Com. v. Ackers

Decision Date21 June 1961
Citation175 N.E.2d 677,343 Mass. 63
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. John M. ACKERS. Petition of John M. ACKERS.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Walter Powers, Jr., Boston, for Ackers.

Robert L. Anderson, Asst. Dist. Atty., Middleboro (Robert M. Ready, Asst. Atty. Gen., with him), for the Commonwealth.

Robert M. Ready, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Robert L. Anderson, Asst. Dist. Atty., Middleboro, with him), for Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, WILLIAMS, KIRK and SPIEGEL, JJ.

WILLIAMS, Justice.

There are exceptions taken by one John M. Ackers in proceedings for his commitment to the treatment center of the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Bridgewater as a sexually dangerous person and an appeal by him from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On February 9, 1954, Ackers was found guilty on an indictment charging him with assault and battery with intent to murder and on an indictment charging him with the carnal abuse of a female child. On the first indictment he was sentenced to a term of from five to ten years, and on the second indictment to a term of from fourteen to twenty years in the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole.

On April 29, 1959, on petition of the district attorney for Plymouth County under G.L. c. 123A, § 6, inserted by St.1958, c. 646, § 1, he was found by the Superior Court to be a sexually dangerous person and committed to the branch treatment center of the department of mental health at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole for a 'term of one (1) day to life.'

On April 25, 1960, after a hearing on Ackers's petition for the discharge of his commitment, see § 9, a judge of the Superior Court made the following findings and order: 'I find that the petitioner, John M. Ackers, is a sexually dangerous person as defined in G.L. c. 123A, § 1. I find that there was no treatment center established at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole, at the time of the petitioner's commitment thereto. It is thereupon ordered and adjudged that the petitioner be released from the custody of the treatment center at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole, forthwith.'

On September 1, 1960, the district attorney filed a second petition for Ackers's commitment to the treatment center. Therein he stated that, on motion of the acting superintendent of the Correctional Institution at Walpole, Ackers was committed to the treatment center at Bridgewater on July 13, 1960, for examination and diagnosis; that on August 25, 1960, a 'Report of Psychiatrists to the Court' clearly indicated that said Ackers was a sexually dangerous person as defined by G.L. c. 123A, § 1, and was in need of care and treatment provided in the treatment center established by said chapter. 'Wherefore, pursuant to § 6 of said c. 123A, application is hereby made for the commitment of said John M. Ackers to said treatment center.' On October 13, Ackers filed a motion to dismiss the petition for the following reasons: '1. On April 25, 1960, this court ordered and adjudged that the said John M. Ackers be released from the custody of the department of mental health where he was committed after being previously adjudged a sexually dangerous person on April 29, 1959, and the Commonwealth is now barred from bringing a second petition to have the said Ackers again adjudged a sexually dangerous person. 2. The said Ackers is not a prisoner lawfully under sentence in the Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole, Massachusetts. 3. The report of the examining psychiatrists on its face does not show any repetitive or compulsive behavior as required by c. 123A, § 1, of the General Laws (Ter.Ed.) and consequently the said Ackers is not a sexually dangerous person as therein defined.' A hearing on the petition was held on November 17, and Ackers's motion to dismiss the petition was denied subject to his exception. At the same time his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which had been filed on October 14, 1960, was denied. The petition for commitment and the petition for habeas corpus were apparently heard together.

At the hearing there was testimony by a qualified psychiatrist tending to prove that the carnal abuse for which Ackers was serving sentence 'was a particularly brutal and vicious rape and assault on the victim. That it was a compulsive act. That the defendant had no remorse for the crime. That the defendant was unstable and a danger to the community. That although this was his only criminal conviction and there was nothing in his conduct in prison to indicate sexual violence or abnormality, the defendant was a sexually dangerous person as defined by G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 123A, as amended, and should be committed to the treatment center.'

At the close of the evidence, Ackers filed, among others, the following requests for rulings of law: '1. Proceedings under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 123A are criminal in nature as the punishment is a sentence of one day to life and from the nature of the proceedings as defined by the said statute. 2. A person who has been adjudged a sexually dangerous person under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 123A and who is thereafter sentenced for one day to life receives said sentence in lieu of any other sentence for other convictions of a crime.' '5. The defendant John M. Ackers having been adjudged a sexually dangerous person by this court on April 29, 1959, and thereafter having been discharged from this commitment on April 25, 1960, was improperly and illegally returned to the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole to serve a sentence imposed on February 9, 1954, and, consequently, the said Ackers is not properly a prisoner under sentence within the meaning of the said c. 123A.' '7. Section 5 and § 6 of the said 123A violate and are contrary to the constitutions of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the United States.'

The judge granted request numbered 1 but denied requests numbered 2, 5, and 7 to which denials Ackers excepted.

It appears from the docket entries that on November 17, 1960, the judge found Ackers to be a sexually dangerous person and ordered him committed to the Bridgewater treatment center for an indeterminate period, of a minimum of one day and a maximum of his natural life. On the same day, the judge denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Ackers contends in his petition that by his commitment on April 29, 1959, as a sexually dangerous person, his sentences, which he had been serving since 1954, were vacated and...

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18 cases
  • Com. v. Rodriguez
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • November 15, 1978
    ...ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 270, 60 S.Ct. 140, 84 L.Ed. 439 (1940). See Commonwealth v. Ackers, 343 Mass. 63, 68-69, 175 N.E.2d 677 (1961).14 See note 10 Supra.15 That is tracking § 1 the defendant's "misconduct in sexual matters," as evidenced by the repetit......
  • Gomes v. Gaughan
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • January 4, 1973
    ...construed this statute as nonpenal. See Commonwealth v. Hogan, 341 Mass. 372, 170 N.E.2d 327, 330 (1960); Commonwealth v. Ackers, 343 Mass. 63, 175 N.E.2d 677, 680 (1961); LaMorre v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hospital, 347 Mass. 534, 199 N.E.2d 204, 206 (1964); Commonwealth v. Maj......
  • Smith v. State Parole Bd.
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • November 30, 1983
    ...cases that in various contexts do not equate c. 123A commitments with punitive criminal confinements. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Ackers, 343 Mass. 63, 68, 175 N.E.2d 677 (1961). The Parole Board says that conviction and liability to punishment are prerequisites to commitment under c. 123A, §......
  • Petition of Peterson
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • April 3, 1968
    ...statutory definition of 'sexually dangerous person' set forth in c. 123A, § 1, is unconstitutionally vague. 4 See Commonwealth v. Ackers, 343 Mass. 63, 68--69, 175 N.E.2d 677. The petitioner attaches great weight to the use of the word 'misconduct.' Whereas this word, if standing alone, mig......
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