Com. of Va. ex rel. Virginia Dept. of Conservation and Economic Development v. Watt, s. 83-1730

Decision Date05 November 1984
Docket NumberNos. 83-1730,83-1888 and 83-1889,s. 83-1730
Citation741 F.2d 37
Parties, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,492 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, ex rel., VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, Virginia Mining and Reclamation Association, Lambert Coal Company, Inc., R & B Mining Corporation, J & J Coal Company, Inc., Golden Chip Coal Company, Coleman and Yates Coal Co., Inc., Jaward Corporation, Appellees, v. James G. WATT, Secretary, Department of Interior, Appellant, and Department of Interior, Defendant. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, ex rel., DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, DIVISION OF MINED LAND RECLAMATION and Virginia Mining and Reclamation Association, Appellees, v. James G. WATT, Secretary, Department of Interior, Appellant, and James Richard Harris, Director, Office of Surface Mining, Ralph H. Cox, Virginia State Director, Office of Surface Mining, Defendants. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, ex rel., DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, DIVISION OF MINED LAND RECLAMATION, Appellant, and Virginia Mining and Reclamation Association, Plaintiff, v. James G. WATT, Secretary, Department of Interior, James Richard Harris, Director, Office of Surface Mining, Ralph H. Cox, Virginia State Director, Office of Surface Mining, Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Walton D. Morris, Jr., Sp. Asst. U.S. Atty., Big Stone Gap, Va. (F. Henry Habicht, II, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D.C., John P. Alderman, U.S. Atty., Morgan E. Scott, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., Roanoke, Va., Robert L. Klarquist, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., on brief), for the Secretary of the Interior.

John L. Kilcullen, Washington, D.C. (Kilcullen, Wilson & Kilcullen Chartered, Washington, D.C., Elsey A. Harris, III, Mullins, Winston, Stout & Thomason, Norton, Va., on brief), for Virginia Mining and Reclamation Association, Jaward Corp., R & B Mining Corporation, J & J Coal Company, Inc., Golden Chip Coal Company, Coleman and Yates Coal Company, Inc., Lambert Coal Company, Inc.

Roger L. Chaffe, Asst. Atty. Gen., Richmond, Va. (Gerald L. Baliles, Atty. Gen. of Va., Richmond, Va., on brief), for The Commonwealth of Virginia.

Before HALL, PHILLIPS and SPROUSE, Circuit Judges.

K.K. HALL, Circuit Judge:

The Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") appeals from preliminary injunctions entered by the district court, prohibiting Interior's Office of Surface Mining ("OSM") from issuing cessation orders at certain surface coal mining and reclamation operations in the Commonwealth of Virginia. The Commonwealth cross-appeals from the district court's denial of its request for preliminary injunctive relief. 1 We conclude that under federal law the underlying actions against the Secretary may be brought only in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to dissolve the preliminary injunctions and to dismiss the actions for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

I.

The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 ("SMCRA"), 30 U.S.C. Sec. 1201 et seq., was enacted to provide for comprehensive regulation of surface coal mining and reclamation of mined lands. The purpose of the SMCRA is to "establish a nationwide program to protect society and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations." Id. at 1202(a).

After an initial period of direct regulation by the Department of the Interior, primary responsibility for the supervision of mining and reclamation activities is delegated to the individual states. This transfer of authority takes place when a state submits an acceptable regulatory program that is approved by the Secretary. 30 U.S.C. Sec. 1253.

The Commonwealth's state regulatory program was approved on December 15, 1981, subject to its compliance with certain conditions, including two conditions related to a federal exemption for mining operations which affect less than two acres. 2 Subsequently, in 1982, the Virginia legislature enacted Chapter 23, Va.Code Sec. 45.1-362 through 45.1-380 (1982), entitled "Surface Mining of Coal for Operations Disturbing Two Surface Acres or Less." According to the Secretary, Chapter 23 is inconsistent with the SMCRA and the federal regulations governing the two-acre exemption and creates a jurisdictional overlap with the approved state program, allowing coal operators to evade federal regulation of their mines. Specifically, the Secretary alleges that Chapter 23 fails to include in the two-acre calculation the land above underground mine workings and conflicts with the federal treatment of haulage roads and multiple mining operations under 30 C.F.R. Secs. 701.5 and 700.11.

Using his oversight authority, pursuant to 30 C.F.R. Secs. 730.11, 732.17, and Part 33, the Secretary began enforcement actions against the Commonwealth and certain coal operators to comply with the federal law and regulations governing the two-acre exemption. The Secretary's actions included the issuance of cessation orders against the operators.

In response, several coal mine operators and the Commonwealth filed related actions below challenging the cessation orders issued by the OSM against coal mines, which the Commonwealth, pursuant to Chapter 23, had declared to be exempt from federal permitting requirements. In their complaints for injunctive relief, the coal operators claimed that the Secretary was precluded from applying the two-acre criteria contained in the federal regulations and in Virginia's approved state program, because plaintiffs' coal mines were in compliance with Chapter 23. The coal operators further charged that the federal regulations governing the two-acre exemption were arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent with the SMCRA.

The Commonwealth in its complaint challenged the Secretary's enforcement of the federal two-acre regulations and the approved Virginia program at mines which were exempt under the Commonwealth's Chapter 23 criteria. The Commonwealth claimed that the federal regulations unlawfully deny the Virginia legislature the power to regulate separately, mines which, according to the Commonwealth, are exempt from the federal criteria. The Virginia Mining and Reclamation Association ("VMRA"), a trade association representing state coal mining interests, intervened as a plaintiff in the action filed by the Commonwealth.

The district court, concluding that it had jurisdiction under 30 U.S.C. Sec. 1276(a)(1), as well as federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331, granted preliminary injunctions, pursuant to 30 U.S.C. Sec. 1276(c). 3 These injunctions prohibit the OSM, pending consideration of the merits of the controversy, from issuing cessation orders against those mines permitted by the Commonwealth under Chapter 23, where the mining operations are causing no environmental harm. The district court denied the broader preliminary injunction requested by the Commonwealth and the VMRA, which would have prohibited the OSM from issuing cessation orders to any two-acre mine claiming an exemption under Chapter 23. Jaward Corporation v. Watt, 564 F.Supp. 797 (W.D.Va.1983).

This appeal and cross-appeal followed.

II.

On appeal, the Secretary contends that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the proceedings below. We agree. 4

30 U.S.C. Sec. 1276(a)(1) provides for judicial review of the Secretary's rulemaking actions as follows:

Any action by the Secretary promulgating national rules or regulations ... shall be subject to judicial review in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit. Any other action constituting rulemaking by the Secretary shall be subject to judicial review only by the United States District Court for the District in which the surface coal mining operation is located ... A petition for review of any action subject to judicial review under this subsection shall be filed in the appropriate Court within sixty days from the date of such action, or after such date if the petition is based solely on grounds arising after the sixtieth day. Any such petition may be made by any person who participated in the administrative proceedings and who is aggrieved by the action of the the Secretary. (Emphasis added).

In Tug Valley Recovery Center v. Watt, 703 F.2d 796 (4th Cir.1983), this Court considered the SMCRA's provisions for judicial review and concluded that a district court in this Circuit lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over any action which is tantamount to an attack on a federal regulation. In that case, an environmental group had brought an action against the Secretary in the District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, complaining that the Secretary's approval of West Virginia's regulatory program violated certain conflict-of-interest provisions of the SMCRA. The West Virginia program authorized administrative review of the regulatory authority's actions by a multiple interest board, but did not guarantee that the review board would be composed exclusively of persons who held no financial interest in coal mining operations.

The environmental group in Tug Valley claimed that the Secretary's approval of West Virginia's statutory program conflicted with the requirements of 30 U.S.C. Sec. 1267(g), which, according to plaintiffs,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
21 cases
  • National Wildlife Federation v. Burford
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Montana
    • September 3, 1985
    ...lead this Court to conclude that Holmes Limestone does not control here. First, as noted by the Fourth Circuit in Commonwealth of Virginia, ex rel. Department of Conservation and Economic Development v. Watt, 741 F.2d 37 (4th Cir.1984), the regulation reviewed in Holmes Limestone "did not d......
  • Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Lujan
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • January 11, 1993
    ...not permissive, courts have said the provision sets "subject matter jurisdiction." See Virginia ex rel. Virginia Dep't of Conservation and Economic Dev. v. Watt, 741 F.2d 37, 40 (4th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1198, 105 S.Ct. 983, 83 L.Ed.2d 984 (1985); Drummond Coal Co. v. Watt, 735......
  • West Virginia Mining v. Babbitt
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia
    • July 11, 1997
    ...operations."); U.S. v. S.S. (Joe) Burford, Inc., 761 F.2d 173, 173 (4th Cir.1985); Commonwealth of Va. ex rel. Virginia Dept. of Conservation & Econ. Devel. v. Watt, 741 F.2d 37, 38 (4th Cir.1984). In sum, the Act provides for comprehensive regulation of surface coal mining and reclamation ......
  • Pittston Co. v. Lujan
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia
    • April 23, 1992
    ...to the regulations themselves which the Fourth Circuit has held cannot be brought in this district. See Commonwealth of Virginia v. Watt, 741 F.2d 37, 40 (4th Cir.1984). On the other hand, Plaintiffs assert that this case presents a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. "The federal ques......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT