Colt's Indus. Union, Local 376 v. Colt's Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 28 November 1950
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: COLT'S INDUSTRIAL UNION, LOCAL 376 v. COLT'S MFG. CO. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 301

77 A.2d 301

137 Conn. 305

COLT'S INDUSTRIAL UNION, LOCAL 376 v. COLT'S MFG. CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Nov. 28, 1950.

William S. Zeman, Hartford, Harry Cooper, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).

William K. Cole, Hartford, Lee Fielden, Hartford, for appellee (defendant). Barclay Robinson, Hartford, on the brief.

Before BROWN, C. J., and JENNINGS, BALDWIN, and O'SULLIVAN, JJ., and SAMUEL MELLITZ, Judge Superior Court.

MELLITZ, Judge.

The plaintiff brought this proceeding under § 8153 of the General Statutes to compel the defendant to arbitrate, among others, a dispute which the plaintiff claimed was arbitrable under an agreement between the parties. The court concluded that the dispute did not involve any provision of the agreement and was not arbitrable. From a judgment dismissing the proceeding the plaintiff has appealed.

The court found the following facts, which are not subject to correction: On September 24, 1948, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a collective bargaining agreement. By the provisions of article 2, the defendant recognizes the plaintiff as the exclusive representative of all of its employees except supervisors and certain others not here material. Article 6 sets up a seniority system governing transfers of employees, layoffs and recalls. Supervisors have no seniority status. When the defendant proposes to lay off some of its employees from the work they are then performing, it is required to send home or to transfer to available jobs elsewhere those with the lowest seniority. Article 12 provides for the submission to arbitration of any dispute arising from a difference 'as to the application of the terms' of the agreement.

Since 1946, and continuing down to the date of this proceeding, the defendant has occasionally followed the limited practice of assigning to supervisors duties of a nature normally carried out by the employees represented by the plaintiff. During the contract negotiations, the plaintiff proposed that no supervisor should perform any work of the employees within the bargaining unit. The proposal was incorporated and no such provision was incorporated into the agreement.

During 1949, the defendant began to lay off certain employees and to assign to supervisors part of the work upon which these employees had been engaged. The plaintiff maintained that this practice violated articles 2 and 6 of the agreement. After carrying this claim unsuccessfully through the various procedural steps set up to resolve grievances, and after the defendant had denied that the dispute was arbitrable, the present proceeding was instituted.

The plaintiff contends that the agreement to arbitrate differences as to the 'application' of the terms of the agreement includes arbitration of differences as to 'interpretation,' and that the parties agreed thereby to submit to arbitration the question whether any term of the agreement has application to a dispute. The contention is untenable. It is not uncommon for parties to arbitration agreements to confide to arbitrators the decision of legal as well as factual disputes. When this occurs, arbitrators have authority to interpret the agreement. Liggett v. Torrington Building Co., 114 Conn. 425, 430, 158 A. 917; Application of Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 166 Pa.Super. 91, 70 A.2d 681. When, however, the agreement does not so provide, its interpretation is a function of the court. B. Fernandez & Hnos., S. en C. v. Rickert Rice Mills, Inc., 1 Cir., 119 F.2d 809, 814. Arbitration proceeds from the voluntary action of the parties and 'No one is under a duty to resort to these conventional tribunals, however, helpful their processes, except to the extent that he has signified his willingness.' Matter of Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 299, 169 N.E. 386, 391. Here the parties have limited arbitration to differences as to the 'application' of the terms of the agreement, and they are bound by the limits they have themselves fixed. Pratt, Read & Co. v. United Furniture Workers, 136 Conn. 205, 209, 70 A.2d 120. The legal question was whether the dispute involved the application of any provision of the agreement. The court was not in error in accepting the responsibility of answering it. Robinson v. National Fraternal League, 81 Conn. 707, 710, 71 A. 1096; Matter of Belding Heminway Co., v. Wholesale & Warehouse Workers' Union, 295 N.Y. 541, 543, 68 N.E.2d 681.

It was in error, however, in holding that no provision of the agreement was involved in the dispute. The basic contention of the plaintiff is that the application of article 6 of the agreement is involved because supervisors have no seniority status and, if the assignment to them of the work of members of the bargaining unit produces the layoff of a member of it, an employee without seniority replaces one with seniority, in violation of the provisions of article 6. There is nothing in the agreement which expressly precludes the defendant from assigning its supervisors to the work normally performed by the employees in the bargaining unit. The effort of the plaintiff to incorporate into the agreement a provision which would bar the defendant from continuing this practice had been futile. Article 6, however, places a limitation on the practice. It accords preferential treatment to employees who possess seniority status both as to layoffs and re-employment. The court ignored this limitation and erred in so doing. When work ordinarily done by a member of the bargaining unit is given to a working supervisor without seniority rights and members of the bargaining unit possessing seniority status are laid off, the question whether the former action caused the...