Com. ex rel. Armstrong v. Collins, 85-SC-155-TG
| Decision Date | 01 May 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-SC-155-TG,85-SC-155-TG |
| Citation | 709 S.W.2d 437 |
| Parties | 32 Ed. Law Rep. 810 COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, ex rel. David L. ARMSTRONG, Attorney General, Appellant, v. Martha Layne COLLINS, Governor, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Lester M. Thompson, Secretary, Finance and Administration Cabinet, and Frances Jones Mills, Treasurer, Commonwealth of Kentucky, A |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Robert L. Chenoweth, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Bryan, Fogle & Chenoweth, K. Gail Leeco, Asst. Attys. Gen., Frankfort, for appellant.
J. Michael Noyes, Gen. Counsel, Office of the Governor, Frankfort, A. Wallace Grafton, Jr., Sheryl G. Snyder, Virginia H. Snell, Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, Louisville, for appellees; Lee Sisney, Charles Wickliffe, Finance and Admin. Cabinet, Frankfort, Henry Watson, III, Cynthiana, of counsel.
The basic issue we address is to what extent, if any, the General Assembly of the Commonwealth may, in adopting a budget bill and based on the financial condition of the Commonwealth provide therein for the reduction, elimination and transfer of appropriated funds, and for all practical purposes, provide as a result thereof, that the effectiveness of certain existing statutes is temporarily modified.
At its regular session in 1984, the General Assembly passed a biennial budget. 1
This document appropriated the revenue for the Commonwealth and determined how that revenue would be expended for the operation, maintenance and support of the three branches of state government and the myriad of ancillary state agencies and programs. 2 This document, included a reduction in appropriations for various salary increases and transfers of funds from various trust and agency accounts to the General Fund to cover central administrative expenses
In addition, at the same session the General Assembly passed corollary legislation 3 which conferred upon the General Assembly the authority to provide, in a budget bill, for the suspension or modification of the operation of an existing statute if the General Assembly found that such action is required by the financial condition of state government.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The appellant, Attorney General of the Commonwealth, on June 6, 1984 filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the Franklin Circuit Court challenging the constitutional validity of those legislative acts. 4 Basically, the petition claimed that the legislative enactments violated the prescriptions of Section 51 of the Kentucky Constitution, both as to the germaneness of the titles of the acts and as to the failure to follow the procedural requirement of Section 51 for the enactment and publication of amendments to existing law. A temporary restraining order was entered by the trial judge which prevented various officials in the Executive branch of government from transferring funds from certain designated trust and agency funds 5 and other special accounts to the general operating fund of the Commonwealth. Following normal briefing and arguments, the trial court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law and declaratory judgment. A notice of appeal was timely filed by the Attorney General and upon appropriate motion, and for obvious reasons, we transferred the appeal directly to this Court.
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
In rejecting the contentions of the Attorney General in the main, the trial court declared that the General Assembly has, under Ky. Const. Secs. 15 and 51, the authority to "suspend existing laws in a budget bill if the provision is germane to the broad subject of appropriations." It further declared that the procedural requirements of Ky. Const. Sec. 51 were not applicable to the challenged statutes because they only effected a "suspension" of existing statutes and were not an "express or implied repeal" of existing statutes.
The trial court also upheld the General Assembly's authority to suspend previously authorized salaries, trust and agency funds. 6 It declared certain transfers of funds invalid because they accomplished more than "the mere suspension of existing statutory provisions" and because they were not "germane" to appropriations within the aegis of Kentucky Constitution Section 51. 7 The former ruling is before us on appeal, the latter is not.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
The appellant urges us to reverse the trial court because of what he maintains is an erroneous and "cryptic analysis" by the trial court of Sections 51 and 15 of the Kentucky Constitution. In essence, appellant argues that the titles to the two acts in question do not pass Section 51's constitutional requirement that the content of the act be germane to the title thereof. The Attorney General also urges us to declare as error the ruling that the procedural requirement of Section 51 does not apply to a "suspension" of existing statutes. Further, appellant argues the trial court erroneously concluded that Section 15 of the Kentucky Constitution permitted the statutory suspension and modification contained in HB 474. Finally, it is argued that the trial court erroneously applied the "germaneness" test of Section 51 to the various provisions of the acts in question.
THE CHALLENGED STATUTES
SB 294 provides as follows:
It is clear from the plain language of the statute that in Section (1) the General Assembly deprives itself of the legal authority to repeal or amend, through the device of a budget bill, any other existing law appearing in the Kentucky Revised Statutes. However, in Section (2), the General Assembly gives itself the power to suspend or modify the operation of any statute, but only if the financial condition of state government so requires. The duration of such suspension is limited to the duration of the budget.
The General Assembly has, by this statute, drawn a line between its power in the budget bill to suspend or modify existing statutes, as opposed to repealing or amending existing statutes. It cannot repeal or amend, but it can suspend or modify existing statutes through the provisions of a budget bill.
Armed with this legislation, the General Assembly, in its biennial budget bill for the years 1984-1986, exercised this authority by drafting items relating to the reduction of increases in state officials' salaries, items providing for the transfer of monies from agencies and special funds to the states' general fund and items qualifying funds for resource recovery road projects, school books, and local jail support.
It is our role to determine if SB 294 may constitutionally permit the General Assembly to suspend or modify the operation of existing statutes; if the answer is in the affirmative, to further determine if both SB 294 and the budget bill comply with the requirements of the title section of Kentucky Constitution Section 51. If the answer to the second inquiry is in the affirmative we must, finally, examine each contested "modification or suspension" contained in the budget bill to determine if such actually constitutes a repeal or amendment, or if each is only a modification or suspension within the purview of SB 294(2) and of the re-enactment and publication section of Kentucky Constitution Section 51.
As stated, SB 294, while denying the power of the General Assembly to repeal or amend existing statutory law through the device of a budget bill, did indeed authorize that legislative body to "provide in a budget bill for the suspension or modification of the operation of a statute." No matter how one slices it, the General Assembly is permitted through the reduction or elimination of an appropriation, to effectively eliminate the efficacy of existing statutes, subject only to the finding of a financial emergency and further subject to the time limitation of the budgetary period.
We believe that this statutory scheme is clearly within the constitutional powers of the General Assembly.
It is clear that the power of the dollar--the raising and expenditure of the money necessary to operate state government--is one which is within the authority of the legislative branch of government. The Constitution of the Commonwealth so states and we have so stated. Kentucky Constitution Section 230, is as follows:
... In a word, the final action on the enactment or adoption of the budget is a legislative matter. It is, of course, the...
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