Com. v. Colleran
| Decision Date | 23 October 2008 |
| Docket Number | SJC-09107 |
| Citation | 895 N.E.2d 425,452 Mass. 417 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Erin J. COLLERAN. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Janet H. Pumphrey for the defendant.
Julia K. Holler, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, & BOTSFORD, JJ.
The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The victim was her two and one-half year old daughter, Skyler. The defendant appeals from the denial of her motion for a new trial, in which she claimed (a) the judge erred by ordering her to proceed to trial in a medicated state, (b) counsel was ineffective for failing to advise her that she had a right to present herself to the jury in an unmedicated state, and (c) counsel was ineffective with respect to his presentation of an expert witness. In her direct appeal, consolidated with the appeal from the denial of her motion for a new trial, the defendant claims error in the admission of prior bad act evidence, and, relating to expert testimony: (a) error in the admission of expert opinion testimony on the issue of criminal responsibility; (b) the prosecutor's misstatement of expert evidence in closing argument; and (c) an assertion that the judge directed a verdict of guilty when instructing on expert testimony. Finally, the defendant requests that we exercise our extraordinary power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, and reduce the degree of guilt to murder in the second degree. We reject the defendant's arguments, but agree that the interests of justice require the degree of guilt be reduced to murder in the second degree.
1. Background. In December, 2001, the defendant, then age twenty-seven, lived with her boy friend, Richard Morse, and their two and one-half year old daughter, the victim, in Sandwich. The defendant and Morse had lived together about four years and planned to marry some time in the future. Morse was employed as a flat mason; the defendant was an embroiderer. On the morning of December 17, Morse went to work at about 7 A.M. and returned at about 2 P.M. The defendant was getting ready to leave for her job. The defendant took Skyler to the defendant's mother's house, as usual, to babysit. The defendant returned with the child after work, at about 7 P.M., then prepared supper.
The defendant and Morse were trying to wean Skyler from sleeping with them, so they put her on the couch to sleep. The defendant went to bed, but was unable to sleep. At about 2 A.M., Skyler awoke, crying. Morse, who had not yet retired, brought Skyler into bed with him and the defendant. He noticed that Skyler fell asleep before him.
Morse was awakened at approximately 6:40 A.M. by the arrival of police officers after the defendant had telephoned 911 and said she killed her daughter. He asked the defendant what happened. She said she choked Skyler. She apologized, and said, Her expression was blank. She showed no emotion and did not cry.
Sergeant James Simpson, one of the first officers to arrive, knew the defendant and her family for years. He asked the defendant what happened. She said, Simpson had been shocked by the defendant's appearance, because "[s]he looked like a skeleton." As he was preparing to take the defendant to the police station, she said, "Jimmy, I can't even cry." She was expressionless.
At the police station the defendant gave both written and oral statements. She said she had been unable to sleep and was pacing about the house. She was contemplating suicide, but was unable to take her life. The defendant told police Skyler awoke at about 6 A.M. on December 18, 2001. The defendant fed her a bottle, then put her on the couch and the child fell asleep. The defendant walked over to Skyler and pushed her face into the couch. Skyler started to cry. The defendant pushed harder so that Morse would not hear. She rolled Skyler onto her back and noticed her lips were blue. Thinking the child was brain damaged, the defendant then choked her. The defendant said that during the incident she knew she could get in trouble for doing it, but she was "feeling possessed," and wondered why she was doing it. She said she was unable to focus or concentrate and her mind was constantly processing random thoughts. She could not explain why she strangled the child. She said she was severely depressed and just wanted to die. She thought if she killed her child, someone would kill her. She was placed on suicide watch. It was later determined Skyler died of manual strangulation and suffocation.
The defendant had considered Skyler a "good baby" and a "happy baby." Her relationship with Morse was good, and they had no financial difficulties. Morse described the defendant as a good mother, and he had no concerns for Skyler's safety. The defendant never had abused the child, and there were no drugs or alcohol in the house.1 The defendant never hit or spanked the child. She was overly worried about the child. The defendant kept all appointments with the child's pediatrician, who testified that nothing was out of the ordinary with Skyler. The defendant's gynecologist testified that he observed the defendant to be very patient with Skyler and did not grab or yell at the child even in very stressful circumstances.
The defendant had been treated for depression in 1997. Her condition improved with medication, but she unilaterally stopped taking the medication because it made her hypomanic and impulsive. Her reaction to the medication suggested an emerging bipolar, or manic-depressive disorder. During the two or three weeks prior to December 18, 2001, the defendant began behaving "different" and "strange." Morse had asked if she felt all right. She said that she believed she was dying and that she felt like she were "dead." Morse became concerned that she might commit suicide. The defendant stopped eating, and her weight dropped noticeably. She had bouts of crying and became very emotional. She was concerned that if anything happened to her Morse would not be able to care for Skyler. She was unable to sleep for more than one week prior to December 18, and repeatedly got up from bed during the night.
The defendant gave notice of a defense of lack of criminal responsibility. In support of this defense, the defendant called Dr. Nancy Connolly, a forensic psychologist with the Department of Correction's forensic health services, to testify. Dr. Connolly had examined the defendant on December 18, 2001, and opined that she was suffering from depression and a dissociative disorder at the time. She explained that the defendant continued to function, but was emotionally detached and distant. There was no indication the defendant was malingering.
Dr. Charlotte Denton, a forensic psychologist at Taunton State Hospital, also testified for the defense. She testified that the defendant was committed on December 18, 2001, for evaluation as to competency and criminal responsibility. The defendant showed signs of profound depression for four to five months, and was perhaps psychotic as well. Dr. Denton testified that she later concluded that the defendant was more psychotic than Dr. Denton originally believed. The defendant was determined to be incompetent to stand trial because she was not responsive to defense counsel and indeed may have been trying to sabotage her defense because she wanted to be sent to jail and wanted someone to kill her. She was given antidepressant and antipsychotic medications. By July, 2002, the defendant's condition improved, and subsequently she was found competent to stand trial. Dr. Denton opined that the defendant "was able to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law, but she was not really able to totally appreciate the wrongfulness of those actions."2 Believing the question of the substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of one's conduct to be a jury question, Dr. Denton would only opine that the defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct had been "impaired."
The defendant's primary expert was Dr. Martin Kelly, a forensic psychiatrist who opined that the defendant lacked substantial capacity to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law due to a serious mental illness, psychotic depression.3 He testified that the defendant's history contained many of the biological signs of psychotic depression: inability to sleep, early morning wakefulness, significant weight loss, lack of interest in things she previously enjoyed, preoccupation with people viewing her critically, bad social judgment, and not interacting with people as she had in the past. He further opined that the defendant suffered from a bipolar disorder.
Dr. Kelly explained that the killing was characteristic of a psychotic depression in women who take the lives of loved ones. Unlike schizophrenia, which is a disturbance of thoughts (such as hallucinations), psychotic depression like that of the defendant is a disturbance of behavior. He testified that a person suffering from psychotic depression typically commits acts profoundly contrary to the person's self-interest, with no logical explanation. He opined that the defendant's act of killing her child was impulsive and without plan by a person who by all accounts was a good and loving mother devoted to her child.
The Commonwealth did not offer any expert testimony in rebuttal.
2. Trial in unmedicated state.
The defendant alleges error in the denial of her motion for a new trial in which she claimed that she was ordered to appear at trial in a medicated state and thus was deprived of her right to support her claim of lack of criminal responsibility by offering at trial her demeanor in an unmedicated state. See Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 32-36,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Commonwealth v. Fernandez
...and premeditation, then the resolution to kill, and lastly the killing in pursuance of the resolution"). In Commonwealth v. Colleran, 452 Mass. 417, 431-432, 895 N.E.2d 425 (2008), we set forth a number of factors to consider in deciding whether a defendant's conviction of murder in the fir......
-
Commonwealth v. Grassie
...Ransom, supra at 583, 266 N.E.2d 304 (alcohol and drugs may have played role in killing). See also Commonwealth v. Colleran, 452 Mass. 417, 431–432, 895 N.E.2d 425 (2008) (collecting cases that discuss factors that have been relevant to reducing murder verdicts under § 33E ). Because these ......
-
Commonwealth v. Niemic
...the ‘whole case,’ and not merely questions that have been properly preserved for appellate review." Commonwealth v. Colleran, 452 Mass. 417, 430-431, 895 N.E.2d 425 (2008), quoting Commonwealth v. Hall, 369 Mass. 715, 736, 343 N.E.2d 388 (1976). "The statute states: ‘Upon such consideration......
-
Commonwealth v. Concepcion
...although we cannot say that the defendant's actions were "driven by [his] mental condition" alone, Commonwealth v. Colleran, 452 Mass. 417, 434, 895 N.E.2d 425 (2008), we do note the incongruous fate of those who physically and figuratively drove him to the crime. Cf. Commonwealth v. Tejeda......
-
What Justice Requires: Equal Protection Clause Issues with the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's 33E Powers.
...694 N.E.2d 1277, 1298 (Mass. 1998) (upholding trial court's verdict reduction for female defendant); see also Commonwealth v. Colleran, 895 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Mass. 2008) (using mitigating factor of mental illness to reduce female defendant's verdict). But see Commonwealth v. Lyons, 828 N.E.2......