Com. v. Santana

• Decision Date: 03 May 1995
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Hector R. SANTANA. COMMONWEALTH v. Jose C. SUOZO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 717

649 N.E.2d 717

420 Mass. 205

COMMONWEALTH v. Hector R. SANTANA.

COMMONWEALTH v. Jose C. SUOZO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Plymouth.

Argued Feb. 7, 1995.

Decided May 3, 1995.

Daniel W. Rice, Westwood, for Hector R. Santana.

Jane E. Ross, Boston, for Jose C. Suozo.

John E. Bradley, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Com.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, LYNCH and GREANEY, JJ. ABRAMS, Justice.

On the afternoon of June 5, 1992, two State police troopers, Trooper John Brooks and Lieutenant Bruce Gordon, while sitting in a marked police cruiser on the side of the road, noticed an automobile in disrepair driving on Route 24 in West Bridgewater. The troopers were experienced drug officers assigned to be on the lookout for traffic violations as well as illegal drug activity during their highway patrol duty. The automobile noticed by the troopers was driven by the defendant Hector R. Santana. The defendant Jose C. Suozo was the only passenger. The troopers entered the highway and pulled in behind the automobile. They observed that the automobile had a broken taillight lens and decided to pull the automobile over to the side of the road. The troopers activated the blue lights on their cruiser. The defendants continued to travel for approximately one and one-half miles without stopping. The troopers then pulled alongside the vehicle and signaled the driver to pull over, which he did.

After the automobile stopped, Brooks approached the driver's side, where Santana was sitting, and Gordon approached the passenger's side, where Suozo was sitting. The vehicle's ignition was hanging from its damaged steering column. When Brooks asked about the ignition, Santana responded that he owned the automobile. Because Brooks thought that the vehicle could be a stolen automobile and did not want to risk a chase, Brooks told Santana to get out of the vehicle. Brooks and Santana went to the back of the automobile. Brooks thereafter verified Santana's license and registration.

At the same time, Gordon motioned to Suozo, who did not speak English, to roll down his window. Suozo opened the door and left the vehicle. Suozo handed Gordon a bag containing a half-gallon container of milk, which had been on the floor between Suozo's legs. Gordon, "confounded" by this action, moved Suozo away from the door and leaned into the automobile to place the bag on the floor. While placing the milk in the automobile's passenger side, Gordon noticed a clear plastic bag under the passenger's seat containing a white, rock-like substance which he believed to be cocaine. The defendants were arrested. A further search of the vehicle yielded an electronic scale in a bag in the back seat. Brooks checked the registration and found that it was valid and that the automobile belonged to Santana.

Both defendants were charged with trafficking in cocaine. The defendants filed identical motions to suppress the evidence found in the automobile. The same judge heard both motions and denied them. He issued identical findings on both motions. The defendants were tried separately. Both defendants were convicted. The defendants appealed. We transferred the cases here on our own motions and have now consolidated the appeals. We affirm the judgments.

1. Pretext. The defendants argue that the judge erred in admitting in evidence items seized from the automobile because the troopers used the broken taillight as a pretext to stop and search the automobile. The motion judge determined that "the stop of the vehicle for defective equipment was a matter of routine standard police procedure." The stop thus was lawful. "Where the police have observed a traffic violation, they are warranted in stopping a vehicle." Commonwealth v. Bacon, 381 Mass. 642, 644, 411 N.E.2d 772 (1980). The operation of an automobile with a broken taillight lens is such a violation. G.L. c. 90, § 7 (1992 ed.). 540 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.04(8)(d) (1994 ed.). ¹

The fact that the troopers may have believed that the defendants were engaging in illegal drug activity does not limit their power to make an authorized stop. ² See Commonwealth v. Petrillo, 399 Mass. 487, 490, 505 N.E.2d 169 (1987) (arrest for motor vehicle trespass which allowed search of automobile was not attackable based on fact that police officer was aware that arrestee was suspected of dealing drugs); Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 510, 436 N.E.2d 400 (1982), quoting Commonwealth v. Tisserand, 5 Mass.App.Ct. 383, 386-387, 363 N.E.2d 530 (1977) ("taking an inventory of the contents of a car about to be towed or impounded is a reasonable procedure; and the fact that the searching officer may have harbored a suspicion that evidence of criminal activity might be uncovered as a result of the search should not vitiate his obligation to conduct the inventory"); Commonwealth v. Ceria, 13 Mass.App.Ct. 230, 235, 431 N.E.2d 608 (1982) ("The legitimacy of an arrest for one offense ordinarily will not depend on whether the officer subjectively believed that the arrest might lead to incriminating information regarding another offense"). "[P]olice conduct is to be judged 'under a standard of objective reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved.' " Id., quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978). See Petrillo, supra at 491, 505 N.E.2d 169, quoting United States v. McCambridge, 551 F.2d 865, 870 (1st Cir.1977). It was reasonable for the police to pull over an automobile that violated a motor vehicle law.

The defendants argue that, even though the police had the authority to stop the automobile, the stop was invalid because a reasonable police officer would not have made the stop in the absence of the motive of searching for drugs. In so arguing, the defendants ask us to adopt the "reasonable police officer" test to determine whether stops are invalid because they are a pretext. Under this test, courts ask "not whether the officer could validly have made the stop, but whether [in] the same circumstances a reasonable officer would have made the stop in the absence of the invalid purpose" (emphasis in original). United States v. Rivera, 867 F.2d 1261, 1263 (10th Cir.1989), quoting United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir.1988). While some courts follow this approach, others use the "authorization" test. United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 501 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 962, 112 S.Ct. 428, 116 L.Ed.2d 448, 116 L.Ed.2d 449 (1991). United States v. Guzman, supra. Under this test, it is irrelevant whether a reasonable police officer would have made the stop but for the unlawful motive; the stop is valid "so long as the police are doing no more than they are legally permitted and objectively authorized to do." United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied sub nom. Cummins v. United States, 502 U.S. 962, 112 S.Ct. 428, 116 L.Ed.2d 448, 116 L.Ed.2d 449 (1991). Massachusetts cases follow the "authorization" approach. See Petrillo, supra at 490, 505 N.E.2d 169; Ceria, supra at 235, 431 N.E.2d 608; Tisserand, supra at 386-387, 363 N.E.2d 530. Under this approach, the stop was proper.

The stop also was valid under the "usual police practices" approach. The motion judge found that "the stop of the vehicle for defective equipment was a matter of routine standard police procedure." See Matchett, supra at 510-511, 436 N.E.2d 400 (in the absence of clear error we defer to finding by motion judge that "search was conducted as a matter of routine, standard police procedure" and was "not a mere pretext concealing an investigatory police motive"). Because it was standard police procedure, a reasonable police officer would have stopped the defendants' automobile even in the absence of an ulterior purpose.

Further, the record does not support the contention that the troopers stopped the automobile in order to search it or to interrogate the defendants regarding illegal drug activities. See Guzman, supra at 1515 ("A pretextual stop occurs when the police use a legal justification to make the stop in order to search a person or place, or interrogate a person, for an unrelated serious crime for which they do not have the reasonable suspicion necessary to support a stop"). See also Rivera, supra at 1263. The troopers were assigned to look for traffic violations and for illegal drug activities. In pulling over the defendants, the troopers were carrying out the former part of their assignment. By driving an automobile with a broken taillight, the defendants took the risk of being stopped. ³

2. Discovery of cocaine. The defendants ⁴ argue that their motions to suppress should have been granted because the bag of cocaine was not in plain view and Lieutenant Gordon did not have probable cause to search ⁵ when he leaned into the automobile. The motion judge determined that the evidence was discovered in plain view as the officer placed the bag containing the milk back into the vehicle. The motions to suppress were properly denied because the evidence was properly obtained under the plain view doctrine.

"Under [the plain view] doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2136-2137, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993). See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-137, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2307-2308, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990); Commonwealth v. Doulette, 414 Mass. 653, 657, 609 N.E.2d 473 (1993); Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 412 Mass. 745, 750 n. 9, 592 N.E.2d 1309 (1992). Massachusetts cases also have required that the police officers come across the item inadvertently. E.g., Commonwealth v. Sergienko, 399 Mass. 291, 293, 503 N.E.2d 1282 (1987); ...