Com. v. Blair
Decision Date | 13 October 2004 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Willie BLAIR, Appellant. |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
William A. Jones, Jr., Pittsburgh, for appellant.
Wayne P. McGrew, Asst. Dist. Atty., Greensburg, for Com., appellee.
Before: JOYCE, ORIE MELVIN, and McCAFFERY, JJ.
¶ 1 On the night of August 11, 2002, Officer Michael Krahe was alone on patrol when he was called upon to investigate a report of a domestic dispute. Upon arriving at the location, Officer Krahe saw a car parked directly in front of the address in question. Officer Krahe saw Appellant, Willie Blair, and another individual sitting in the car and acting evasive. In order to reach the door of the residence to investigate the domestic dispute, Officer Krahe would have had to turn his back on the individuals in the car. Concerned for his own safety, Officer Krahe asked Appellant and the other person to show him their hands. They refused and, instead, Appellant opened the car door and started to get out. While Officer Krahe kept repeating his order to remain in the car, Appellant nevertheless kept the door open and threw a bag of cocaine under the car. On appeal, Appellant asks us to determine whether the cocaine should be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal investigative detention. We hold that when the officer ordered Appellant to remain in the car for further investigation, Appellant was legally detained. Therefore, we affirm the order denying Appellant's motion to suppress.
¶ 2 The factual and procedural history, as set forth in the trial court opinion1, is as follows.
(Trial Court Opinion, 3/14/03, at 1-2) (citations to transcript omitted).
¶ 3 After his arrest, Appellant filed a timely motion to suppress the evidence recovered from underneath the car. On February 25, 2003, Judge McCormick held an evidentiary hearing, and then denied the motion in an order and opinion issued on March 14, 2003. Appellant waived his right to a trial by jury, proceeded to a stipulated non-jury trial, and was found guilty of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance2, possession of a controlled substance3, and possession of drug paraphernalia4. On April 10, 2003, Judge McCormick sentenced Appellant to eighteen (18) to thirty-six (36) months in prison. Appellant filed a timely appeal and presents the following issue for our review:
WAS THE POLICE RECOVERY OF THE BAGGIE OF COCAINE IN THIS CASE THE PRODUCT OF AN UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT?
¶ 4 Preliminarily, we note:
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Since the prosecution prevailed in the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426, 445, 826 A.2d 831, 842 (2003) (citations omitted), cert. denied, Bomar v. Pennsylvania, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1053, 157 L.Ed.2d 906 (2004).
¶ 5 We have carefully reviewed the record and have determined that it does support the factual findings of the trial court. See Notes of Testimony (N.T.), Suppression Hearing, 2/25/03, at 5-25. Our focus on review, therefore, shifts to the propriety of the legal conclusions which the trial court drew from those facts. See Bomar, supra.
¶ 6 Although the law of search and seizure is constantly evolving, its focus remains on the delicate balance of protecting the right of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and protecting the safety of our citizens and police officers by allowing police to make limited intrusions on citizens while investigating crime. See Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)
; Commonwealth v. Graham, 554 Pa. 472, 721 A.2d 1075, 1078 (1998). Over one hundred years ago, the United States Supreme Court observed:
`No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.'
Terry, 392 U.S. at 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251, 11 S.Ct. 1000, 35 L.Ed. 734 (1891)). In Terry, the Supreme Court recognized the importance of the competing governmental interests, in particular the safety of police officers:
Terry, 392 U.S. at 23-24, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Our Supreme Court has long recognized this interest as well. See Commonwealth v. Hicks, 434 Pa. 153, 158-159, 253 A.2d 276, 279 (1969)
(. )
¶ 7 The value placed on individual liberty by our courts and our society remains unchanged to this day. However, over the past quarter-century, it is indisputable that there has been a change on the streets of our country. It is undeniable that many of our streets are infinitely more dangerous for citizens and police officers alike than they were in 1968 when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Terry and in 1969 when our Supreme Court decided Hicks. Mindful of this reality and the balance we must strike, we turn to our legal analysis.
¶ 8 Our Supreme Court has outlined three types of interactions between police and citizens:
The first of these is a "mere encounter" (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. The second, an "investigative detention" must be supported by reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or "custodial detention" must be supported by probable cause.
Commonwealth v. McClease, 750 A.2d 320, 324 (Pa.Super.2000) (quoting In the Interest of S.J., 551 Pa. 637, 713 A.2d 45, 47 n. 3 (1998)). The threshold inquiry in these cases is whether the citizen in question has been legally seized.
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