Com. v. Alvarado

• Decision Date: 15 August 2008
• Docket Number: SJC-10189.
• Citation: 892 N.E.2d 282,452 Mass. 194
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Jose ALVARADO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

892 N.E.2d 282

452 Mass. 194

COMMONWEALTH v. Jose ALVARADO.

SJC-10189.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

Argued May 6, 2008.

Decided August 15, 2008.

Harry L. Miles, Northampton, for the defendant.

Thomas H. Townsend, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, CORDY, & BOTSFORD, JJ.

BOTSFORD, J.

At issue in this case is whether dismissal is required following the Commonwealth's violation of one of the procedural deadlines in G.L. c. 123A, § 14 (a). On November 20, 2007, after a probable cause hearing, a judge in the Superior Court committed Jose Alvarado to the Massachusetts Treatment Center (treatment center) for evaluation by two qualified examiners pursuant to G.L. c. 123A, § 13 (a). Forty-three days later, on January 2, 2008, the qualified examiners filed their reports, finding Alvarado to be sexually dangerous. The Commonwealth filed a petition for trial on January 18, 2008, sixteen days after the qualified examiners had filed their reports but within sixty days of the November 20, 2007, order of commitment. Because G.L. c. 123A, § 14 (a), requires a petition for trial be filed within fourteen days of the qualified examiners' reports, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on the Commonwealth's delay.¹ A different judge in the Superior Court denied the defendant's motion. We granted the defendant's application for direct appellate review. We affirm the denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss.

General Laws c. 123A provides for the commitment of persons found to be sexually dangerous. The statute sets out a series of procedural requirements to be followed in any commitment proceeding. "The statutory scheme exists to protect the public `from harm by persons likely to be sexually dangerous' by striking a balance between the public interest and a defendant's substantive due process rights." Commonwealth v. Parra, 445 Mass. 262, 264, 836 N.E.2d 508 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Knapp, 441 Mass. 157, 164, 804 N.E.2d 885 (2004). General Laws c. 123A, § 13 (a), provides that, once a judge is satisfied that probable cause exists to believe that a person is sexually dangerous, that person "shall be committed to the treatment center for a period not exceeding 60 days for the purpose of examination and diagnosis under the supervision of two qualified examiners who shall, no later than 15 days prior to the expiration of said period, file with the court a written report of the examination and diagnosis and their recommendation" for that person. Should the Commonwealth seek to proceed with commitment, G.L. c. 123A, § 14 (a), prescribes that a petition for trial "shall be made within 14 days of the filing of the report of the two qualified examiners. If such petition is timely filed within the allowed time, ... a trial by jury will be held within 60 days to determine whether such person is a sexually dangerous person." G.L. c. 123A, § 14(a).

The sixty-day deadline in § 13 (a) is "mandatory to protect a defendant's liberty interest, and any delay by the Commonwealth that results in a confinement exceeding sixty days is a violation of the statute." Commonwealth v. Gross, 447 Mass. 691, 693, 856 N.E.2d 850 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Parra, 445 Mass. at 263, 836 N.E.2d 508. However, not all deadlines in the statute are intended to protect this interest. "In terms of a defendant's liberty interest, the relevant period is the sixty-day time period. The forty-five day deadline for the qualified examiners' report appears intended to give the Commonwealth a full two weeks in which to file its petition for trial." Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 439 Mass. 826, 831, 792 N.E.2d 119 (2003). Thus, when the forty-five day deadline is violated by the qualified examiners, "the party adversely affected is the Commonwealth, as it must expedite its decision to seek trial and submit its petition in order to meet that requirement prior to the expiration of the sixty-day detention." Id. Because the defendant's liberty interest is not implicated by the delay, dismissal is not required for such a violation. Id. at 831-832, 792 N.E.2d 119.

The defendant's argument is that the fourteen-day deadline within which the Commonwealth must file its petition, like the over-all sixty-day limit on his confinement, is intended to protect his liberty interest. And like the sixty-day limit, the defendant contends that any violation, no matter how small, must result in dismissal. We conclude that the violations of the Commonwealth's fourteen-day deadline should be analyzed in the same manner as violations of the qualified examiners' forty-five day deadline. The two deadlines are designed to work together, as two component parts of a single sixty-day period. The larger sixty-day period is intended to protect the liberty interest of the defendant. The two smaller time periods within it collectively represent an allocation of that available time between the qualified examiners and the Commonwealth, and are not individually intended to protect the liberty interest of the defendant. Therefore, ordinary violations of the fourteen-day deadline, like violations of the forty-five day deadline, do not result in prejudice to the defendant's liberty interest, and do not require dismissal.² Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 439 Mass. at 831, 792 N.E.2d 119. Cf. Commonwealth v. Sargent, 449 Mass. 576, 585, 870 N.E.2d 602 (2007) (Commonwealth filed petition for trial after qualified examiners' reports were received, but one day before reports were docketed by court, whereas G.L. c. 123A, § 14 [a], requires trial petition to be filed after qualified examiners' reports are filed with court; dismissal not required).

The...