Com. v. Louraine

• Decision Date: 24 August 1983
• Citation: 453 N.E.2d 437,390 Mass. 28
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Peter LOURAINE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 437

453 N.E.2d 437

390 Mass. 28

COMMONWEALTH v. Peter LOURAINE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Hampden.

Argued March 8, 1983.

Decided Aug. 24, 1983.

Myles D. Jacobson, Boston (Maureen B. Brodoff, Boston, with him), for defendant.

William T. Walsh, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for Com.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, NOLAN and O'CONNOR, JJ.

LIACOS, Justice.

On May 26, 1979, the defendant allegedly stabbed Albert Zalucki twenty-one times. Zalucki died, and the defendant was indicted for murder in the first degree. He was convicted by a jury on March 16, 1982, of murder in the first degree, and was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. He now appeals his conviction pursuant to G.L. c. 278, § 33E.

The defendant alleges error on a number of grounds, but primarily relies on his claims that (1) he was deprived by a ruling of a motion judge of an opportunity to present his demeanor in an unmedicated condition to the jury; (2) the trial judge failed to take appropriate steps during the trial to determine his continued competency to stand trial; (3) the trial judge failed to instruct the jury correctly; and (4) the trial judge neither ruled on the question of the voluntariness of certain statements made by the defendant nor submitted the issue to the jury. The defendant also asks us to exercise our power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or to mitigate the degree of guilt. We reverse the judgment of conviction.

There was evidence of the following facts. On May 26, 1979, at approximately 3 A.M., two police officers responded to a call to go to 23-B Van Buren Avenue in Springfield. When the officers proceeded inside, they found the body of Zalucki. They heard a voice from the second floor. Looking up, they saw at the top of a staircase the outline of a large male. When they identified themselves as police officers, the man responded, stating, "I called the police. I stabbed him. I'm Peter Louraine." At the trial, one of the arresting officers identified the man who spoke as the defendant. Several officers present at the scene testified that the defendant appeared calm, and recognized one of the officers as a high school classmate. A bloodied knife found by the police officers near the body of Zalucki was placed in evidence.

Deborah Flebotte, a stepsister of the victim, testified that Louraine lived at 23-B Van Buren Avenue with a second stepbrother, John Regan. ¹ She testified that Zalucki had visited Louraine and Regan at the apartment and that Louraine, several hours before the murder, told her that Zalucki would be stopping by later.

The Commonwealth presented expert medical testimony that the victim had been stabbed twenty-one times. The wounds were concentrated in the area of the neck, chest, and abdomen, and had been inflicted rapidly. There were also "defense wounds" on Zalucki's hands. Either one of two different wounds was sufficient to cause death. The expert testimony also established that Zalucki would have experienced pain from the wounds for a period of approximately thirty minutes before losing consciousness.

The defendant did not contest the facts as to the homicide, but instead relied on a defense of lack of criminal responsibility. He introduced evidence which outlined a long history of mental illness, commencing in his early teens, which continued up to the day of the crime. The Commonwealth did not dispute that the defendant suffered from a mental illness at the time of the crime; rather it questioned the severity of the illness. ² Strangely, neither the defendant nor the Commonwealth introduced expert medical testimony concerning the defendant's mental capacity at the time of the crime, although the fact of the defendant's various commitments to mental institutions was put before the jury.

The defendant's twin brother, Philip Louraine, testified that his brother and he ³ held rather bizarre religious beliefs. He testified that they believed that they were prophets of God and had to defend themselves against demons. Philip recounted that the defendant had told him after the homicide that "Al [Zalucki] was the devil and that Al was going to hurt him, so he had to kill Al." Philip also testified that the defendant had reported experiencing hallucinations, had been committed to mental hospitals, had a history of ingesting drugs (including marihuana, lysergic acid diethylamide, and mescaline), ⁴ had acted in a strange and violent fashion on several occasions, and had attempted suicide several times.

Much of this testimony was corroborated by the testimony of the Reverend John A. Koonz, a Roman Catholic priest, Joel Louraine, the defendant's brother, and Peggy Louraine, the wife of a third brother. They confirmed Philip's testimony that the defendant had a long history of acting in a strange fashion and did hold bizarre religious beliefs, and that the defendant had suffered hallucinations and engaged in many violent episodes.

Hospital records concerning the defendant's admissions to Northampton State Hospital and other mental institutions were introduced. The Northampton records indicated that the defendant, at his own insistence, was admitted on January 24, 1979, after cutting his wrist with a razor blade. The records show that the defendant was experiencing "flashbacks" attributable to the ingestion of mescaline and that he was diagnosed as suffering from "[s]chizophrenia, chronic undifferential type." He was discharged on February 7, 1979. The defendant was readmitted on March 13, 1979, and a provisional diagnostic impression was entered that he was suffering from drug abuse. He was released the next day. The provisional diagnosis was changed to schizophrenia, but it was thought that there was no "need for [an] in-patient stay." He was released as an outpatient to the mental health care facility at 23-B Van Buren Avenue. A mental health assistant at Northampton State Hospital testified that the defendant's mood shifted greatly during the periods when he was admitted to the hospital.

A registered nurse assigned to the Hampshire County jail, Joseph Leonczyk, also testified concerning the defendant's behavior between September 14 and September 28, 1979, while he was awaiting trial. He testified that the defendant appeared to be nervous and that his hands trembled. He recalled the defendant's telling him that "inner forces were bombarding his mind" and that he had suicidal thoughts.

1. Involuntary medication of the defendant during trial. There was no evidence that the defendant was taking any antipsychotic medication at the time of the homicide. The defendant argues that, since his mental capacity to commit the crime charged was at issue, the Commonwealth should not have been permitted to administer drugs, over his objection, which visibly affected his demeanor and mental processes at trial. ⁵ He asserts that he was deprived of the opportunity to place his true demeanor before the jury on the crucial issue of mental capacity and, as a consequence, was denied a fair trial.

The defendant filed a pretrial motion requesting that, if he were found competent, he be permitted to attend the trial in an unmedicated condition. ⁶ After a hearing, a motion judge of the Superior Court denied the motion and later entered written findings. He found that the defendant suffered from a mental illness known as chronic paranoid schizophrenia and that, while in custody, he was receiving antipsychotic medication in various forms and doses. These doses had been increased gradually by State medical personnel and were considered to be "heavy." He found that the defendant's behavior and his symptoms of mental illness were "being controlled to some extent by the medication," but that the medication reduced the defendant's alertness and ability to concentrate. He also found that the defendant would not be competent to stand trial if the defendant did not receive medication. ⁷

Evidence was offered at a competency hearing held one week before trial, which indicated that the defendant's condition remained unchanged. ⁸ After the hearing, the trial judge found that the defendant was psychotic and experienced psychotic episodes, during which he had "auditory and visual hallucinations" and "delusional and bizarre ideas." He also found that medication, while not eliminating the episodes, enabled the defendant "better to control himself and to cope with these episodes." Expert medical testimony at the pretrial hearing indicated that the defendant was then receiving "heavy" or "maximum" dosages of Stelazine, another antipsychotic medication.

We start with the proposition that few rights are more fundamental in our jurisprudence than that of an accused "to present ... [his] version of the facts." Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). This right is necessary to ensure that the defendant is not deprived of a fair trial. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302-303, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1049-50, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). This right is guaranteed not only by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution, but also by art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Article 12 provides that "every subject shall have a right to produce all proofs, that may be favorable to him." A defendant is entitled to place before the jury any evidence which is at all probative of his mental condition. United States v. Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254, 259-260 (9th Cir.1975). See United States v. Ives, 609 F.2d 930, 932-933 (9th Cir.1980). Thus, "any and all conduct" of the defendant is admissible in evidence. 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 228, at 9 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979). The defendant's mental state both before and after the crime is admissible. Id. at § 233. Expert testimony is to be "unrestricted in stating all that is relevant to the defendant's mental illness." Commonwealth v. Callahan, 386 Mass. 784, 792, 438 N.E.2d 45 (1982), quoting ...