Com. v. Ceria

• Decision Date: 23 February 1982
• Citation: 431 N.E.2d 608,13 Mass.App.Ct. 230
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. David J. CERIA.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 608

431 N.E.2d 608

13 Mass.App.Ct. 230

COMMONWEALTH v. David J. CERIA.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Jan. 26, 1982.

Decided Feb. 23, 1982.

Kirk Y. Griffin, Boston, for defendant.

Robert A. Marra, Jr., Legal Asst. to the Dist. Atty., Revere (Peter Grabler, Asst. Dist. Atty., with him) for the Commonwealth.

Before GOODMAN, CUTTER and GREANEY, JJ.

GREANEY, Justice.

After a trial before a jury in the Superior Court, Ceria was convicted on four indictments charging him with the knife point assault and rape of two women. Prior to trial, he moved to suppress the victims' identifications on the grounds (1) that his arrest on unrelated charges which led to the identifications was not based on probable cause; (2) that this arrest was merely a pretext for obtaining his photograph for investigation of the sex crimes; and (3) that the identifications made at the probable cause hearing were unduly suggestive. After hearing, the motion was denied. We find no error.

The judge made detailed findings of fact which the defendant does not challenge. We summarize those findings. Prior to April 4, 1978, Metropolitan District Commission police officers were advised that between November, 1977, and March, 1978, four women had been sexually assaulted while walking or jogging on the Esplanade. ¹ The officers possessed a composite sketch of the assailant prepared by a police artist with the assistance of some of the victims. They also knew that the assailant usually approached his victims on a yellow motorized bicycle (moped).

On April 4, 1978, at approximately 7:00 P.M., Officers Dean and Powers stationed themselves in a marked cruiser under the Longfellow bridge at a point where they could observe (through binoculars) the walkways in and around the Esplanade. At the same time, Detective White positioned himself in an unmarked police vehicle at a second point where he could assist the other officers if necessary.

Shortly after the surveillance was established, Officer Dean observed a woman jogging in the vicinity of the Longfellow bridge, followed closely by a man on an orange moped who resembled the composite sketch. While Dean advised White of the situation, Powers approached the moped on foot, identified himself in a loud voice as a police officer, and asked the operator to stop. The operator (the defendant) shut out his lights and immediately "took off" at approximately thirty to thirty-five miles per hour. With both police vehicles in pursuit, the defendant reached Storrow Drive and cut diagonally across it, nearly causing an accident as oncoming automobiles braked and swerved to avoid him. He proceeded down a street, and then returned to Storrow Drive, where he was finally stopped in a vehicular tunnel near the Government Center exit.

The defendant gave the officers his correct name and address but indicated that he did not have a license to operate the moped. When asked about its ownership, the defendant stated "first that he was the owner, then indicated that his father was the owner, then his guardian, then his foster father." The judge found that, at this juncture the officers "were reasonably confused by what ... were apparently evasive answers. They cited Ceria for operating to endanger and operating without a license (and) ... then arrested (him) for the cited offenses and for larceny of over $100 of the moped from (a) person or persons unknown."

The defendant was booked on these charges at the Lower Basin police station. Since that station lacked some of the necessary booking equipment, he was then taken to the Old Colony Station to be fingerprinted and photographed. See G.L. c. 263, § 1A. Ceria was then returned to the Lower Basin station, at which point his foster father and guardian arrived. The guardian established that he owned the moped, and the defendant was released. The judge found, however, that the question of the moped's ownership "was not clear until after the photographing and fingerprinting stage at the Old Colony station."

The next morning the defendant's photograph was inserted in an array by the detective in charge of the rape investigations, and the array was shown to the two victims in these cases. This procedure, which has not been challenged as suggestive, led to the defendant's positive identification by both victims. The present charges followed. ²

1. The defendant's motion to suppress the photographic identification turns on the validity of the arrest pursuant to which his photograph was taken. The parties apparently agree that the defendant could not lawfully have been arrested for two of the offenses then charged. ³ The motion judge ruled that the defendant had lawfully been arrested on the third charge, larceny of the moped. Accepting the judge's findings of fact as having adequate support in the record, the defendant nevertheless contends that the police did not have probable cause to make an arrest for larceny. We disagree.

The facts known to the officers when they first approached the defendant justified stopping him to inquire about his activity in the area. See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 366 Mass. 394, 397-399, 318 N.E.2d 834 (1974); Commonwealth v. Thibeau, --- Mass. ---, ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) 2401, 2402, 429 N.E.2d 1009; Commonwealth v. Mc Cauley, --- Mass.App. ---, --- - ---, Mass.App.Ct.Adv.Sh. (1981) 904, 906-908, 419 N.E.2d 1072; Commonwealth v. Crowley, 13 Mass.App. 915, 430 N.E.2d 450 (1982). His immediate flight when approached would naturally create a strong suspicion that he had committed a crime or was about to do so. "While flight alone is certainly not sufficient ground to arrest, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441) (1963), it is a 'strong ... (indication) of mens rea,' Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66 (88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917) (1968), and is clearly a factor on which police are entitled to rely in making (a later) decision to arrest." Commonwealth v. Battle, 365 Mass. 472, 476, 313 N.E.2d 554 (1974). Cf. Commonwealth v. Thibeau, supra, --- Mass. at ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. at 2403, 429 N.E.2d 1009. The fact of flight, considered together with the defendant's admission that he did not possess a license and his evasive and inconsistent answers (see Commonwealth v. Riggins, 366 Mass. 81, 88, 315 N.E.2d 525 (1974); Commonwealth v. Chaisson, 358 Mass. 587, 590, 266 N.E.2d 311 (1971) ), could reasonably have led prudent officers to believe that the moped was stolen. The fact that the officers later learned that the defendant had permission to use the moped is not significant, since the existence of probable cause is to be determined "at the moment of arrest," not in light of subsequent events. Commonwealth v. Storey, 378 Mass. 312, 321, 391 N.E.2d 898 (1979). In arguing that probable cause was lacking the defendant overlooks the principle that probable cause to arrest does not require the quantum of proof necessary to convict. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1309, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); Commonwealth v. Andrews, 358 Mass. 721, 723, 267 N.E.2d 233 (1971); Sullivan v. District Court of Hampshire, --- Mass. ---, ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) 2370, 2378, 429 N.E.2d 335; Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160, 162 n.5, 430 N.E.2d 1195 (1982). We conclude that the information known to the police upon the completion of their field interrogation constituted probable cause to make a valid felony arrest for larceny.

2. As his second point, the defendant contends that the arrest was "pretextual and conducted with the sole purpose of obtaining evidence to aid in the investigation of the Esplanade assaults." The legitimacy of an arrest for one offense ordinarily will not depend on whether the officer subjectively believed that the arrest might lead to incriminating information regarding another offense. Rather, police conduct is to be judged "under a standard of objective reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved." Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978). See Sirimarco v. United States, 315 F.2d 699, 702 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 807, 83 S.Ct. 1696, 10 L.Ed.2d 1032 (1963); Klinger v. United States, 409 F.2d 299, 304 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 859, 90 S.Ct. 127, 24 L.Ed.2d 110 (1969); United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F.2d 853, 854 n.1 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1136, 94 S.Ct. 881, 38 L.Ed.2d 762 (1974); United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291, 1293-1296 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 139-140 (5th Cir. 1980). Cf. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 n.6, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877 n.6, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980).

The reasons underlying this view were succinctly stated in the First Circuit's opinion in United States v. McCambridge, 551 F.2d 865, 870 (1st Cir. 1977): "The validity of an arrest is normally gauged by an objective standard rather than by inquiry into the officer's presumed motives. If this were not so, an arrest's validity could not be settled until long after the event; it would depend not only on the psychology of the arresting officer but the psychology of the judge." ⁴ See also United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1128 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958, 99 S.Ct. 1499, 59 L.Ed.2d 771 (1979).

While "we do not say that there could never be an egregious situation where an arrest on purely colorable grounds might be held invalid as 'pretextual' " (United States v. McCambridge, supra at 870; see e.g. Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1961); Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308, 314-315 (5th Cir. 1968) ), the demonstrated existence of probable cause to arrest Ceria for larceny seals this arrest off from further attack on its underlying motivations. ⁵ See Commonwealth v. Walker, 370 Mass. 548,...