Com. v. Buckley

• Decision Date: 28 November 1888
• Citation: 148 Mass. 27,18 N.E. 577
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. BUCKLEY et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

148 Mass. 27

18 N.E. 577

COMMONWEALTH v. BUCKLEY et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Plymouth.

November 28, 1888

November 28, 1888

COUNSEL

J.M. & T.C. Day, for defendants.

A.J Waterman, Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.

OPINION

W ALLEN, J.

The indictment is upon Pub.St. c. 202, § 29, for maliciously threatening to accuse a person of the crime of burning a building not his own, with intent to extort money. The defendants offered to prove that the charge threatened was true, and the evidence was excluded. It is contended that the evidence was competent on the question of malice. The malice required by the statute is not a feeling of ill-will towards the person threatened, but the willful doing of the act with the illegal intent. Com. v. Goodwin, 122 Mass. 19. If the threat was willfully made, with the intent to extort money, it was a malicious act, and the fact that the charge was true would be immaterial. It is further contended that the evidence was competent upon the question of intent, and Com. v. Jones, 121 Mass. 57, is relied on. That was an indictment for maliciously threatening to accuse one of an indecent assault upon the wife of the defendant, with intent to extort money. There was conflicting evidence whether the defendant threatened to prosecute for an assault on his wife unless money was paid to him, or whether he demanded money in satisfaction for an assault on his wife. He offered evidence to prove that the assault was committed, and it was held that the evidence was competent upon the question of the defendant's intent. The court say: "If Robinson had in fact made such an assault upon the defendant's wife, the defendant might lawfully demand reparation. If the wrong which he offered to prove had in fact been committed, the demand which the defendant made for payment may have been without the intent to extort money necessary to constitute the crime alleged in the indictment." In the case at bar, the crime threatened to be charged did not involve any wrong to the defendants, and it is not contended that the defendants made any demand for reparation for a wrong done to them, or that the evidence offered had any tendency to show that the demand was not with intent to extort money. The argument is that the evidence is competent upon the question whether the defendants intended to threaten to accuse of the crime unless the money was paid or only demanded the money as a...