Com. v. Collins
Decision Date | 21 October 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 473 CAP.,473 CAP. |
Citation | 957 A.2d 237 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Rodney COLLINS, Appellant. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Kimberly M. Dolan, Esq., for Rodney Collins.
Robin Beth Godfrey, Esq., Amy Zapp, Esq., Hugh J. Burns, Jr., Esq., Peter Carr, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
BEFORE: CASTILLE, C.J., and SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, GREENSPAN, JJ.
The instant matter is before this Court on appellant's appeal from that part of the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denying him a new trial pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the PCRA court's denial of a new trial.
On May 18, 1993, a jury sitting before the late Honorable Justice Juanita Kidd Stout convicted appellant of first-degree murder and possessing an instrument of crime.1 The convictions arose from the shooting death of Andre Graves in the early morning hours of July 13, 1992 in the 500 block of North 54th Street in Philadelphia. Graves was shot three times in the head at point-blank range while riding in the passenger seat of a Ford Taurus station wagon that was owned and being driven by his friend, Kevin Cofer, while appellant rode in the backseat.2 Subsequently, the same jury found two aggravating circumstances and two mitigating circumstances and, after determining that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators, sentenced appellant to death. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) ().3 Represented by new counsel,4 appellant appealed from his convictions and judgment of sentence to this Court. On October 27, 1997, this Court unanimously affirmed appellant's convictions and judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. (Rodney) Collins, 549 Pa. 593, 702 A.2d 540 (1997). After this Court denied reargument on December 11, 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court denied appellant's petition for a writ of certiorari on October 5, 1998. Collins v. Pennsylvania, 525 U.S. 835, 119 S.Ct. 92, 142 L.Ed.2d 73 (1998).
On November 10, 1998, appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County ("PCRA court"). Following the appointment of counsel,5 an amended petition was filed on January 19, 2000, and three supplemental petitions were filed thereafter. The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss on July 18, 2000. An evidentiary hearing was ultimately held between October 4th and October 8, 2004. On February 15, 2005, the PCRA court, per the Honorable Kathryn S. Lewis, issued an opinion denying relief on all of appellant's guilt-phase claims but vacating appellant's death sentence. The Commonwealth did not appeal from the PCRA court's grant of a new penalty hearing.
Appellant's timely appeal from the denial of a new trial follows. In all, appellant presents a total of fifteen claims for relief: five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, of which two allege ineffectiveness on the part of both trial and direct appeal counsel while the other three allege ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel only; six claims of PCRA court error based on the court's denial of a hearing with respect to various other ineffectiveness claims; and four claims of PCRA court error in handling certain discovery and evidentiary matters that arose during the PCRA hearing. In reviewing the PCRA court's decision to deny a new trial, our standard of review is limited to examining whether the court's findings of fact are supported by the record and whether its legal conclusions are free of error. Commonwealth v. Sneed, 587 Pa. 318, 899 A.2d 1067, 1071 n. 6 (2006).
Appellant first raises five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. To merit relief based on an ineffectiveness claim under the PCRA, a petitioner must show that such ineffectiveness "in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place." 42 Pa. C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). We have interpreted this standard to require a petitioner to prove that: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel's performance lacked a reasonable basis; and (3) the ineffectiveness of counsel caused the petitioner prejudice. Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 913 A.2d 220, 233 (2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 384, 169 L.Ed.2d 270 (2007) ( ).6 "A chosen strategy will not be found to have lacked a reasonable basis unless it is proven `that an alternative not chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than the course actually pursued.'" Commonwealth v. (Rasheed) Williams, 587 Pa. 304, 899 A.2d 1060, 1064 (2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. Howard, 553 Pa. 266, 719 A.2d 233, 237 (1998)). To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error or omission, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Sneed, 899 A.2d at 1084 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). A reasonable probability is a probability that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. Id. A failure to satisfy any one of the three prongs of the test for ineffectiveness requires rejection of the claim. Id. at 1076.
As previously noted, two of appellant's five ineffectiveness claims allege ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Because appellant was represented by new counsel on direct appeal, and his appeal was pending on collateral review prior to our decision in Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726 (2002), these two claims are cognizable only as "layered claims." Id. at 739 n. 16. That is, to be eligible for relief on these two claims, appellant must plead and prove that: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for a certain action or failure to act; and (2) direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness. Commonwealth v. McGill, 574 Pa. 574, 832 A.2d 1014, 1023 (2003). As to each relevant layer of representation, appellant must meet all three prongs of the Pierce test for ineffectiveness. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. (Michael) Pierce, 567 Pa. 186, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (2001), abrogated on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726 (2002)).7 A failure to satisfy any of the three prongs of the Pierce test requires rejection of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Sneed, 899 A.2d at 1076, which, in turn, requires rejection of a layered claim of ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel, McGill, 832 A.2d at 1023.
As appellant has properly layered his two claims that allege ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we proceed to reach the merits of appellant's ineffectiveness claims, looking first, in each instance, to the underlying claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness. For ease of discussion, although appellant's Brief to this Court presents his layered claims first and fourth in sequence, we have reordered appellant's ineffectiveness claims such that the two layered claims appear first and second in our analysis, followed by the three claims of ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel only.
Appellant first claims that direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to counter the testimony of Philadelphia Police Officer John Finor of the Firearms Identification Unit, who testified for the Commonwealth that the gunshots that killed Mr. Graves were fired from the backseat of the Ford Taurus station wagon. Appellant argues that trial counsel should have consulted with his own ballistics expert prior to trial. According to appellant, such expert would have advised trial counsel not to pursue counsel's "crackpot" theory that the shooter stood outside the Taurus and would have testified that the shots were more likely fired from the driver's seat, rather than the backseat, of the car. Appellant's Brief at 24.
In response, the Commonwealth first argues that appellant waived this claim for failing to plead it in his PCRA petition. The Commonwealth notes that, although appellant did plead in the petition the "theory that a ballistician should have been called to testify in support of the defense [presented at trial] that the gunshots were likely fired from outside the [Taurus]," appellant failed to plead in the petition the "theory that a defense ballistician should have been called ... to testify that the gunshots were likely fired from [within] the driver's side of the [Taurus]." Commonwealth's Brief at 10. Citing Commonwealth v. Wilson, 580 Pa. 439, 861 A.2d 919 (2004), the Commonwealth contends that these are "substantially different" claims and that the "newly constructed claim" is waived since appellant failed to amend his PCRA petition to plead it. Commonwealth's Brief at 13.
In his reply brief, appellant responds to the Commonwealth's waiver argument by contending that, while "the theories or arguments [he presents] in support of [t]his claim" differ from those presented in support of the claim as pleaded in his PCRA petition, the claim itself is one and the same. Reply Brief at 3 ( ). Appellant contends that Wilson is distinguishable from the instant case because Wilson presented additional facts...
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