Colonial House, Inc. v. Connecticut State Bd. of Labor Relations

• Decision Date: 26 January 1961
• Docket Number: No. 94208,94208
• Citation: 176 A.2d 381,23 Conn.Supp. 30
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: COLONIAL HOUSE, INC. v. CONNECTICUT STATE BOARD OF LABOR RELATIONS et al.

Page 381

176 A.2d 381

23 Conn.Supp. 30

COLONIAL HOUSE, INC. v. CONNECTICUT STATE BOARD OF LABOR RELATIONS et al.

No. 94208.

Superior Court of Connecticut, New Haven County.

Jan. 26, 1961.

Jay S. Siegel, Hartford, for plaintiff.

Albert L. Coles, Atty. Gen., and Alphonse C. Jachimczyk, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

Norman Zolot, Hamden, for defendant Hotel and Restaurant Employees' and Bartenders' Union, Local 217.

MacDONALD, Judge.

Plaintiff, a restaurant corporation, brought this action for a declaratory judgment to determine whether or not a certain decision and order by the defendant state board of labor relations, entered on August 29, 1960, was lawful under the rules and regulations of said board and the General Statutes and whether plaintiff is bound thereby under the consent election agreement of June 3, 1960, to abide by such rules and regulations. The defendant union, a local union of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. and a 'labor organization' within the meaning of § 31-101 of the General Statutes, has filed a plea in abatement, claiming that this court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter under the declaratory judgment act (1) because it is an appeal from an interlocutory rather than a final order and therefore premature; (2) because the Labor Relations Act does not specifically provide for judicial review of representation proceedings; (3) because plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action under § 277(a) of the Practice Book; and, finally, (4) because the plaintiff has other redress in the form of an appeal from a final order of the defendant labor relations board.

It is alleged in the complaint that, pursuant to a consent election agreement between plaintiff and this defendant local, a secret ballot election was conducted by the defendant board, through its authorized agent, in which a majority of plaintiff's employees voted not to designate the defendant local as their collective barganing representative; that six days after the delivery of the agent's report of this result to both parties, the defendant local filed with the defendant board a 'Motion to Declare Void and Set Aside Election,' which, over plaintiff's objection, the defendant board ruled that it would accept and consider, despite the fact that § 56-111 of the general rules and regulations of the board as well as the express terms of their agent's report of the election provided that any objections to the election or report must be filed within five days of the date of the issuance and service of such report on the parties.

In Connecticut Savings Bank v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 133 Conn. 403, 409, 51 A.2d 907, 910, our Supreme Court discussed at length the interpretation and scope of our declaratory judgment statute (then Rev.1930, § 5334; now General Statutes § 52-29), stating in part as follows, in language as applicable now as it was then: 'Our statute, which antedated the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, is broader in scope than that act and the statutes in most, if not all, other jurisdictions. We have consistently construed our statute and the rules under it in a liberal spirit, in the belief that they serve a sound social purpose. Sigal v. Wise, 114 Conn. 297, 301, 302, 158 A. 891; New Haven Water Co. v. [City of] New Haven, 131 Conn. 456, 464, 40 A.2d 763. We have undoubtedly given a broader scope to proceedings for declaratory judgments than have the courts in many other jurisdictions.

'An action for a declaratory judgment is a special statutory proceeding, not one in equity. Silberman v. McLaughlin, 129 Conn. 273, 276, 27 A.2d 634; Town of Newington v. Mazzoccoli, 133 Conn. 146, 150, 48 A.2d 729. The condition precedent to the maintenance of an action in equity--that there be no adequate remedy at law--has no application. In order to ascertain the limitations upon the use of actions for declaratory judgments, we look to the restrictions established by the rules we have quoted. The first of these is that there must be an issue in dispute or an uncertainty of legal relations 'which requires settlement between the parties.' This provision means no more than that there must appear a sufficient practical need for the determination of the matter; Sigal v. Wise, supra, 114 Conn. 302, 158 A. 891; Hill v. Wright, 128 Conn. 12, 19 * * *; and that need must be determined in the light of the particular circumstances involved in each case. James v. Alderton Dock Yards, 256 N.Y. 298, 305, 176 N.E. 401. This limitation is, however, concerned only with the nature of a dispute which is determinable in an action for a declaratory judgment, and not with the question whether, if a plaintiff may secure an adjudication of his rights or jural relations in an ordinary proceeding, he is therefore debarred from maintaining an action for a declaratory judgment.'

The issue raised in this action is not concerned with the Labor Relations Act (General Statutes, c. 561) or claimed violations thereof, so as to be governed by its provisions, and plaintiff need not, therefore look to that act for its basis for bringing this action. It specifically alleges, as a basis for its claim for the relief sought, that certain procedure followed by the defendant board, in failing to adhere to specific statutory procedures for promulgatingadministrative rules and regulations as set forth in §§ 4-45 and 4-48 of the General Statutes, and in failing to follow § 56-111 of its general rules and regulations as published, 'was unlawful and constitutes an invasion of the legal rights of the Plaintiff in that it will be required to submit to further proceedings * * * and be bound by the ruling of the Defendant Board dated August 29, 1960, without the judicial review of said ruling at a later time.' It alleges 'an actual bona fide and substantial question and issue in dispute and a substantial uncertainty of legal relations requiring settlement,' which, it claims, satisfies the conditions imposed by § 277 of the Practice Book for the court's assumption of jurisdiction under § 52-29 of the General Statutes.

Our Supreme Court has frequently pointed out that the statutes and rules pertaining to declaratory judgments create an independent remedy and should be accorded a liberal construction. As stated in Sigal v. Wise, 114 Conn. 297, 301, 158 A. 891, 892, '[t]he statute authorizing the superior court to render declaratory judgments is as broad as it well could be made. * * * The rules adopted to carry out the statute authorize the superior court to render such judgments 'as to the existence or nonexistence (a) of any right, power, privilege or immunity; or (b) of any fact upon which the existence or nonexistence of such right, power, privilege or immunity does or may depend, whether such right, power, privilege or immunity now exists or will arise in the future.' * * * While the rules go on to limit that power in certain respects, neither in them nor in the statute is there any restriction upon the power of the court to render judgments determining rights which are contingent upon the happening of some future event. Indeed, a contrary intent is clearly indicated by the provision in the rules authorizing the determination of any fact upon which the existence or nonexistence of any right, power, privilege, or immunity does or may depend, whether such right, power, privilege, or immunity now exists or will arise in the future. The remedy by means of declaratory judgments is highly remedial, and the statute and rules should be accorded a liberal construction to carry out the purposes underlying such judgments. One great purpose is to enable parties to have their differences authoritatively settled in advance of any claimed invasion of rights, that they may guide their actions accordingly and often may be able to keep them within lawful bounds, and so avoid the expense, bitterness of feeling and disturbance of the orderly pursuits of life which are so often the incidents of law suits. Fully to carry out the purposes intended to be served by such judgments, it is sometimes necessary to determine rights which will arise or become complete only in the contingency of some future happening. Even if the right claimed in this case is a contingent one, its present determination may well serve a very real practical need of the parties for guidance in their future conduct. A construction of our statute and rules which would exclude from the field of their operation and determination of rights, powers, privileges, and immunities which are contingent upon the happening or not happening of some future event would hamper their useful operation.' See also Larkin v. Bontatibus, 145 Conn. 570, 575, 145 A.2d 133.

More specifically, the court has indicated...