Com. v. Cepulonis

• Citation: 9 Mass.App.Ct. 302,400 N.E.2d 1299
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Richard A. CEPULONIS.
• Decision Date: 28 February 1980
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 1299

400 N.E.2d 1299

9 Mass.App.Ct. 302

COMMONWEALTH v. Richard A. CEPULONIS.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Argued Jan. 11, 1980.

Decided Feb. 28, 1980.

Richard C. Heidlage, Boston, for defendant.

Daniel F. Toomey, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Before BROWN, GREANEY and DREBEN, JJ.

GREANEY, Justice.

On November 9, 1972, the defendant entered pleas of guilty to two indictments charging him with armed robbery. G.L. c. 265, § 17. Before the pleas were accepted, he was examined by a Superior Court judge and indicated in the course of the colloquy that he was aware of the nature of the crimes, that he had committed both offenses, that he understood the maximum possible sentences (any term of years up to life), that he had not been coerced into pleading guilty, and that he was satisfied with his counsel's advice. A Worcester police officer testified to the particulars of the robberies and to the fact that each victim had personally identified the defendant. In her sentencing argument, the defendant's counsel pointed out, among other things, that the defendant was then serving a fifteen year sentence at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Concord for a series of robberies that he had committed in 1969. ¹ She requested a "forthwith sentence . . . to Walpole." The prosecutor recommended a "forthwith to Walpole, five to ten years." The judge sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of ten to twenty years at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole. ²

On February 3, 1977, the defendant moved to retract his pleas and to have the sentences revoked. ³ Following an evidentiary hearing, at which the defendant and his plea counsel testified in detail, a second Superior Court judge (the judge who had accepted the pleas had by then retired) made findings and rulings and denied the motion. The defendant has appealed and alleges that the pleas were not voluntarily or intelligently made because: (1) his plea counsel provided him with ineffective assistance by failing to investigate an alibi defense; (2) he was coerced into offering the pleas; (3) the pleas were induced by counsel's mistaken advice as to parole eligibility; and (4) he expected that the judge would adopt and impose the Commonwealth's recommended sentence. We have before us the record made at the time of the pleas, the transcript of the hearing on the motion, and the judge's findings and rulings. The judge's findings will be overturned only if they are unwarranted by the evidence or unjustified in law. Commonwealth v. Murphy, 362 Mass. 542, 547, 289 N.E.2d 571 (1972); Commonwealth v. Stanley, 363 Mass. 102, 104, 292 N.E.2d 694 (1973); Commonwealth v. Brown, --- Mass. ---, --- ^a, 390 N.E.2d 1107 (1979). We also are attentive to the principle that the judge has the superior vantage point from which to observe and weigh the testimony and is the ultimate arbiter on questions of credibility. Commonwealth v. Botelho, 369 Mass. 860, 868, 343 N.E.2d 876 (1976); Commonwealth v. Subilosky, --- Mass.App. --- ^b, 374 N.E.2d 334 (1978). See Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 3 Mass.App. 554, 557, 336 N.E.2d 872 (1975). We affirm the denial of the motion.

1. Effective assistance of counsel. The guarantees of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provide a criminal defendant with the right to effective assistance of counsel at each critical stage of the proceedings against him, including a hearing where he pleads guilty. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 1051, 10 L.Ed.2d 193 (1963). Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S. 1, 2, 92 S.Ct. 759, 760, 30 L.Ed.2d 755 (1972). Commonwealth v. Bolduc, --- Mass. ---, --- ^c, 378 N.E.2d 661 (1978). Because the competency of counsel affects the determination of voluntariness, entry of a guilty plea cannot constitute a waiver of the defendant's right to assert that he was incompetently advised. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973); Salkay v. Wainwright, 552 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir. 1977). The defendant claims that he informed his plea counsel that he was living in Richmond, Virginia, with his wife when the crimes were committed; that counsel refused adequately to pursue the defense, stating that it would be too costly to investigate; and that, as a result, he was left with the alternatives of either pleading guilty or facing a trial shorn of his only meaningful defense.

In deciding a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a criminal case, an examination is required to ascertain whether there has been "serious incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention of counsel behavior of counsel falling measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer and, if that is found, then, typically, whether it has likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defence." Commonwealth v. Rondeau, --- Mass. ---, --- ^d, 392 N.E.2d 1001, 1003 (1979), quoting from Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96, 315 N.E.2d 878 (1974). Commonwealth v. Domaingue, --- Mass.App. ---, --- - --- ^e, 392 N.E.2d 1207 (1979). A failure to investigate and pursue a plausible alibi defense known to, or with normal diligence accessible to, counsel would fall beneath the level of competency expected. See Osborne v. Commonwealth, --- Mass. ---, --- ^f, 389 N.E.2d 981 (1979). However, "failure to pursue a groundless (alibi) defense is ineffective assistance of counsel . . . , and failure to pursue a marginal (alibi) defense before advising a guilty plea may not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel . . . , especially where the defendant has sufficient reasons to plead guilty," such as the strength of the case against him or the opportunity to receive a favorable disposition. ⁴ Id. at --- - --- ^g, 389 N.E.2d at 986. Even in cases where arguably there may have been a defense, some Federal courts have held that advice to plead guilty did not render counsel's assistance ineffective. See Allen v. VanCantfort, 436 F.2d 625, 630 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1008, 91 S.Ct. 2189, 29 L.Ed.2d 430 (1971) (insanity defense possibly available; compelling evidence of guilt); Cavett v. United States, 545 F.2d 486, 487-488 (5th Cir. 1977) (counsel's advice to plead guilty to avoid penalty under multiple offender act reasonably competent even though previous offenses possibly susceptible to collateral attack); Jackson v. Estelle, 548 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir. 1977) (counsel's advice to plead guilty reasonably competent because wife's statement to police contradicted possible alibi defense). See also Commonwealth v. Bernier, 359 Mass. 13, 20-22, 267 N.E.2d 636, 641 (1971) (trial counsel need not present any and every claim or defense desired by his client regardless of merit; counsel is not a "tool for the accomplishment of the ends of his client, whatever the ends might be").

The motion judge rejected the bulk of the defendant's testimony on the alibi and found that plea counsel had discussed the subject with the defendant and had advised him that she did not think he had a defense. He concluded that the defendant's "talk . . . of a possible defense of living in Virginia at the time the offenses were committed is not persuasive."

The evidence found credible by the judge supports the conclusion that the defendant accepted his counsel's advice to plead guilty based on a realistic appraisal of the alibi. Defense counsel, a practitioner for almost twenty years with experience in criminal trial work, testified that she was prepared and ready for a trial if the defendant wanted a trial. She testified that the defendant mentioned a Virginia alibi to her but that "he had no evidence." Although her memory almost five years after the event was understandably dim, the testimony just quoted, in the light of all her testimony, indicates that she questioned the defendant as to corroboration for the alibi and he had nothing of substance to offer in its support. Other factors also undoubtedly had a bearing on the evaluation of the alibi. The defendant had seen and heard the strength of the Commonwealth's case first hand at the probable cause hearing, and he knew that it rested on substantially unchallenged eyewitness testimony. ⁵ If the defendant took the stand at a trial to espouse the alibi, he faced probable embarrassment from his prior criminal record. ⁶ The fact that the robberies were committed while the defendant was on parole, and caused the resumption of a lengthy sentence for previous robberies, caused his counsel to accurately characterize the prosecutor's plea recommendation as "excellent." ⁷ There is no question that the defendant knew that he was entitled to a trial, and that he was informed by counsel that she was prepared to defend him. With these facts, the motion judge could also have considered it important that the defendant had waited almost five years to raise the ineffectiveness claim, ⁸ that he continued to retain plea counsel to represent him on a petition to reduce the sentences heard several years later before the Appellate Division of the Superior Court (G. L. c. 278, § 28B), and that the defendant's wife, the corroborating witness for the alibi, was not called to testify at the hearing on the motion and her absence was not explained. Plea counsel was not required to engage in a quixotic pursuit of a defense which could not reasonably be expected to exonerate the defendant instead of recommending a guilty plea. Her advice was based on a manifestly sound appraisal of all the circumstances facing the defendant and should not be second guessed. Commonwealth v. Stone, 366 Mass. 506, 517, 320 N.E.2d 888 (1974). We are satisfied that the defendant was informed that the alibi was untenable and that his decision to plead guilty was his voluntary choice after consideration of all the relevant factors including his counsel's bleak but realistic assessment of the alibi. ⁹

2. Coerciveness. The...