Com. v. Connor

• Decision Date: 05 September 1980
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Myles J. CONNOR, Jr.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 709

410 N.E.2d 709

381 Mass. 500

COMMONWEALTH v. Myles J. CONNOR, Jr.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued May 29, 1980.

Decided Sept. 5, 1980.

Edward B. Hanify, Boston (Jess T. Fardella, Boston, with him), for defendant.

Philip T. Beauchesne, Asst. Dist. Atty. (Matthew L. McGrath, III, Legal Asst. to

the Dist. Atty., with him), for the Commonwealth.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and QUIRICO, BRAUCHER, KAPLAN, WILKINS, LIACOS and ABRAMS, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

The basic issue presented by the report of a Superior Court judge is whether a judge may disqualify counsel for the defendant over the defendant's objection. Myles J. Connor, Jr., was charged in two indictments with being an accessory before the fact to murder in the first degree. G. L. c. 274, § 2. Martin K. Leppo entered his appearance for the defendant on both indictments. Approximately six weeks later Mr. Leppo filed a "motion for disclosure to determine conflict of interest" accompanied by an affidavit of Connor. After a series of hearings the judge ruled that Mr. Leppo was disqualified from representing the defendant in his upcoming trial. The judge reported his ruling to the Appeals Court, ¹ and we granted the defendant's application for direct appellate review. We vacate the judge's order and remand the matter to the Superior Court for further proceedings.

We recount the facts as put to the judge. Since 1975 the defendant has been represented by Mr. Leppo and his associate Anthony M. Traini. The main witness for the Commonwealth is to be one Thomas Sperazza. Mr. Leppo and Mr. Traini have also represented Sperazza in the past. ² The defendant's motion sought a ruling that Mr. Leppo was not disqualified from representing Connor by reason of Mr. Leppo's past representation of Sperazza.

Hearings on this motion were held on January 24, February 7, and February 19, 1980. At the hearing on January 24, 1980, the prosecutor stated that Sperazza would be the chief government witness against the defendant in the instant cases. Mr. Leppo informed the judge that he and Mr. Traini had represented Sperazza, and that their entire representation had ended by January, 1980. Mr. Leppo further informed the judge that he and Sperazza had never discussed any of the facts relating to the present indictment.

At the hearing, the defendant, age thirty-six, with almost three years of college education, told the judge that he wanted Mr. Leppo to represent him regardless of possible conflicts of interest. The defendant offered to sign a formal waiver.

The judge explained the possibility of a conflict of interest to the defendant and expressed concern whether a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel could ever be waived, particularly at an early stage of the proceedings where it was impossible to predict with any accuracy what a witness's testimony would be or what conflict the dynamics of trial might bring forth. The judge offered the defendant his choice of other persons as counsel, but the defendant declined. At the end of the hearing, the judge took the motion under advisement.

On February 7, the prosecutor informed the court that Mr. Leppo had in the past represented another witness, Robert Fitzgerald as well as an unapprehended codefendant, Ralph Petrozziello. The judge ordered Mr. Leppo disqualified from acting as Connor's counsel on the two indictments then pending.

On February 19, the judge was informed that in addition to Sperazza and Fitzgerald, Mr. Leppo had also represented prospective witnesses Debra Harding Sperazza and Martha Farante. The name of another prospective witness, Thomas Maher, was familiar to Mr. Leppo, but he was unable to state definitely whether his office had represented Maher in the past. Finally, Mr. Leppo's office had previously represented John Stokes, now deceased. The Commonwealth stated that it planned to offer some statements by Stokes at Connor's trial.

The judge specifically found that Mr. Leppo's representation of all these individuals had ended and that their prior cases were unrelated to the case at bar. None of these past appearances by counsel involved any communications bearing on the subject matter of the present cases with one possible exception. ³

The defendant again told the judge he wanted Mr. Leppo to represent him regardless of any conflicts of interest. The judge refused to revoke his order disqualifying Mr. Leppo. The judge then reported his ruling. See note 1 supra.

The defendant claims that he has a constitutional right to counsel of his choice. That right, however, is not absolute, and may, in some circumstances, be subordinate to the proper administration of justice. "Choice of counsel should not be unnecessarily obstructed by the court, . . . but where there is a serious possibility that a definite conflict of interest will arise, the necessities of sound judicial administration require the court to take command of the situation." United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775, 788 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 998, 97 S.Ct. 523, 50 L.Ed.2d 608 (1976). Accord, United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979); Abraham v. United States, 549 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 1977). See Commonwealth v. Dabrieo, 370 Mass. 728, 739, 352 N.E.2d 186 (1976). The issue is whether this case requires such drastic action by the judge.

Counsel is vital to the adversary process. A judge therefore must have some discretion to disqualify a conflict-burdened attorney when the conflict might well restrict or prevent counsel's fulfillment of his role. A judge would be hampered in the exercise of his constitutional duties if he could not act to protect counsel's vital function. Such power is "to be exercised sparingly and when the need is apparent and pressing and only after careful consideration, but with the power goes the duty to exercise it on proper occasions." Collins v. Godfrey, 324 Mass. 574, 579, 87 N.E.2d 838, 841 (1949).

Connor does not quarrel with the power of a judge to disqualify counsel if the proper administration of justice is threatened. Connor contends that the sole basis for the judge's order was a mistaken view that in these circumstances a defendant could not execute a valid waiver. We do not agree. As we read the record it is equally inferable that the judge acted to protect the fair and proper administration of justice, and if the judge found that Mr. Leppo should be disqualified for this reason, he had authority to do so. ⁴ As the record is unclear, we consider the issue of waiver.

A defendant may waive his right to the assistance of an attorney "unhindered by a conflict of interests." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 483 n.5, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1178, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978). The defendant's ability to waive the right to conflict-free counsel arises, first, from a criminal defendant's personal right to make his defense, with its corollary right of self-representation, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2532, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Commonwealth v. Davis, --- Mass. ---, --- - --- n.12 ^a, 384 N.E.2d 181 (1978), and, second, from his right to be represented by counsel of choice. Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at 833, 95 S.Ct. at 2540. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 53 S.Ct. 55, 58, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932). United States v. Liddy, 348 F.Supp. 198, 199 (D.D.C.1972). Cf. Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, 371 Mass. 46, 353 N.E.2d 732 (1971). See generally United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1979). To hold otherwise would be patronizing.

The defendant argues that Mr. Leppo's past representation of the prosecution witnesses on unrelated matters creates only a possibility of conflict of interest, and that such a possibility is not serious enough to justify interference with his right to select his attorney. He adds that since Mr. Leppo's representation of the prospective witnesses (and codefendant Petrozziello) has ended, the danger that counsel will be hampered by "contemporaneous divided loyalties," is minimal. Commonwealth v. Soffen, --- Mass. ---, --- ^b, 386 N.E.2d 1030 (1979). Compare Commonwealth v. Cobb, --- Mass. --- ^c, 405 N.E.2d 97 (1980). See Theodore v. New Hampshire, 614 F.2d 817 (1st Cir. 1980). Connor contends that on this record "there is no clear indication that a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to effective counsel in these circumstances would adversely affect the defendants', the prosecutor's or the public's interest in a fair trial." United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 277 n.4 (1975).

The record, however, is too meager for us to draw such a conclusion. It reveals that the judge engaged in extended colloquies with the defendant. The judge told the defendant that conflicts might arise during trial, and that the uncertainties of a trial made it unclear precisely how such conflicts might arise or how they might affect the defense strategy. The judge then interrogated the defendant to determine whether the defendant understood these potential conflicts, whether the defendant understood that continuing with conflict-burdened counsel could have adverse consequences to his defense, and lastly whether the defendant understood his right to other counsel. ⁵ See United States v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98, 104 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 969, 98 S.Ct. 1607, ...