ACMAT CORP. v. GREATER NEW YORK MUT. INS.

• Decision Date: 12 April 2005
• Docket Number: No. 25099.,25099.
• Citation: 88 Conn.App. 471,869 A.2d 1254
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: ACMAT CORPORATION v. GREATER NEW YORK MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

869 A.2d 1254

88 Conn.App. 471

ACMAT CORPORATION v. GREATER NEW YORK MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 25099.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 18, 2005.

Decided April 12, 2005.

Joel M. Fain, with whom was Trenton C. Haas, Hartford, for the appellant (defendant).

John W. Lemega, with whom was John C. Pitblado, Hartford, for the appellee (plaintiff).

DRANGINIS, FLYNN and WEST, Js.

WEST, J.

The defendant, Greater New York Mutual Insurance Company (Greater New York), appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered following a trial to the court, declaring that Greater New York issued to the plaintiff, ACMAT Corporation, an insurance policy providing comprehensive general liability and products liability coverage with specified liability limits during the period from January 1, 1964, to January 1, 1968. On appeal, Greater New York claims that the court improperly concluded that (1) it possessed subject matter jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment, (2) the allegations in the complaint stated a valid ground for declaratory relief and (3) the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to prove the existence of the insurance policy. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to Greater New York's appeal. In 1950, Waldvogel Brothers, Inc., a New York corporation, loaned money to Henry Nozko, Sr., to form Acoustical Materials Corporation, a business engaged in the installation of acoustical ceilings in commercial buildings. Located in East Hartford, Acoustical Materials Corporation was a subsidiary corporation of Waldvogel Brothers, Inc., until 1969, when Waldvogel Brothers, Inc., was dissolved. Nozko purchased the stock of Acoustical Materials Corporation and, in 1972, changed its name to ACMAT Corporation. Since 1988, the plaintiff has been named as a defendant in numerous lawsuits by individuals alleging bodily injuries, dating back to the 1950s, that resulted from exposure to asbestos in the plaintiff's workplaces. Facing potentially serious liability, the plaintiff undertook an exhaustive search of its records to ascertain whether Greater New York provided insurance coverage applicable to the injuries that formed the basis of the lawsuits. Although the plaintiff was unable to locate any insurance policies issued by Greater New York, it did discover, among other documents, a certificate of insurance, signed by an authorized representative of Greater New York, that listed Acoustical Materials Corporation as the named insured. The certificate indicated that Acoustical Materials Corporation had in effect with Greater New York, through January 1, 1966, a products liability and comprehensive general liability policy (number 17-C3-C00627) with bodily injury limits of $500,000 per person and $1 million per accident. Confronted with the certificate and a request that it participate in the plaintiff's defense in the asbestos lawsuits, Greater New York conducted its own search for evidence of the policy, following which it denied that the policy ever existed and refused to tender a defense.

In light of Greater New York's refusal, the plaintiff filed this action seeking, inter alia, declarations that Greater New York had issued to Acoustical Materials Corporation an insurance policy that provided comprehensive general liability and products liability coverage with liability limits of $500,000 per person and $1 million per accident, and that the policy was in full force and effect during the period from January 1, 1964, to January 1, 1968. In its answer, Greater New York denied the policy's existence.

Following a two day trial to the court, at which the plaintiff called five witnesses and introduced several exhibits, the court issued a memorandum of decision, declaring in relevant part: "The court declares, by way of this judgment, that the defendant ... issued to the plaintiff ... an insurance policy numbered 17-C3-C00627 which provided comprehensive general liability and product liability coverage to [the plaintiff], with the policy in effect beginning January 1, 1965, to January 1, 1966, and it also provided limits to its liability of $500,000 per person and $1 million per accident. This policy and/or its similar predecessors and successors were validly issued by the defendant ... to the plaintiff ... and were in full force and effect from January 1, 1964, through January 1, 1968." This appeal followed.

I

Greater New York first claims that the court improperly concluded that it possessed subject matter jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment. It argued that the declaration the plaintiff sought did not settle the parties' dispute or prove the existence of a right, power, privilege or immunity and there was no justiciable controversy before the court. We disagree with that claim.

"As a threshold matter, we set forth the applicable standard of review for a claim challenging a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. A determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. When ... the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Allen, 83 Conn.App. 526, 531, 850 A.2d 1047, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 907, 859 A.2d 562 (2004).

An action for declaratory judgment is a special proceeding under General Statutes § 52-29,¹ implemented by Practice Book §§ 17-54 and 17-55. Rhodes v. Hartford, 201 Conn. 89, 92, 513 A.2d 124 (1986). It "provides a valuable tool by which litigants may resolve uncertainty of legal obligations." Milford Power Co., LLC v. Alstom Power, Inc., 263 Conn. 616, 625, 822 A.2d 196 (2003). "Our Supreme Court has frequently pointed out that the statutes and rules pertaining to declaratory judgments create an independent remedy and should be accorded a liberal construction. As stated in Sigal v. Wise, [114 Conn. 297, 301, 158 A. 891 (1932)], [t]he statute authorizing the Superior Court to render declaratory judgments is as broad as it well could be made." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Colonial House, Inc. v. Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations, 23 Conn.Supp. 30, 34, 176 A.2d 381 (1961). Indeed, "[o]ur statute, which antedated the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, is broader in scope than that act and the statutes in most, if not all, other jurisdictions." Connecticut Savings Bank v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 133 Conn. 403, 409, 51 A.2d 907 (1947).

"Notwithstanding this liberal heritage, [our Supreme Court] has repeatedly stated that a declaratory judgment action is not a procedural panacea for use on all occasions but is a special statutory proceeding to be used only in accordance with the statute and rules adopted to implement the statute...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 2 E. Stephenson, Connecticut Civil Procedure (3d Ed.2002) § 226(d), p. 583. The rules of practice define the scope of declaratory judgment actions as follows: "The judicial authority will, in cases not herein excepted, render declaratory judgments as to the existence or nonexistence (1) of any right, power, privilege or immunity; or (2) of any fact upon which the existence or nonexistence of such right, power, privilege or immunity does or may depend, whether such right, power, privilege or immunity now exists or will arise in the future." Practice Book § 17-54.

Greater New York argues that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment because the declaration the plaintiff sought did not settle the parties' dispute or prove the existence of a right, power, privilege or immunity between the parties, particularly whether the plaintiff has a right to a defense from Greater New York in the asbestos lawsuits. Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that Greater New York is correct, we note that Practice Book § 17-54 clearly does not limit the scope of declaratory judgment actions to determining whether there exists a right, power, privilege or immunity between the parties. Subsection (2) of Practice Book § 17-54 expressly authorizes the court to declare "the existence or nonexistence ... (2) of any fact upon which the existence or nonexistence of such right, power, privilege or immunity does or may depend, whether such right, power, privilege or immunity now exists or will arise in the future." (Emphasis added.) And that is precisely what the court did here. It declared the existence of a fact — that Greater New York had issued to Acoustical Materials Corporation an insurance policy providing comprehensive general liability and products liability coverage with specific liability and time limits — on which depends the existence of a right — the plaintiff's right to a defense from Greater New York in the asbestos lawsuits.

Greater New York contends that such an interpretation of Practice Book § 17-54(2) is impermissible as it would result in piecemeal litigation by permitting parties to file declaratory judgment actions simply to establish one of myriad issues to be resolved in order for a party finally to achieve its desired result. Indeed, Greater New York states in its brief that the court's declarations concerning the subject insurance policy "settled no legal relation between the parties because [the court] did not determine whether the underlying asbestos claims that are the real matter in interest to [the plaintiff] are covered." We reject that contention for two reasons. First, our Supreme Court has stated that a court's declarations need not finally settle the legal relations between the parties: "That our statute and rules undoubtedly were designed to reach beyond declarations of law which would finally determine the rights of the parties as regards each other definitely appears from the ... provision in § 249 [now Practice Book §...