Colorado Seminary v. Board of Com'rs of Arapahoe County

• Decision Date: 12 January 1903
• Citation: 71 P. 410,30 Colo. 507
• Parties: COLORADO SEMINARY v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF ARAPAHOE COUNTY et al.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

71 P. 410

30 Colo. 507

COLORADO SEMINARY v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF ARAPAHOE COUNTY et al.

Supreme Court of Colorado

January 12, 1903

Error to district court, Arapahoe county.

Suit between the Colorado Seminary and the board of county commissioners of Arapahoe county and others. From a decree in favor of the latter, the former brings error. Decree modified.

Wells & Taylor and Doud & Fowler, for plaintiff in error.

C. E Herrington and George F. Dunklee (O. E. Jackson, of counsel) for defendants in error.

CAMPBELL C.J.

The controversy is between the county of Arapahoe, represented by its board of commissioners, and the Colorado Seminary; the former asserting, and the latter denying, that certain property of the seminary is subject to taxation. The case calls for a construction of the charter of the seminary which was granted by an act of the legislative assembly of the territory of Colorado in 1864 (Sess. Laws 1864, p. 209). Section 5 and a portion of section 1 are the only provisions which are material. Among other things, section 1 constitutes the trustees named therein a body corporate 'for the purpose of founding, directing and maintaining an institution of learning, * * * with full power to * * * acquire, hold and convey property, real, personal and mixed, to the extent they may judge necessary for carrying into effect the objects of this incorporation.' Section 5 reads: 'Such property as may be necessary for carrying out the design of the seminary in the best manner, while used exclusively for such purpose, shall be free from all taxation.' At the threshold of the case we are confronted by a decision of this court (County Com'rs v. Colorado Seminary, 12 Colo. 497, 21 P. 490), which, if not modified or overruled, the county attorney says, is conclusive against the contention of plaintiff in error. Its counsel, however, insist that there is such a material difference in the facts of the two cases as to render the decision there inapplicable here, at least as to a portion of the property involved. A careful examination of that opinion, and a comparison of the facts of the two cases, satisfy us that if the construction of the seminary charter, which, in the closing words of the opinion, it was intimated that the court was inclined to adopt, controlled that decision, then that construction, if adhered to, is decisive of this case in favor of the county. It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine--First, whether that decision is to be reconsidered; and, second, if so, what is the proper construction of the provisions of the charter of the plaintiff in error which are applicable to this controversy.

1. This court has gone possibly as far as any appellate tribunal in maintaining the maxim of stare decisis. The rule, however, is not inflexible, and the maxim should not be allowed to stand as an absolute bar in the way of a re-examination of legal questions previously decided by the same court, if improperly determined, and particularly where the decision reviewed has not passed into a settled rule of property. This is well illustrated in Calhoun Gold Min. Co. v. Ajax Gold Min. Co., 27 Colo. 1, 59 P. 607, 50 L.R.A. 209, 83 Am.St.Rep. 17, wherein this court overruled one of its former decisions upon an important question of mining law, announced 14 years before, and repeatedly reaffirmed. So far as we are advised, no other corporation of the state has a charter similar to the one under consideration; hence no general rule of property has been established, no private rights have been acquired by third persons upon the faith of its protection, and none such will be impaired if a review of the judgment results in a change of doctrine. Yet for another reason we reluctantly enter upon a reconsideration of this cause. The writer of the opinion and his associates evidently gave to the important questions before the court diligent attention. For their judgment we have sincere respect, and their conclusion should not be lightly set aside. These considerations, however, should not deter us from reviewing the question if we are thoroughly satisfied that their conclusion was wrong in whole or in part. We proceed, then, to the second proposition submitted.

2. It is said by the learned judge in the case referred to that taxation is the rule, and exemption the exception; that there is no presumption in favor of exemption, but that every reasonable doubt should be resolved against it. In a later case decided by this court (Bishop, etc., of Cathedral of St John the Evangelist v. Treasurer of Arapahoe Co., 68 P. 272) it was said, 'Provisions exempting property used for educational purposes are less strictly construed than those exempting property used for ordinary gain or profit;' and it was also said that the meaning of words employed in the exemption statute 'must be ascertained from the intent of the people and the legislature in exempting from taxation property used for educational purposes.' While the decision there was based upon the general exemption laws, the same rule applies to a construction of the charter under consideration. But if a stricter rule than the one indicated in our later decision should prevail, we think that the previous construction of the charter of plaintiff in error was too narrow, if the closing words of the opinion correctly announce the actual conclusion which the court reached. The construction should be reasonably strict, but not so strict as to defeat the obvious intention of the general assembly. Apparently, the decision was based upon the meaning attributed to section 5 of the charter, as thus stated in the opinion: 'The language employed in the statute before us is perhaps not as plain as it might be, but a fair construction thereof points to the conclusion that it was the intention to relieve from taxation only such property as should be in actual use; viz., the seminary buildings, campus, and the like.' In that opinion, Northwestern University v. People, 99 U.S. 309, 25 L.Ed. 387, is cited as a case which, when carefully studied, is an authority directly supporting the rule announced. Our study leads us to an opposite conclusion. The question before the federal court was whether certain property of the Northwestern University was exempt. The supreme court of Illinois had held it liable to taxation. The exemption claimed was based upon a section of an act of the Illinois legislature of 1855 providing: 'All property of whatever kind or description belonging to or owned by said corporation shall be forever free from taxation for any and all purposes.' Laws 1855, p. 483. All parties conceded that this language was broad enough to cover the exemption, but the contention of the tax officers of the state was that the act was in violation of the constitution of 1848 (article 9, § 3), which reads: 'Such other property as the general assembly may deem necessary for school * * * purposes, may be exempt from taxation.' The property was listed for taxation in 1874...