Com. v. Bridge
| Decision Date | 24 September 1981 |
| Citation | 495 Pa. 568,435 A.2d 151 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Carl A. BRIDGE, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
F. Walter Bloom, III, Dist. Atty., Wm. G. Martin, Franklin, for appellee.
Before O'BRIEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY and KAUFFMAN, JJ.
Appellant, Carl A. Bridge, was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of five (5) to ten (10) years following a jury finding that he was guilty of voluntary manslaughter. The charge resulted from the shooting by appellant of his ex-wife, in the head, causing her death. At trial the Commonwealth attempted to establish murder of the first degree. Evidence was introduced by the prosecution to establish that appellant killed his ex-wife pursuant to a predesigned plan. The defense did not deny responsibility for the death but argued in the alternative, that appellant was not guilty by reason of involuntary intoxication or guilty of no more than involuntary or voluntary manslaughter by reason of the "serious" provocation on the part of the victim and appellant's diminished capacity by reason of intoxication. Post-verdict motions were denied and this direct appeal followed.
The first assignment of error in this appeal is the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury they could consider appellant's claim of voluntary intoxication in determining whether the requisite intent for voluntary manslaughter had been established. This assignment of error focuses upon the present draft of section 308 of the Crimes Code. 1 That section provides:
§ 308. Intoxication or drugged condition.
Neither voluntary intoxication nor voluntary drugged condition is a defense to a criminal charge, nor may evidence of such conditions be introduced to negative the element of intent of the offense, except that evidence of such intoxication or drugged condition of the defendant may be offered by the defendant whenever it is relevant to reduce murder from a higher degree to a lower degree of murder.
Appellant initially argued that this section offends equal protection guarantees asserting that a legislature may not limit the use of evidence of intoxication to the crime of murder of the first degree and preclude its use in lesser crimes requiring a specific mens rea. 2 In the supplemental brief the argument was rephrased into a due process attack. It was asserted that a defendant could not be precluded from introducing evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate an element of the criminal offense which the prosecution is bound to prove beyond to prove a reasonable doubt. These contentions reflect the recurring question as to what, if any, role voluntary intoxication will be allowed to play in the determination of criminal responsibility.
Even the most permissive society recognizes that voluntary intoxication will not be tolerated as an excuse or justification for anti-social behavior. Thus the law has consistently rejected as a defense the actor's assertion that "I would not have committed the deed if I had been sober." The cases are legion in this jurisdiction reaffirming the principle that voluntary intoxication neither exonerates nor excuses criminal conduct. Commonwealth v. Gordon, 490 Pa. 234, 416 A.2d 87 (1980); Commonwealth v. Pitts, 486 Pa. 212, 404 A.2d 1305 (1979); Commonwealth v. England, 474 Pa. 1, 375 A.2d 1292 (1977); Commonwealth v. Graves, 461 Pa. 118, 334 A.2d 661 (1975); Commonwealth v. Fostar, 455 Pa. 216, 317 A.2d 188 (1974); Commonwealth v. Tarver, 446 Pa. 233, 284 A.2d 759 (1971); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 445 Pa. 488, 284 A.2d 798 (1971); Commonwealth v. Ingram, 440 Pa. 239, 270 A.2d 190 (1970); Commonwealth v. Brabham, 433 Pa. 491, 252 A.2d 378 (1969); Commonwealth v. Reid, 432 Pa 319, 247 A.2d 783 (1968); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 862, 70 S.Ct. 96, 94 L.Ed. 528, reh. denied 338 U.S. 888, 70 S.Ct. 181, 94 L.Ed. 546; Commonwealth v. Eyler, 217 Pa. 512, 66 A. 746 (1907); Commonwealth v. Cleary, 135 Pa. 64, 19 A. 1017 (1890); Keenan v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. 55 (1863); Kilpatrick v. Commonwealth, 31 Pa. 198 (1858); Respublica v. Weidle, 2 Dall. 88 (1781).
Notwithstanding this firmly imbedded concept, it is evident that evidence of voluntarily induced intoxication is not totally irrelevant in criminal cases. In some instances, intoxication is an element of the offense, e.g., driving under the influence, and therefore proof of intoxication (or some degree thereof) is necessary to prove the crime. 3 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3731. See also Commonwealth v. Horn, 395 Pa. 585, 150 A.2d 872 (1959); Commonwealth v. Palmer, 265 Pa.Super. 462, 402 A.2d 530 (1979).
It is also true that there are certain instances where intoxication is not an element of the offense, and yet evidence of intoxication is nevertheless accepted as being relevant. For instance, if the accused seeks to offer his intoxication to prove that he did not perform the physical act required by the crime that he was unconscious at the time and therefore did not commit the deed this evidence is germane to the factfinders' inquiry and is properly submitted for their evaluation. In such cases, the issue can be neatly confined to the question of whether the accused was the perpetrator of the deed charged.
The areas discussed to this point provide little basis for disagreement and are not the subject of our instant concern. There is no contention that the present version of section 308 in any way touches upon these accepted principles. The difficulty arises when we reach the question as to whether or not the actor's degree of sobriety should be relevant to determine the mental state required to commit the crime charged.
At this point, the societal judgment relating to overindulgence and the concern that intoxication may be used as a device to avoid punishment comes into play. As stated where the legislature has expressly made the actor's state of sobriety relevant or where the degree of inebriation may have affected the actor's ability to perform the act required to commit the crime, the reluctance to permit evidence of intoxication to be considered by the factfinder is not present. In contrast, where the state of mind of the actor is at issue the reluctance to allow this evidence is probably reflective of the instinctive distrust of our ability to accurately ascertain the mental state of another. There is also a natural repugnance against one voluntarily depriving himself of his faculties, and then seeking to excuse errant behavior because of the absence of those faculties. Commonwealth v. McCausland, 348 Pa. 275, 35 A.2d 70 (1944); Commonwealth v. Dudash, 204 Pa. 124, 53 A. 756 (1902). Competing with these conditions is the argument that where the legislature has seen fit to define a particular state of mind as being a prerequisite of the offense then all factors bearing on whether that state of mind in fact existed then becomes relevant. That the legislative judgment to specifically define a particular state of mind as a prerequisite for the offense evidences an intent to make irrelevant the circumstances which brought about the state of mind of the actor when the act was committed. The point at issue is what in fact was that state of mind and all facts relevant to that question, including voluntarily induced inebriation, should be considered by the finder of fact. 4
A number of the jurisdictions in this country follow the latter view and hold where a crime requires a specific mens rea evidence of intoxication is allowed to be introduced to demonstrate that the defendant did not possess the requisite intent. State v. Cooper, 111 Ariz. 332, 529 P.2d 231 (1974); Stevens v. State, 246 Ark. 1200, 441 S.W.2d 451 (1969); People v. Conley, 64 Cal.2d 310, 49 Cal.Rptr. 815, 411 P.2d 911 (1966); Dolan v. People, 168 Colo. 19, 449 P.2d 828 (1969); People v. Heiple, 29 Ill.App.3d 452, 330 N.E.2d 556 (1975); Preston v. State, 259 Ind. 353, 287 N.E.2d 347 (1972); State v. Watts, 223 N.W.2d 234 (Iowa 1974); State v. Wheeler, 195 Kan. 184, 403 P.2d 1015 (1965); State v. Kjeldahl, 278 N.W.2d 58 (Minn.1979); State v. Ostwald, 591 P.2d 646 (Mont.1979); State v. Tapia, 81 N.M. 274, 466 P.2d 551 (1970); People v. Jones, 27 N.Y.2d 222, 316 N.Y.S.2d 617, 265 N.E.2d 446 (1970); State v. Simmons, 286 N.C. 681, 213 S.E.2d 280 (1975), vacated in part on other grounds, 428 U.S. 903, 96 S.Ct. 3207, 49 L.Ed.2d 1208; State v. French, 171 Ohio St. 501, 172 N.E.2d 613 (1961); State v. Smith, 260 Or. 349, 490 P.2d 1262 (1971); Bradford v. State, 208 Tenn. 500, 347 S.W.2d 33 (1961); State v. Hartley, 16 Utah 2d 123, 396 P.2d 749 (1964); State v. Conklin, 79 Wash.2d 805, 489 P.2d 1130 (1971). See J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law, 529-33 (2d ed.1960); J. Miller, Handbook of Criminal Law, 137-41 (1937); Paulsen, Intoxication as a Defense to Crime, 1961 U.Ill.L.F. 1; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law, § 68(a).
The history of this issue in this jurisdiction has been a checkered one. In Commonwealth v. Tarver, supra, this Court restricted the use of evidence of intoxication to reducing the offense of murder of the first degree to a lesser degree of murder. It rejected the view that this evidence should be allowed wherever a specific mens rea crime was charged. The Tarver position was repudiated by the legislature in its original draft of section 308 which provided:
§ 308. Intoxication or drugged condition.
Intoxication or drugged condition are not, as such, defenses to a criminal charge; but in any prosecution for any offense, evidence of intoxication or drugged condition of the defendant may be offered by the defendant whenever it is relevant to negative an element of the offense.
This provision did not limit the use of evidence of voluntary intoxication to an offense requiring a specific mens rea. It followed the Model Penal Code (...
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