Com. v. Connolly
Decision Date | 28 February 1985 |
Citation | 394 Mass. 169,474 N.E.2d 1106 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Robert CONNOLLY. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
David C. Casey, Boston, for defendant.
Patricia A. McEvoy, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.
Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and LIACOS, ABRAMS, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.
This case requires us to define the phrase "while under the influence," as used in G.L. c. 90, § 24(1)(a )(1), as appearing in St.1982, c. 373, § 2, the law that prohibits operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or other substances.
Robert Connolly was charged with operating a motor vehicle "while under the influence of intoxicating liquor." When arrested, he refused to take a breathalyzer test. After he was convicted at a bench trial, he claimed a de novo jury trial.
The police officer who arrested Connolly testified at the jury trial as follows. He stopped a car driven by Connolly for going through a red light. When he spoke to Connolly, he observed that Connolly's eyes were glassy and that his speech was slurred. The police officer asked Connolly to walk a straight line and to pick up a coin from the ground. When Connolly performed those tests, he observed that Connolly was unsteady on his feet, so he arrested him.
Connolly testified that in the eight hours before his arrest he had consumed three or four "beers."
The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the judge sentenced Connolly to serve thirty-two days in a house of correction on consecutive weekends. Connolly filed an appeal from the judgment and a motion to stay the sentence pending appeal. The judge denied Connolly's motion, and Connolly petitioned a single justice of the Appeals Court to stay the execution of his sentence pending appeal. The single justice stayed the execution of sentence, and the appeal was docketed in the Appeals Court. On our own motion, we transferred the case to this court.
Connolly argues that in his jury instructions the judge incorrectly explained the meaning of the words "under the influence of intoxicating liquor," as used in G.L. c. 90, § 24(1)(a )(1). We agree, so we reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial.
Substantially following Instruction 5.10 of the Model Jury Instructions for Criminal Offenses Tried in the District Court Department (1980), the judge instructed the jury as follows:
The judge illustrated his instruction with an example:
The original statute providing for punishment for operating a motor vehicle "while under the influence of intoxicating liquor" was enacted in 1906. St.1906, c. 412, § 4. That language survives in G.L. c. 90, § 24(1)(a )(1). "The statute was passed for the protection of travellers upon highways...." Commonwealth v. Clarke, 254 Mass. 566, 568, 150 N.E. 829 (1926). See also Commonwealth v. Lyseth, 250 Mass. 555, 558, 146 N.E. 18 (1925).
In Commonwealth v. Lyseth, supra, the defendant appealed from his conviction for operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of G.L. c. 90, § 24. He contended that the trial judge erroneously had refused to give a requested jury instruction that the defendant could not be found guilty unless he was actually driving in a manner different from the way he would have driven if he had not drunk liquor. This court rejected that contention, stating that "[t]he Commonwealth was not required to prove that the defendant was drunk," and that "[i]t was wholly immaterial whether the defendant exercised due care to avoid injury to other travellers." Commonwealth v. Lyseth, supra at 558, 146 N.E. 18.
Those principles retain their validity today. Therefore, in the present case the judge correctly instructed the jury that to be driving while under the influence of liquor a person need not be drunk. The judge also correctly stated that to obtain a conviction under G.L. c. 90, § 24, the Commonwealth need not prove the defendant actually drove unskillfully or carelessly, and that "[t]he statute says that the intake of alcohol must adversely affect the person."
However, the judge went too far when, following Model Instruction 5.10, he charged the jury that "[b]eing under the influence ... means that a person ... was influenced in some perceptible degree by the intake of alcoholic beverages," and he exacerbated that error when he explained his statement by hypothesizing a case in which a person drinks liquor, drives, and as a result of the liquor suddenly feels "slightly lightheaded," "slightly depressed," or "slightly happier" than that person would feel in the absence of liquor. Although the statutory language, read literally, would allow that interpretation, we must read it in light of the legislative purpose to protect the public from drivers whose judgment, alertness, and ability to respond promptly and effectively to unexpected emergencies are diminished because of the consumption of alcohol. Interpreting the statute in that light, we conclude that, in a prosecution for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's consumption of alcohol diminished the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle safely. The Commonwealth need not prove that the defendant actually drove in an unsafe or erratic manner, but it must prove a diminished capacity to operate safely.
The legislative enactment of G.L. c. 90, § 24(1)(e ), inserted by St.1961, c. 340, supports our definition. That section originally provided, in part: In 1972, the Legislature changed the word "fifteen" to "ten." St.1972, c. 488, § 1. The presumptions contained in § 24(1)(e ) originated in 1939 reports published by the National Safety Council and the American Medical Association concerning the effect of alcohol on driving. See Commonwealth v. Brooks, 366 Mass. 423, 427, 319 N.E.2d 901 (1974). The legislative adoption of those presumptions, therefore, strengthens our conclusion that in G.L. c. 90, § 24, the Legislature has focused on impaired drivers, not on "slightly happier" or "slightly depressed" drivers.
The rule of strict construction of criminal statutes, see Commonwealth v. Brown, 391 Mass. 157, 159, 460 N.E.2d 606 (1984), also leads us to conclude that the trial judge erroneously explained the words "while under the influence" to the jury. As we have stated above, the statute,...
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