Com. v. Blonde

Decision Date23 July 1990
Docket NumberNo. 89-P-1220,89-P-1220
Citation556 N.E.2d 1049,29 Mass.App.Ct. 914
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. Michael J. BLONDE.
CourtAppeals Court of Massachusetts

Michael J. Traft, Boston, for defendant.

Jane A. Donohue, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Com.

Before KASS, SMITH and GILLERMAN, JJ.

RESCRIPT.

Measured against the criteria set out in Commonwealth v. Cardenuto, 406 Mass. 450, 548 N.E.2d 864 (1990), the defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty should have been allowed. A jury returned a verdict of guilty on an indictment of arson of a dwelling house.

The site of the fire, 371/373 Dorchester Street, South Boston, was a mixed use property with two store spaces on the ground floor and two apartments above. It was obvious that the blaze which occurred on February 17, 1988, had been set. The firefighters who responded to the alarm smelled gasoline and discovered a Ziploc bag with gasoline, on top of which rested a pack of matches and a burned cigarette butt. The evidence warranted a finding that Blonde was the trustee of the trust which held title to the premises, but shed no light on the relationship between Blonde and Ronald Bradford Lawrence, III, who was identified as having the beneficial interest, nor did the evidence indicate who would own any remainder. When the firefighters came upon the premises, they were locked. Blonde, the defendant, had keys to the premises, but so did other persons. No evidence placed the defendant at the premises on the evening the fire occurred the woman who managed the tanning salon, which occupied one of the two store spaces on the premises, had been at the salon from late afternoon to 8:30 P.M. Other store space had been used as a barbershop but had been vacant for five months. All the balance of the property was tenanted. An existing fire insurance policy was due to expire on the day following the fire, but an insurance agent had arranged for a substitute policy. The amounts of insurance, $250,000 for the building and $60,000 for its contents, represented no increase of insurance. A 1987 appraisal, made in connection with a mortgage application, placed a value of $200,000 on the property. The market for real estate in South Boston in 1987-1988 was firm. Beneficiaries of the insurance policy were not identified.

No one saw the defendant at the scene of the fire. There was no evidence that Blonde had entered into an agreement with anyone to set fire to the premises or had inquired for an arsonist. Apart from the single vacancy in the property, there was no evidence of financial distress, and that vacancy did not warrant an inference that the defendant was in dire financial straits.

As to consciousness of guilt, there was some evidence. On the day of the fire, the defendant said that he had suffered chest pains (he had experienced a prior episode of this trouble) and took himself into Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH). Blonde first said that he went to MGH between 8 P.M. and 9 P.M.; later he told the district chief who was investigating the fire that he had gone to MGH at 7:30 P.M. Hospital records show Blonde to have been logged in at the emergency service at 9:15 P.M. His examining physician at MGH concluded that Blonde was not suffering from heart disease (of which there was family history). The Commonwealth draws inculpatory inferences from Blonde's placement of himself at MGH at a time earlier than his actual arrival. The...

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5 cases
  • Choy v. Commonwealth
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • February 22, 2010
    ...beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 34 Mass.App.Ct. 610, 617, 614 N.E.2d 697 (1993), quoting Commonwealth v. Blonde, 29 Mass.App.Ct. 914, 916, 556 N.E.2d 1049 (1990). We conclude that a rational jury could determine, based on the evidence the Commonwealth presented at tria......
  • Choy v. Com.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • February 22, 2010
    ...beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Robinson, 34 Mass.App.Ct. 610, 617, 614 N.E.2d 697 (1993), quoting Commonwealth v. Blonde, 29 Mass.App.Ct. 914, 916, 556 N.E.2d 1049 (1990). We conclude that a rational jury could determine, based on the evidence the Commonwealth 921 N.E.2d 948 pr......
  • Com. v. Carlton
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • October 15, 1997
    ...must often rely on a "web of circumstantial evidence" when establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Blonde, 29 Mass.App.Ct. 914, 916, 556 N.E.2d 1049 (1990). This case fits within the norm, in that the evidence against the defendant on the record is mainly A reasonable ......
  • Com. v. Robinson, s. 91-P-1371
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • July 26, 1993
    ...only by a "web of circumstantial evidence" that entwines the suspect in guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Blonde, 29 Mass.App.Ct. 914, 916, 556 N.E.2d 1049 (1990), and cases cited. Eyewitness or other direct evidence is rarely available and the question is whether indirec......
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