Colo. Med. Bd. v. Office of Admin. Courts
| Decision Date | 23 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 13SA209 |
| Parties | In re: The COLORADO MEDICAL BOARD, Plaintiff v. The OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS and Matthew E. Norwood, an Administrative Law Judge in the Office of Administrative Courts, Defendants and Polly Train, M.D., Defendant–Intervenor |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Attorneys for Plaintiff: John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Jack M. Wesoky, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Allison R. Ailer, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado.
Attorneys for Defendants: John W. Suthers, Attorney General, John August Lizza, First Assistant Attorney General, Alice Q. Hosley, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado.
Attorneys for Defendant–Intervenor: Hershey Decker, Kari M. Hershey, Carmen N. Decker, Todd E. Likman, Lone Tree, Colorado.
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae COPIC Insurance Company: Jaudon & Avery LLP, David H. Yun, Jared R. Ellis, Denver, Colorado.
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Defense Lawyers Association: Ruebel & Quillen, LLC, Jeffrey Clay Ruebel, Westminster, Colorado.
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Medical Society: Martin Conklin P.C., John L. Conklin, Jerome R. Geraghty, Denver, Colorado.
En Banc
¶ 1 We issued a rule to show cause under C.A.R. 21 to decide whether the district court abused its discretion in holding that, as a matter of law, section 12–36.5–104(10)(a), C.R.S. (2013), protects professional review committee records from subpoena or discovery and admissibility in “civil suits,” but not administrative proceedings. We hold that section 12–36.5–104(10)(a) protects the records of a professional review committee from all forms of subpoena or discovery. The statute further protects the records from admissibility in civil suits. We also hold that the term “civil suit” includes administrative proceedings of an adjudicatory nature. Accordingly, the Colorado Medical Board's (the “Board”) records are protected from subpoena or discovery and are not admissible in the administrative hearing regarding the denial of Dr. Polly Train's medical license, and the Board need not furnish to Train the records at issue in this petition.
¶ 2 Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order requiring the Board to comply with the discovery order entered by the Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”), and we remand this case to the district court with directions to return it to the ALJ for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 3 Train applied for a license to practice medicine in Colorado but was denied. She sought review of the Board's decision. An ALJ from the Office of Administrative Courts (the “OAC”) held a hearing to decide whether Train was wrongfully denied a license. During discovery, Train requested certain Letters of Concern that contained information she considered relevant to the denial of her license. These Letters of Concern are private letters sent from the Board to licensed doctors when there is an issue that warrants discussion and warning, but not necessarily public disclosure and punishment.
¶ 4 The Board objected that the Letters of Concern were confidential records protected by the professional review privilege, also known as the peer review privilege, and it stated that it was “not willing to waive peer review confidentiality on all [Letters of Concern] even in a redacted form.” The ALJ ordered the Board to produce the Letters of Concern from the last five years that involved matters similar to Train's. A corresponding protective order from the ALJ required that the Letters of Concern be treated as confidential and that all identifying information be redacted.1
¶ 5 The Board sought review of the ALJ's order in the district court. 2 It asked the district court to enjoin the ALJ's order on the basis that the Letters of Concern were protected from subpoena or discovery. The Board again argued that it is a professional review committee, see§ 12–36–118(10)(b), C.R.S. (2013), and that professional review committees possess a privilege that protects their records from subpoena or discovery and admissibility in any civil suit. § 12–36.5–104(10)(a). These Letters of Concern, the Board argued, are its “records” under section 12–36.5–104(10)(a), and as such, are not subject to subpoena or discovery. The district court concluded that, as a matter of law, section 12–36.5–104(10)(a) protected the Board's records from subpoena or discovery only in civil suits, which did not include administrative proceedings. The district court held that the ALJ did not violate the statute in ordering that the Letters of Concern be provided to Train.
¶ 6 The Board petitioned us for review. The Board argues that section 12–36.5–104(10)(a) provides for two distinct protections: (1) protecting the records from any form of subpoena or discovery; and (2) protecting the records from being admitted in a civil suit. The ALJ, OAC, and Train argue that the term “civil suit” limits the words “subpoena or discovery” and “admissible” in the statute such that the records are only protected from subpoena or discovery in a civil suit, and that the hearing regarding Train's medical license was not a civil suit.
¶ 7 We hold that section 12–36.5–104(10)(a) protects the records of a professional review committee from all forms of subpoena or discovery. The statute further protects the records from admissibility in civil suits. We also hold that “civil suit” includes administrative proceedings of an adjudicatory nature. Accordingly, the Board's records are protected from subpoena or discovery and are not admissible in the administrative hearing regarding the denial of Train's medical license, and the Board need not furnish the records.
¶ 8 Section 12–36.5–104(10)(a) provides as follows:
Except as specified in paragraph (b) of this subsection (10), the records of an authorized entity, its professional review committee, and its governing board are not subject to subpoena or discovery and are not admissible in any civil suit.
The proper statutory construction of section 12–36.5–104(10)(a) is a question of law we review de novo. See, e.g., Klinger v. Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 50, 130 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Colo.2006). When construing a statute, we ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly's intent, reading applicable statutory provisions as a whole in order to accord consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all their parts. People in the Interest of W.P., 2013 CO 11, ¶ 11, 295 P.3d 514, 519; Moffett v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., 219 P.3d 1068, 1072 (Colo.2009). We liberally construe statutes to fully carry out the General Assembly's intent. § 2–4–212, C.R.S. (2013).
¶ 9 We give the language of the statute its commonly accepted and understood meaning. Crandall v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 238 P.3d 659, 662 (Colo.2010); see also§ 2–4–101, C.R.S. (2013). If a statute is unambiguous, we give effect to the statute's plain and ordinary meaning and look no further. Daniel v. City of Colo. Springs, 2014 CO 34, ¶ 12, –––P.3d –––– (citing Springer v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 799 (Colo.2000)). However, if the statutory language lends itself to alternative constructions or if its intended scope is unclear, it is considered ambiguous, and we may look beyond the statute's plain language to ascertain its meaning and effectuate its purpose. Id.; see also§ 2–4–203, C.R.S. (2013).
¶ 10 We now consider the statutory provision at issue here, section 12–36.5–104(10)(a), interpreting it in light of the principles of statutory construction discussed above.
¶ 11 The General Assembly enacted the Medical Practice Act, § 12–36–101, et seq., C.R.S. (2013), to serve the interests of public health, safety, and welfare by protecting the public from the unauthorized, unqualified, and improper practice of medicine. § 12–36–102, C.R.S. (2013). To further that purpose, the General Assembly created the Board and gave it certain powers and duties. §§ 12–36–103 to 104, C.R.S. (2013). The Board is a professional review committee,3§ 12–36–118(10)(b), C.R.S. (2013), and it is entitled to the protection of its records pursuant to section 12–36.5–104(10)(a).
¶ 12 In order to protect the public in Colorado, the Board is empowered to use a variety of different tools in determining whether someone, as an initial matter, should be allowed a license. See, e.g.,§ 12–36–111, C.R.S. (2013). In addition, the Board is tasked with monitoring the conduct of its licensed doctors to review for regulated conduct. § 12–36–118(4)(c)(II.5), C.R.S. (2013). Relevant here, it is authorized to issue a confidential Letter of Concern to a licensee when it has noticed errant conduct that could lead to serious consequences if not corrected. Id. A Letter of Concern is a private admonition sent directly to the licensed doctor with the purpose of directing the doctor to a corrective course of conduct. A Letter of Concern is a record of the Board, see§ 12–36.5–102(7)(a), C.R.S. (2013), and it is protected under section 12–36.5–104(10)(a).
¶ 13 Legislatures typically provide for confidentiality of professional review committee proceedings and records in order to ensure that committee members are able to openly, honestly, and objectively study and review the conduct of their peers. SeePosey v. Dist. Ct., 196 Colo. 396, 586 P.2d 36, 37 (1978). In Colorado, one aspect of that protection aimed at empowering the Board is found in section 12–36.5–104(10)(a). The statute reads, “[T]he records of an authorized entity, its professional review committee, and its governing board are not subject to subpoena or discovery and are not admissible in any civil suit.” § 12–36.5–104(10)(a). It also lists a handful of statutory exceptions. § 12–36.5–104(10)(b), C.R.S. (2013).4 Here...
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