Collins v. United States

• Decision Date: 06 February 1985
• Docket Number: No. 83-474.,No. 83-523.,No. 83-771.,83-474.,83-523.,83-771.
• Parties: James J. COLLINS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee. Eddie P. BEST, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee. Kevin D. BALDWIN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

491 A.2d 480

James J. COLLINS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

Eddie P. BEST, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

Kevin D. BALDWIN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 83-474.

No. 83-523.

No. 83-771.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued September 20, 1984.

Decided February 6, 1985.^*

Amended Opinion Filed April 8, 1985.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Edward Gross, Washington, D.C., for appellant Collins.

Randy Hertz, Public Defender Service, Washington, D.C., with whom James Klein and John P. Dwyer, Public Defender Service, Washington, D.C., were on the brief for appellant Best.

Thomas K. Clancy, Washington, D.C., for appellant Baldwin.

Helen M. Bollwerk, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., with whom Joseph E. diGenova, U.S. Atty., Michael W. Farrell and Mary Ellen Abrecht, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on the brief for appellee.

Before PRYOR, Chief Judge, and NEBEKER and ROGERS, Associate Judges.

ROGERS, Associate Judge:

Appellants appeal their convictions by a jury of armed robbery, D.C.Code §§ 22-2901, —3202 (1981 & Supp. 1984), and appellant Collins appeals his conviction of carrying a pistol without a license, id. § 22-3204. They assign as error the trial court's refusal to order a competency examination of the complainant and to allow cross-examination about the complainant's alleged psychiatric treatment and prior arrest for gun possession. Appellants Baldwin and Collins also assign as error the denial of a motion for discovery of the witness' psychological and psychiatric records, and appellant Collins contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the lineup and in-court identifications. We find these claims unpersuasive and affirm.

I

Sherlock Muirhead testified that on April 27, 1982, around 3 p.m., while he was standing near Kennedy Street and Georgia Avenue, N.W., three men drove up in a car, one of whom (Collins) got out of the car, pointed a gun at him, and ordered him into the car. A second man (Best), whom Muirhead recognized as "Fat Scrapper," drove the car while Collins continued to point the gun at Muirhead. During the drive, Collins took forty-five dollars ($45) from Muirhead's pockets and a third man (Baldwin) removed Muirhead's watch from his wrist. Collins also asked the others whether they should kill Muirhead. Baldwin responded that he did not care; Best said they should let Muirhead go since he would not tell the police. Muirhead was let out of the car at Illinois and Georgia Avenues, and he called the police, giving a description of the three men and the car, as well as the license plate number.

Approximately three hours later, the police found Collins standing next to the car Muirhead had described. As the police approached, Collins tossed a loaded gun into the bushes, which Muirhead later identified as similar to the gun which Collins had pointed at him. While the police were speaking to Collins, Baldwin, who fit the description given by Muirhead, joined Collins. When the police asked them about the robbery, Collins denied that he and Baldwin had been at Georgia Avenue and Kennedy Street that day. Both Collins and Baldwin were arrested; Muirhead's watch was found on Collins. Best was arrested several weeks later, on a warrant, while he was walking with Baldwin.

The defense claimed that Muirhead had fabricated the robbery. Collins testified he had done repair work on Muirhead's car, and Muirhead never fully paid him. When he saw Muirhead on April 27, he approached him about the payment, and Muirhead pulled out a gun. Collins grabbed the gun and asked Muirhead when he was going to pay for the repairs. Muirhead began acting "fidgety," so Collins hit him in the face, knocking him down. Muirhead then said he would pay the following Friday, and gave Collins his watch, several bags of marijuana and two bags of aluminum foil as collateral for the debt. Collins returned to his car, and drove off with Baldwin.

Best testified he had no recollection of what he had done on April 27th. He admitted knowing Muirhead but claimed he did not know Collins. Baldwin did not testify. In rebuttal, the government offered evidence to show that Muirhead had not registered a car in the District of Columbia between 1980 and the time of trial.

II

Appellants filed pretrial motions for a psychiatric examination of Muirhead to determine his competency to testify at trial and for discovery under Brady v. Maryland¹ of his psychological and psychiatric records. Attached to the motion for a competency examination was an affidavit of Ms. Sheffield, defense counsel for Best, and a letter from a psychologist suggesting hypothetically, on the basis of what Ms. Sheffield had related, that Muirhead might suffer from schizophrenia or a neurological disorder. In her affidavit, Ms. Sheffield characterized Muirhead's behavior during two interviews while he was in jail on charges in another case as "hyperactive," "easily distracted" and "very suspicious of everyone." She also stated that Muirhead had said he "had seen many doctors [psychiatrists] . . . and that the doctors seemed to think he was crazy," and he had "been told by the doctors to take thorazine" but refused. Appellants alleged in their Brady motion that Muirhead had undergone at least one psychiatric or psychological evaluation in connection with a 1978 juvenile commitment, which found he was suffering from a mental illness. In addition, they alleged that Youth Center staff who were conducting a study pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5010(e) in October 1982 (as a result of Muirhead's conviction for armed robbery) thought Muirhead was suffering from severe and acute mental illness, and that psychiatric or psychological reports would be generated as a result of his evaluation.

The motions were denied on December 17, 1982 after a hearing and an in camera inspection by the motions judge of Muirhead's juvenile social files and § 5010(e) study. Appellants renewed the motion for a competency examination before the trial judge who, after in camera review of the records, reached the same conclusion as the motions judge, finding no indication in the documents to raise any questions about Muirhead's competency. ² Appellants contend on appeal that in view of their proffer, they met the "red flag" (of material impact on issue of competency) test of United States v. Crosby, 149 U.S. App.D.C. 306, 307, 462 F.2d 1201, 1202 (1972), and that where a witness is the key witness for the prosecution, a stricter standard of competency is required, particularly when there are no "strong indications of reliability" and no corroboration of a witness' testimony.

The decision whether to order a psychiatric examination of a witness to determine his competency or to aid the jury's assessment of credibility is a matter within the trial court's discretion. United States v. Benn, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 180, 184, 476 F.2d 1127, 1131 (1973); United States v. Crosby, supra, 149 U.S.App.D.C. at 307, 462 F.2d at 1202; Hilton v. United States, 435 A.2d 383, 387 (D.C. 1981). Because such an examination has the potential to impinge upon a witness' right to privacy and to harass a witness, a presumption exists against ordering mental examinations. Rogers v. United States, 419 A.2d 977, 980 (D.C. 1980) (citing United States v. Butler, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 356, 359, 481 F.2d 531, 534 (1973)). A trial court's ruling on a witness' competency should not be disturbed unless the record provides "unmistakable evidence that the trial court's impressions are defective." Hilton, supra, 435 A.2d at 388; Rogers, supra, 419 A.2d at 980. See also Ledbetter v. United States, 350 A.2d 379, 380 (D.C. 1976) (absent clear error, this court cannot change the trial court's balancing of the possible evidentiary advantage against the invasion of a witness' privacy). We find no such evidence.

Our in camera review of the records examined by the motions judge confirms that Muirhead had not been found to suffer from a mental illness. In exercising his discretion, the motions judge could reasonably rely on the expert views in the records rather than on counsel's observations and a psychologist's tentative views based on counsel's description. Further, the description of Muirhead's behavior in counsel's affidavit is consistent with the conclusion in the records about his behavior and personality. Muirhead also gave sufficiently detailed and accurate descriptions of the alleged robbers to enable the police to identify Collins and Baldwin, indicating an ability to observe and report. The fact that he was the only eyewitness to the robbery is insufficient on the record before us to overcome the presumption against ordering a competency examination for a witness. Hilton, supra, 435 A.2d at 387-88; Albany v. United States, 377 A.2d 1145, 1146 (D.C. 1977).

In seeking production under Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. at 87-88, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-1197, of records indicating that Muirhead had received some type of psychological treatment in the past, appellants rely on Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318-20, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1111-12, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). As the government points out, to come within Davis v. Alaska, supra, "a fortiori the material to which [appellants] seek access must in fact exist." The juvenile social file and the § 5010(e) study are not public documents in possession of the prosecutor; the former is a confidential court record, D.C.Code § 16-2332 (1981), and the latter is a presentence report prepared for the court subject to limited disclosure, Super.Ct.Crim.R. 32(b)(3) (a study conducted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5010(e) (1982) is a "presentence investigation" and subject to limited disclosure to the defendant prior to sentencing). Moreover, the in camera records do not indicate that Muirhead suffered from, or had received treatment for, a mental illness. Nor do we find the records contained exculpatory information. See United States v. Akers, 374 A.2d 874, 876 (D.C. 197...