double jeopardy warrant § 2255 relief.
Petitioner...
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