Com. v. Anselvich
| Decision Date | 07 September 1904 |
| Citation | 186 Mass. 376,71 N.E. 790 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. ANSELVICH. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
John D. McLaughlin, for the Commonwealth.
John W Corcoran, Wm. B. Sullivan, and Chester W. Ford, for defendant.
This is a complaint under Rev. Laws, c. 72, § 16, charging the defendant with having sold, bought, given, taken, or otherwise disposed of or trafficked in certain bottles marked and distinguished with the name of 'L. Speidel & Co.,' as set forth in the complaint, together with the word 'Registered,' the description of which name mark, and device had previously been duly and legally filed and published. The principal contention of the defendant is that the statute under which the complaint was made is unconstitutional.
This statute appears to have three objects, of which one is to protect the public from fraud and deception by preventing the unauthorized use, a second time, of vessels or receptacles originally marked in such a way as to indicate their contents, together with the source from which they came another is to protect the manufacturer or dealer from loss of profits or reputation by the unauthorized use of his property to deceive the public by a sale of an inferior article in such a manner as to indicate that it was manufactured or put up by him; and the third is to aid the manufacturer or dealer in protecting and preserving a king of property which, from its nature and use, is peculiarly liable to be misappropriated by careless or dishonest persons. These are proper objects of legislation, which have been recognized in our statutes for many years. St. 1850, p. 331, c. 90, §§ 1, 2; St. 1852, c. 197; St. 1853, p. 450, c. 156, § 1; St. 1870, p. 250, c. 340; Rev. St. 1836, c. 28, § 132; Gen. St. 1860, c. 49, § 117; Id. c. 56, § 3; Id. c. 161, §§ 55, 56; Pub. St. 1882, c. 76, §§ 3, 4, 5, 6; Id. c. 203, §§ 63, 64; Rev. Laws, c. 72, §§ 2, 3, 5, 10, 12. Unless this statute violates the Constitution in the nature of its provisions, or in the methods which it prescribes to accomplish the objects of the Legislature, it must be sustained. We see nothing in it that transcends the power of the Legislature in these particulars. The means provided are reasonably adapted to the ends in view. The statute does not apply to any case in which there has been a purchase from the owner of the registered receptacle, and it properly forbids the defacement, or use, or sale of the receptacle without the written consent of the owner in all cases in which there has been no purchase by any one from him. The defendant contends that the statute improperly gives advantages to certain classes of persons, which others do not have. In this he is mistaken. It makes provisions in reference to a kind of property used in a peculiar way, which is of such a nature as to call for peculiar provisions for the protection of the public and of its owners against the fraud of evildoers. So, too, the provision making possession by an agent or dealer without the written consent of or purchase from the owner prima facie evidence of a violation of the statute is not class legislation. The peculiar conditions referred to in this part of the statute have such a probable connection with the commission of the offense that the Legislature well may legislate in reference to them. It is not persons who are particularly dealt with in the statute, but the conditions which pertain to their occupation and business. It is in the power of the Legislature to make certain conditions prima facie evidence of the commission of a crime, and this is a common kind of legislation. Com. v. Williams, 6 Gray, 1; Holmes v. Hunt, 122 Mass. 505-518, 23 Am. Rep. 381; Com. v. Hall, 128 Mass. 410, 35 Am. Rep. 387; Com. v. Barber, 143 Mass. 560, 10 N.E. 330; Com. v. Intoxicating Liquors, 172 Mass. 311, 52 N.E. 389. It cannot be said that the conditions referred to in this statute are so foreign to probable guilt as to furnish no justification for the legislative enactment that they shall be deemed prima facie evidence of guilt. Statutes having some of the features of this act as to the protection of trade-marks have been upheld by this court. Com. v. Rozen, 176 Mass. 129, 51 N.E. 223; Tracy v. Banker, 170 Mass. 266, 49 N.E. 308, 39 L. R. A. 508; Gilman v. Hunnewell, 122 Mass. 139; Lawrence Manufacturing Company v. Lowell Hosiery Mills, 129 Mass. 325, 37 Am. Rep. 362. The case of People v. Cannon, 139 N.Y. 32, 34 N.E. 759, 36 Am. St. Rep. 668, arose under a statute whose language is almost identical with the language of this, as found in the original enactment in St. 1893, p. 1322, c. 440, and the court in an elaborate opinion unanimously held the law to be constitutional. Decisions in Gillespie v. People, 188 Ill. 176, 58 N.E. 1007, 52 L. R. A. 283, 80 Am. St. Rep. 176, and Horwich v. Walker-Gordon Laboratory Company, 205 Ill. 497, 68 N.E. 938, declaring similar statutes unconstitutional, are not in harmony with the cases in this commonwealth. We are clearly of opinion that the parts of the statute involved in this case are constitutional. Without intimating that there is any ground for a different conclusion in regard to section 18 of the chapter (see Com. v. Intoxicating Liquors, 172 Mass. 311, 52 N.E....
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