Com. v. Rondeau

• Decision Date: 05 July 1979
• Citation: 378 Mass. 408,392 N.E.2d 1001
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Donald K. RONDEAU.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1001

392 N.E.2d 1001

378 Mass. 408

COMMONWEALTH v. Donald K. RONDEAU.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Argued March 6, 1979.

Decided July 5, 1979.

Steven J. Rappaport, Boston, for defendant.

Francis R. Fecteau, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and QUIRICO, KAPLAN, WILKINS and ABRAMS, JJ.

QUIRICO, Justice.

This appeal is before us pursuant to G.L. c. 278, §§ 33A-33G. The defendant was convicted on three indictments charging armed robbery and sentenced to serve eighteen to twenty-five years from and after any sentences presently being served. He moved for a new trial on the alternate grounds (a) that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow his trial attorney to withdraw so that he might become an alibi witness for the defense, or (b) that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial. The judge denied the motion after hearing, and the defendant appealed. The Appeals Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. Rondeau, --- Mass.App. --- ^A, 380 N.E.2d 1330. We granted the defendant's application for further appellate review. See G.L. c. 211A, § 11(B ). We reverse.

The South Works Credit Union in Worcester was held up on March 12, 1971, at about 10:40 A.M. by three men. One man, identified by several witnesses as the defendant, wore a hat, sunglasses, and a false beard that largely obscured his face. This man entered the Credit Union holding a nickel-plated revolver, and he ordered everyone present to stand up and put their hands behind their backs. Two other men, who wore masks, then entered, leaped over the tellers' counter, and placed about $4,500 in a pillowcase. The gunman told the occupants not to move for a few minutes, and all three individuals then left the premises.

The defendant sought to establish an alibi. One Ronald Grogan was on trial in the Worcester County courthouse on March 12, 1971. He testified that the defendant came to the courthouse that day to offer moral support and that he saw the defendant at various times between 9:30 A.M. and noon. In particular, according to Grogan, the defendant was seated as a spectator in Grogan's courtroom at 10:00 A.M. and at 11:00 A.M. One Joseph Courtney, who was not a defendant in this case but who was serving a sentence for other unrelated crimes, testified that he was the unmasked, bewhiskered gunman in the Credit Union and that the defendant was not involved. Subsidiary details of Courtney's story differed, however, from those related by other witnesses. ¹ Finally, Detective Oscar Provencher testified to seeing the defendant in the courthouse, but stated that the defendant left the courthouse at about 10:10 A.M.

After the trial the defendant obtained new counsel, who then filed a motion for a new trial. This motion was heard in March of 1976. The defendant and Donald P. Feldman, the trial attorney, testified at the hearing. Mr. Feldman stated that, during the first trial, he was ready to testify under oath to seeing the defendant in the courthouse on the morning in question at fifteen-to-twenty minute intervals. The judge, who was also the trial judge, denied the motion on the basic ground that he disbelieved Mr. Feldman's account.

The meritorious and dispositive issue before us on this further appeal is whether the defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by the failure of Mr. Feldman to withdraw from representation and to testify as an alibi witness. ² No simple constitutional test suffices for resolution of this question. In the absence of firm guidance by the Supreme Court, the Courts of Appeals have fashioned divergent standards against which to measure the effectiveness of criminal trial attorneys. ³ See Maryland v. Marzullo, 435 U.S. 1011, 1011-1013, 98 S.Ct. 1885, 56 L.Ed.2d 394 (1978) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). We attempted to bring some order into this doctrinal chaos in Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 315 N.E.2d 878 (1974), where we said: "(W)hatever the attempted formulation of a standard in general terms, what is required in the actual process of decision of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . is a discerning examination and appraisal of the specific circumstances of the given case to see whether there has been serious incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention of counsel behavior of counsel falling measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer and, if that is found, then, typically, whether it has likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defence." Id. at 96, 315 N.E.2d at 883. Accord, e. g., Commonwealth v. Mains, --- Mass. ---, --- - --- ^B, 374 N.E.2d 576 (1978).

Saferian envisages a two-step inquiry in the usual case where ineffective assistance of counsel is claimed. There must first be an evaluation of the attorney's conduct. There is language in two of our post-Saferian decisions that suggests continued adherence to the "farce and mockery" test approved in Commonwealth v. Bernier, 359 Mass. 13, 18, 267 N.E.2d 636 (1971). See Delle Chiaie v. Commonwealth, 367 Mass. 527, 536, 327 N.E.2d 696 (1975); Commonwealth v. Rittenberg, 366 Mass. 446, 449, 319 N.E.2d 717 (1974). We have, however, explicitly recognized at least once that Saferian enunciated a more lenient standard of competence, in accord with the clear Federal trend. See Commonwealth v. Adams, --- Mass. ---, --- ^C, 375 N.E.2d 681 (1978). After Saferian, a defendant need show only that the conduct of his lawyer was "measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer." This showing, it should be noted, is similar to that needed to prove a case of legal malpractice. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A (1965); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 n.24, 737 n.27 (3d Cir. 1970).

In addition to a showing of incompetence of counsel, our cases usually require a demonstration of prejudice resulting therefrom. Commonwealth v. Bolduc, --- Mass. ---, --- ^D, 378 N.E.2d 661 (1978). Commonwealth v. Mains, supra. Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 373 Mass. 109, --- - --- ^E, 364 N.E.2d 1260 (1977). Connolly v. Commonwealth, 366 Mass. 435, 438, 319 N.E.2d 719 (1974). Commonwealth v. Saferian, supra. See also Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974) (defendant must lose substantial defense); Beran v. United States, 580 F.2d 324, 326 (8th Cir. 1978) (prejudice must be shown), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 946, 99 S.Ct. 1422, 59 L.Ed.2d 634. But see Moore v. United States, supra at 737 (prejudice merely evidence of ineffectiveness); United States v. DeCoster, 159 U.S.App.D.C. 326, 333, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (1973) (government must show lack of prejudice). When the arguably reasoned tactical or strategic judgments of a lawyer are called into question, we do not "second guess competent lawyers working hard for defendants who turn on them when the jury happen to find their clients guilty." Commonwealth v. Stone, 366 Mass. 506, 517, 320 N.E.2d 888, 896 (1974). Instead, we require that such judgments be "manifestly unreasonable" (Commonwealth v. Adams, supra ), and this typically means loss of "an otherwise available, substantial ground of defence."

Within the analytical framework we have summarized, the motion for a new trial presented a close question to the trial judge. On the one hand, Mr. Feldman cogently presented an alibi defense and attempted to impeach the identification testimony of prosecution witnesses. Ineffectiveness is not established simply by showing that Mr. Feldman failed to call an additional witness (himself) to bolster the defense case. Commonwealth v. Little,--- Mass. ---, --- ^F, 379 N.E.2d 1105 (1978). Thomas v. Estelle, 588 F.2d 170, 171 (5th Cir. 1979). On the other hand, Mr. Feldman was the only alibi witness shown by the record to have been available who, we assume, could not be impeached by evidence of a criminal record; Grogan and Courtney were both so impeached. In addition, the extensive use of photographs and station house confrontations made before the trial of this case substantially weakened the identification testimony of eyewitnesses. The confluence of these factors should have alerted Mr. Feldman that his own testimony would be crucial. See Wilson v. Cowan, 578 F.2d 166, 168 (6th Cir. 1978). The judge found as a fact, however, that Mr. Feldman's proposed testimony was not credible. Such finding is not ordinarily to be overturned on appeal. Commonwealth v. Brown, --- Mass. ---, --- ^G, 390 N.E.2d 1107 (1979), and cases cited. On the basis of the facts found by the judge, therefore, there was no error in denying the motion for a new trial to the extent it was based on the mere failure of Mr. Feldman to testify.

Notwithstanding our conclusion that, in view of the judge's findings, there was no error, we inquire further whether there was "a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice" (Commonwealth v. Freeman, 352 Mass. 556, 564, 227 N.E.2d 3 (1967)) in light of Mr. Feldman's failure to withdraw before the commencement of the trial. Once it became apparent to Mr. Feldman that his testimony might be necessary to the proper defense of his client, he was ethically obligated to withdraw as counsel unless one of a few exemptions from this obligation existed. S.J.C. Rule 3:22, DR 5-102(A), DR 5-101(B), 359 Mass. 814 (1972). Rule 12 of the Superior Court (1974). ⁴ His failure to withdraw created a conflict of sorts between his own interests and those of his client. We have consistently held that a demonstrated conflict of interest arising from simultaneous representation of multiple clients is, without more, enough to render the assistance of counsel constitutionally ineffective. See Commonwealth v. Davis,--- Mass. ---, --- - --- ^H, 384 N.E.2d 181 (1978); Commonwealth v. Leslie, --- Mass. ---, --- ^I, 382 N.E.2d 1072 (1978); Commonwealth v. Bolduc, supra at --- ^J, 375 N.E.2d 1192. Cf. Commonwealth v. Tabor, ---...