Columbia Gas Transmission LLC v. Tri-State Airport Auth., CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-11854
| Decision Date | 12 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-11854 |
| Parties | COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION LLC, Plaintiff, v. TRI-STATE AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
Pending is a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil procedure 12(b)(1) brought by Defendant Tri-State Airport Authority (the "Airport"). ECF No. 208. In its motion, the Airport contends this Court lacks original jurisdiction over this action now that the United States has been dismissed from this case, and it argues the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. In the alternative, the Airport argues that even if this Court has subject matter jurisdiction and its continued exercise is proper, the Court should abstain from deciding this matter pursuant to the Colorado River doctrine. Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court DENIES the Airport's 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.
In 2012, a landslide at the Tri-State Airport in Huntington, West Virginia damaged Plaintiff Columbia Gas' ("Columbia Gas") high-pressure natural gas pipeline. Part of Columbia Gas' pipeline known as BM-74 is located in an easement on property owned by the Airport and leased to the West Virginia State Armory Board for use by the West Virginia Army National Guard (the "Guard") and United States Army Reserve.
On March 9, 2012, a Columbia Gas employee inspecting the BM-74 pipeline discovered that a 400 foot landslide had formed above Columbia Gas' pipeline. As the slide progressed over the following days, the sliding soil displaced the pipeline approximately eighteen feet from its original position, causing the pipeline to buckle. This required Columbia Gas to take the pipeline out of service and to remediate the area by excavating, stabilizing, and reconstructing the failed slope. Approximately 50,000 cubic yards of organic material was removed and replaced, and 200 feet of pipeline was replaced, costing approximately $1,116,915.00 for the whole remediation effort.
On March 7, 2014, Columbia Gas filed a Complaint against the Airport, the United States, and State Defendants—the Guard, the West Virginia State Armory Board, the Adjutant General of West Virginia. Compl., ECF No. 1. In its Complaint, Columbia Gas lodged claims against each defendant for negligence, trespass, and private nuisance; it sued the United States on these grounds under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). Id.
According to Columbia Gas, the 2012 landslide was caused by two negligent acts: the Airport's improper placement of uncompacted organic material on the slope above Columbia Gas' easement during the 1950s and 1970s, and an armory drainage system negligently constructed by contractors hired by the State Defendants and negligently approved by the United States. As a result of these allegedly negligent acts, the armory drainage system errantly emptied onto the uncompacted slope located adjacent to Columbia Gas' high-pressure natural gas pipeline, which resulted in the slope getting saturated with water, failing, and damaging Columbia Gas' pipeline. In responsive pleadings, Defendants—all allegedly joint tortfeasors—did not assert crossclaims against one another for contribution.
In July 2015, the Court dismissed the State Defendants because they are entitled toEleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. United States, et al., No 14-11854, 2015 WL 4276334, at *1 (S.D.W. Va. July 14, 2015). Subsequently, Columbia Gas filed an action against the State Defendants in West Virginia state court. See Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC. v. West Virginia Army Nat'l Guard, et al., No. 15-196 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. 2015). Columbia Gas' state court case asserts equitable claims against the State Defendants for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, rather than tort claims for negligence, trespass, and private nuisance—the dismissed claims against the State Defendants in federal court. The state court case does not include the Airport as a party.
On February 4, 2016, the Court dismissed the United States under the FTCA's independent contractor exception. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC. v. United States, et al., No. 14-11854, 2016 WL 447627, at *1 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 4, 2016). On February 8, 2016, the Airport filed the instant motion to dismiss, arguing that in light of the Court's dismissing the FTCA claims, this court lacks original jurisdiction; continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is improper; and in the alternative, Colorado River abstention is warranted. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss 1 (Feb. 8, 2016), ECF No. 208. Trial of this action is set to begin on February 17, 2016.
Having summarized the facts and procedure of this case, the Court will turn to the issues of original jurisdiction, retention of supplemental jurisdiction, and Colorado River abstention.
The Airport argues the Court lacks original jurisdiction over this matter and it has only supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 4. Specifically, the Airport argues that Columbia Gas failed to plead diversity jurisdiction and it failed to allege facts supporting a finding of such; therefore, the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction. Def.'sMot. to Dismiss at 5. The Court disagrees and finds it has diversity jurisdiction over this action.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, federal diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity between the parties and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. The complete diversity requirement does not flow directly from the statutory language, but is instead a long-standing, judge-made rule strictly construing the diversity statute. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005). Thus, in an action based on diversity jurisdiction, "the presence in the action of a single plaintiff from the same State as a single defendant deprives the district court of original diversity jurisdiction over the entire action." Allapattah, 545 U.S. at 553. Additionally, the Complaint must plausibly plead either the jurisdictional basis, or at the very least, facts essential to show jurisdiction. Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999); see also McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, (1936) (). Here, although the Complaint does not assert diversity jurisdiction is proper, it alleges facts indicating there is complete diversity among the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
The Complaint alleges facts which establish that the only two parties remaining in this action—one a limited liability corporation and the other a municipal corporation—are completely diverse. A corporation is deemed a citizen of every state where it is incorporated and where it has its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). The "principal place of business" refers to "the place where a corporation's officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities." Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010). It is the place "where the corporation maintains its headquarters—provided that the headquarters is the actual center of direction, control, and coordination, i.e., the 'nerve center,' and not simply an office where the corporationholds its board meetings." Id. at 93. A limited liability company, such as Columbia Gas, will also be a citizen of every state where its members are citizens. Cent. W. Va. Energy Co. v. Mountain State Carbon, LLC, 636 F.3d 101, 103 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Gen. Tech. Applications, Inc. v. Exro Ltd., 388 F.3d 114, 121 (4th Cir. 2004)). A municipal corporation is a citizen of that state where it is created by statute or law. Port of Seattle v. Oregon & W. R. Co., 255 U.S. 56, 71 (1921) ().
As the Airport points out, the Complaint alleges that Columbia Gas is incorporated under the laws of Delaware, with its principal place of business in Fairfax, Virginia. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1. Although Columbia Gas did not allege the identity or citizenship of its members, the facts in the Complaint lead to the reasonable conclusion that no member of Columbia Gas is a citizen of West Virginia. See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 12 (). Additionally, Columbia Gas did not allege the citizenship of the Airport, but the Complaint pleads the Airport is a West Virginia public corporation, from which the Court can reasonably infer its place of incorporation is West Virginia. See Compl. ¶ 6 (). Additionally, the Airport's principal place of business must be in West Virginia, since the Airport is located in that State. Lastly, if the Airport is considered a municipal corporation like the port in Port of Seattle, the Court can infer that the Airport was created under the laws of West Virginia or one of its municipalities because of the Airport's being located in West Virginia. Thus, the Airport's domicile is West Virginia under the domicile tests for corporations and for municipal corporations. All of these facts and reasonable inferences come from the face of the Complaint. Because Columbia Gas is a citizen ofDelaware and Virginia, and the Airport is a citizen of West Virginia, complete diversity exists. As such, the Complaint alleges facts that establish diversity jurisdiction.
Second, the...
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