Columbia & P.S.R. Co. v. Chilberg

• Decision Date: 11 July 1893
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: COLUMBIA & P. S. R. CO. v. CHILBERG, TREASURER.

34 P. 163

6 Wash. 612

COLUMBIA & P. S. R. CO. v. CHILBERG, TREASURER.

Supreme Court of Washington

July 11, 1893

Appeal from superior court, King county; I. J. Lichtenberg, Judge.

Action by the Columbia & Puget Sound Railroad Company against A Chilberg, treasurer and delinquent tax collector of the city of Seattle, to enjoin defendant from selling certain property belonging to plaintiff for delinquent taxes. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Geo Donworth and Jas. B. Howe, for appellant.

Andrew F. Burleigh, for respondent.

HOYT J.

It is contended on the part of the appellant that the act of November 28, 1883, commonly known as the "Gross Earnings Law," was void for the reason that it was in conflict with the organic law of the territory. The provision of the organic act ^[1] which it is claimed was violated in its enactment was as follows: "All taxes shall be equal and uniform, and no distinction shall be made in the assessments between different kinds of property, but the assessments shall be according to the value of the property." If the legislation in question established a different rule of taxation as to any class of property from that by virtue of which taxes are imposed upon other classes it was void by reason of such conflict. Such, however, is not the necessary construction of the act in question. A more reasonable interpretation thereof is that it did not attempt to prescribe any rule of taxation. Under this provision in the organic act, there can be no doubt of the right of the legislative assembly to exempt the property of any person or corporation. Such has been the holding of nearly or quite all of the courts of the different states under constitutional provisions requiring assessments to be according to value as broad and full as the clause of the organic act above set out. It must therefore, under the authorities, be held that under said provision it was within the power of the legislative assembly to have entirely exempted the property of all railroad corporations from taxation; and, if this could be done without any consideration being received therefor, it certainly could be for what was deemed by the legislature a sufficient consideration. It must therefore be held that the act in question was not void by reason of its conflict with the provisions of the organic act.

It is further claimed on the part of the appellant that, if the law is valid, it did not exempt other property of the corporation than that actually used in its operation. We think, however that the language used is so broad that it must be held to cover all of the property of the...